Whatnot's CPO on Why the Company "Regrets That Product Management Exists"

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Overview

Tom Verrilli is chief product officer at Whatnot, the live-stream shopping platform. They were previously chief product officer at Twitch for a long stretch and director of product growth at Twitter. In a conversation with Lenny Rachitsky, Verrilli explains a line they wrote that surprised many readers: Whatnot's product team was built on the premise that "we regret that product management exists."

38 min read

The phrase is not a call to eliminate PMs. Verrilli argues that product management should be used deliberately for specific high-leverage needs rather than assigned to every team by default. Senior people, including managers and executives, should stay close to the actual work. AI makes that more feasible than before. Verrilli also stresses that this model fits Whatnot's product and culture, and that it may not fit everyone.

2:50

Where product management came from, and why Whatnot "regrets" it

Verrilli starts with history. Product management originally didn't exist. The business side, often a founder-CEO, talked directly with engineering and design about what to build, and they executed together. Internet businesses scaled faster than any businesses before them, so at some point someone had to take over the specifics of execution because there was too much for one person to hold. In that early form, Verrilli says, the role was a working-it-out function. You had to explain less to engineers and designers because they understood the context or had been involved in forming it.

In Verrilli's view, the idea that tech needs a specialist "decision-making class of humans" is a more modern development than a pure necessity. Whatnot's position is that it would be better if engineering and design had enough context, and were close enough to users, to make the same decisions a PM would make.

The only argument Verrilli knows of for making product management a specialist function is that it's "a trade, not a qualification." It is a skill built through repetition, like a muscle. The flip side is that when engineers and designers are kept away from that work, their own muscles stay underdeveloped. Verrilli says product management can be deployed as important leverage on things that must go very well, and that doing so lets design and engineering focus on their crafts in those situations. But where possible, they consider it optimal not to have a PM, and to have design and engineering go through those steps themselves.

Lenny asks whether PM was valuable early and then got diluted by too many mediocre PMs. Verrilli observes that most engineers and designers remember the great PMs they worked with mostly because they worked with so many bad ones. They frame this as honest self-criticism of the function, not an insult. They blame much of the dilution on a scaling pattern: at some point, an "HR ratio" of a pod appeared. For every six engineers, you add a designer, a PM, and an EM. Once a company serves a billion daily users, it has many engineers and therefore many PMs, including in places that don't need one, such as notifications infrastructure. Verrilli says that hiring so many PMs "infantilizes the engineers and the designers who are perfectly capable of making good decisions, but just never had to because there was always a PM to babysit them."

8:43

Specialization cuts both ways

Lenny raises the obvious objection. Much of PM work is tedious: alignment meetings, docs, note-taking. Engineers want to code and designers want to design. Verrilli agrees that specialization works both ways. An infrastructure lead can reasonably say they want to think about scale, not alignment debates. Skills also don't always transfer. Someone good at building mental models of how infrastructure scales may not be good at listening to a customer and finding the core problem behind what they said.

So "we regret" is phrased that way on purpose, Verrilli explains, to remind the team that you "don't hire a PM just for the sake of hiring one, you hire one with a really specific need." The culture has to match that. Whatnot's internal documents on how it ships say anyone can bring change forward, and a designer or engineer can be DRI for new product development. But everyone goes through the same process, including product review, because "it is real work." If someone doesn't want to do that work, PMs can be moved around. Instead of mapping PMs to teams on the assumption that a PM will always handle that work, Whatnot maps them to problems or core projects. As a result, some engineering teams have gone a year or more without a dedicated PM despite ongoing product work.

Lenny notes that this kind of talk usually comes from developer-tool companies like Linear, where it's easy to see why engineers might be enough. Coming from someone who has built very consumer-oriented products, it carries more weight. Verrilli says they learned this over time. Twitch was "very Amazon two-pizza team, ratio-driven." Twitter had tight alignment and "a lot of alignment meetings." In their view, much of that structure exists because management can't see what's going on, so it hires more people and adds layers, and "systems beget systems." What is changing, they say, is the realization that leverage no longer requires stacking more PMs under a senior person. It is now easier to understand what's happening in a business and to talk directly with the codebase and with engineers. They no longer think consumer versus enterprise is the dividing line. The culture of the organization is what matters.

How much of this is AI?

Verrilli says the shift isn't explicitly caused by AI, but AI makes it much easier. They describe two factors.

The first is the huge leverage AI gives individual contributors. Verrilli recounts talking with senior leads who feel so capable with AI that they feel pressure about the work they aren't doing, since a couple more hours could move a lot. With well-honed judgment, AI tooling makes it easy to move fast. As an example, they say you can now pull data through a Hex thread that would have taken an Amazon L7 data scientist a week or two in 2017.

The second is cultural. The ratio-driven model came with slogans like "hire great people and get out of their way" and bottoms-up roadmaps. Verrilli thinks tech has recently shifted toward recognizing that top-down can be quite good. People at the top can decide quickly, cut out alignment debate, and usually have more macro context. If they are "genuinely in touch with ground truth" and good enough, having senior leaders involved in many decisions is efficient. One very senior PM covering more areas can be more effective than three entry-level PMs. AI makes this easier again.

Verrilli adds that PMs themselves benefit from not being tied to a single team. Moving across different problems builds more "muscle groups" than staying attached to whatever one EM owns.

15:25

How Whatnot's product org is structured

Whatnot has just passed 20 PMs, with 21 or 22 in the building. Verrilli calls this small given the GMV its sellers move. The PMs are loosely organized into three groups: buyer, seller, and trust and risk (standards, payments, safety, and similar areas). Within those groups, PMs have loose alignments, such as broadly growth or broadly discovery, but they are reassigned often.

That comes from how Whatnot plans. Every six months, the CEO, Verrilli, and other senior leads define what needs to be true over the next six months, both outcomes and critical projects. They then go through the list and ask who the DRI is. That is mostly how PM work gets allocated. Verrilli notes that a planning cycle had finished that very morning. Often, at the end of such a review, they find something that is the second or third priority on several teams' roadmaps, clearly important, with no owner. A PM gets pulled in and told, in effect, "congratulations, this is the thing we need you to deliver over the next 6 months." The assignment is rarely a specific feature. It's more like working out what needs to be true. Not every owner is a PM, but most are, chosen for the fit of their skills: financial, algorithmic and recommendations-oriented, or core user features.

17:40

31,832 applicants, one hire: what Verrilli looks for

Lenny quotes another line Verrilli wrote: "In the last 2 years, 31,832 people applied to be a product manager at Whatnot. We hired one."

Verrilli is clearest about what is trending down. That's candidates who spend much of their interview talking about driving alignment and stakeholder management. They say there is "a group of PMs," which they were part of earlier in their career, whose specialty "wasn't technical or customer-oriented, it was politics." An answer to "tell me about a time you failed" like "I didn't keep the CEO up to date and that led to a pivot" is an anti-pattern to them.

What stands out positively is seeing both macro and micro thinking over the interviews and case study. The candidate can describe how a system works and an end state, then show near-impatience about how they'd validate it quickly and where they'd push to get it done. Verrilli also looks for specificity about what the candidate actually built. Many people from large companies (they mention FAANG and Uber) "babysat things that existed" and polished the edges. Verrilli wants people who were given a problem and came up with something novel, or iterated through a complicated change and made decisions along the way. In a large organization with inertia, they note, it's easy to go along with what's happening instead of being an agent of change or a decision-maker, "which is ultimately what you need PM to do."

Later, Verrilli describes a pattern they see often. Everyone hired at Whatnot, in any role, does a hands-on case study. Candidates who present very well get a prompt and some data, are asked to return with a PRD, and then have to defend it verbally. Verrilli finds it telling how quickly the thinking falls apart for people who are good at the theater but not the specifics.

19:53

Developing systems thinking: "know then go"

Lenny mentions that Netflix's Elizabeth Stone also named systems thinking as the most important rising trait. Her advice was to step back one level and consider how your manager sees the problem. Verrilli treats systems thinking as a skill built through mental exercise.

One small version happens in product review. When someone proposes an experiment, Verrilli asks what the team will do if it's green and what it will do if it's red. If the person doesn't know how their strategy would change, they haven't thought it through yet. The same applies to building local solutions: ask what happens with a thousand times the expected usage, or what knock-on effects might follow, before putting pen to paper or code into the system.

Verrilli argues that this speeds people up. PMs often get slowed by worries that legal, finance, or another team might object. Whatnot's internal motto is "know then go": think through everything that could go wrong, understand where scale will break, and then move anyway. Having thought it through, you'll likely preempt many of the problems. "You don't have to solve all of them, you've just got to think through all of them and then you end up solving more than you think." In a high-growth environment, Verrilli adds, you're not looking for a 5% statistical win but for something that moves the whole business and compounds over time.

22:22

Senior people back to IC work

The change Verrilli seems most excited about is PMs, including senior ones, returning to hands-on work. In "ratio land," a successful PM got promoted to director and told to stop being hands-on and just coach. "We took all of our A players and then promoted them out of doing things," Verrilli says. Those people then spent their time in alignment and in reviews, producing what Verrilli calls a "yo-yo" process: someone does the work, it goes to review, gets rejected, and bounces back and forth. They acknowledge this comes from their own "scar tissue."

At Whatnot, four or five people manage other PMs, and Verrilli says all of them spend over 90% of their time on IC work. Verrilli estimates they personally still spend about 50% of their time on IC work. They give several reasons.

First, a VP-level product person with 10 to 15 years of experience should have well-honed instincts and can decide faster than a structure where a problem is split among several PMs who must align across engineering teams that debate each other.

Second, a senior person can cover the work of several junior PMs. Seeing more of the board makes the intuitively correct trade-off more likely. Verrilli's example is an evergreen e-commerce question: how should the discovery algorithm treat sellers who ship slowly? Someone who understands both seller management and discovery can make the right call from either side. They recall that at Twitch, the discovery team and the ads team were "always at war for impressions" over where ads go in the feed and how they affect discovery metrics and ad revenue. Verrilli admits being among the people most at fault. One of their first moves was to put ads into discovery with the same PM accountable for both. With a shared goal, such as value generated from the feed through either organic or paid placement, that person makes the trade-off naturally. When one person spans multiple areas, Verrilli says, they align those areas organically and eliminate months of back-and-forth and politics that turn things "from being company first to career first."

Third, keeping VPs, directors, and the CPO in IC work keeps everyone connected to "what's actually true as opposed to what seems true in a review." Verrilli sums it up with a football analogy: why wouldn't you want Messi playing for your team rather than always bringing the academy along?

Asked what IC work means for a PM, Verrilli answers: whatever is required to ship most effectively. They have shipped some production code at Whatnot but don't think it's the best use of their time. They're sure someone quietly reworked their code to fix linting, localization, and the other things "me and Claude Code did not get right." For them, IC work mainly means being in the support tickets, knowing current customer problems, pulling the data yourself, sitting with engineering and design, querying the codebase directly, writing the spec, and running the stand-up.

Who wants to go back, and how pay works

Lenny points out that many people who climbed to VP don't want to become ICs again. Verrilli expects a split across the industry. Some large organizations may still work best without everyone hands-on. The culture has to match, and every startup reflects its founders. Verrilli's recruiting targets people who used to love product management and are sick of alignment meetings. They pitch CPOs and VPs of product with, "Don't you miss actually doing things?" Verrilli says they've found that many people who spent five or six years as senior directors at places like Meta, stuck in alignment meetings, miss talking to customers and engineers and shipping.

Lenny mentions reports of former CTOs, including from Workday, Instagram, and Box, joining Anthropic as members of technical staff. Verrilli says their greatest wish is for Whatnot's product bench to look like that.

On pay, Verrilli offers what they call a "spicy take": being paid well as an IC is easier in this model. Add up the compensation for five L5s under an L7, and four L7s under a VP, then ask why three people couldn't each be paid VP-level money if they're having that much impact.

29:41

"How do you know that was fraud?": staying close to ground truth

Asked why this model is better, Verrilli says the product improves. People have long told Whatnot that leadership staying hands-on won't scale and that it will need many more layers. Verrilli says they found that isn't true, though it takes a different muscle and a deliberate effort to understand ground truth.

Their recurring example comes from growth meetings. Someone says a pattern was fraud. How do you know? It's labeled fraud in the dataset. How does it get labeled? Probably someone in ops. Do you know the SOP they follow? No. Then you don't know it's fraud. An experienced product director pushed this way will go find out, and the system agents use for data labeling gets stronger because a smart, invested person is now helping guide it. Verrilli's broader belief is that "growth can hide all sins." Companies grow, everyone works from averages, and problems go unexamined. The cultural commitment is to "whole ass few things" (crediting Ron Swanson), put the best people deep in the details, and fix things along the way. Over time, Verrilli says, this is more efficient because you understand how things work the first time.

AI adds leverage here too. As a junior PM, Verrilli spent a lot of time asking engineers how hard things would be, which took time away from actual work. Now they can ask Claude for rough levels of effort. If they suspect some "car crash of models" is hitting new users when they open the app, they can load the feed logic and ask who sees what, in what order, and when each thing fires. A tenured person who sees that the result is bad can just make the call. Verrilli says that saves a kickoff meeting, an alignment meeting, a week of writing PRDs, and experiment time.

Advice for PMs in a tough market

For experienced PMs struggling to find roles, Verrilli's main advice is to start doing IC work in their current job. That keeps the skills sharp and, they bet, will help where you are as well as where you go next. They acknowledge the online talk about "PMs are engineers now" and call coding a good muscle to build. They pushed production code to understand the process themselves. But before building, they say, the priority is getting back to scoping the right thing, understanding the problem, and defining what good looks like. Senior people should use their wider view to contribute more. Verrilli also criticizes a coaching style where directors watch junior PMs cycle through reviews on a PRD while already knowing the answer, the "lead a horse to water" approach. They think leaders should help people see what good looks like quickly instead of running an "endless review yo-yo."

Lenny says their own view has shifted: PMs have more leverage improving what the team ships than shipping code themselves. Verrilli agrees. The mechanics of git commits and similar tasks take them much longer than working out and describing the problem. They still try things themselves, for example to judge whether dev tools have really gotten easier instead of taking someone's word for it. But understanding the codebase and working with someone who can execute avoids "a thousand classic traps" engineers learned to avoid early in their careers.

35:24

Beyond prototyping: data science, the codebase, and live feedback loops

Asked for the biggest AI productivity gains other than prototyping, Verrilli names data science first "by a country mile." Whatnot uses Hex Threads. They say it's hard to remember working as a PM without tools that let you pull nuanced cohorts, look up an individual user after a report, examine logs to see exactly what that user did and saw, count how many similar users exist, estimate impact, and quickly build sensitivity models, forecasts, and regressions. The same tools help Whatnot ship faster because regressions and odd interactions between products show up sooner. In large, complex systems, those problems usually cause slowdowns such as release trains. Verrilli says that over the past year they spent less time talking to data scientists than ever in their career, while spending perhaps ten times more time in the data than ever before. They say they don't know what the future of data science looks like.

The second gain is asking Claude how the codebase works instead of interrupting engineers. Early in their career, Verrilli aimed to understand systems at the "boxes and lines" level. Now, they say, there's no excuse not to understand them at a more detailed level.

The third may be specific to Whatnot. Verrilli has worked on live products for about a decade and has long been able to watch customers use a feature for the first time. With current AI tools, when a user says they're having a problem, you can examine the codebase live and tell whether it's a real bug or a comprehension gap. That combines a video of the user, real-time code analysis, and observability into "a feedback loop on steroids."

They tell a story from their second week at Whatnot. Sellers can pick auction formats. In "sudden death," the auction ends when the timer runs out. In the classic format, a bid in the last five seconds adds ten seconds. A seller on stream complained that a 7-second timer was too slow and wished it were 3 seconds so they could move more product. Two engineers looked at each other, said it was a config change, updated it in real time, and posted in the show's chat telling the seller to refresh the app. Verrilli says they thought, "I'm with my people." They add that AI makes this kind of responsiveness accessible to many people, but they themselves wouldn't touch production code that way. It's great for "qualified humans," not for them.

The data scientist problem, and which roles are growing

Lenny relays a data scientist friend's complaint: their job has turned into checking flawed analysis from non-data scientists, and half of it is wrong. Verrilli says they're sympathetic and have seen this happen. They see it as another argument for fewer, more senior PMs who have more experience. They also think much of the confusion comes from organizations underinvesting in data engineering, data structures, and labeling. Many of Whatnot's best data scientists now focus on making tracking and attribution correct so analyses are harder to misread. Using AI to find data, like using AI to write code, doesn't remove responsibility for the result. It gives leverage to people already inclined toward that work.

On which roles are rising and falling, Verrilli notes that Whatnot has still hired plenty of data scientists. "Fewer" means fewer for the same output, not necessarily fewer overall, because companies using these tools well can grow faster and take on more. Verrilli would be surprised if the net number shrank. The trend is more like fewer per unit of customer impact. The rising role, in their view, is something like a tech lead running a very small team, an "engineering manager light." As trying things gets cheaper, Whatnot has been incubating small teams to "sit in the corner" and attempt things once considered too hard. Verrilli says this isn't quite prototyping, has increasingly high leverage, and sits between a member of technical staff and a full EM.

44:51

The product team of the future

Verrilli says they don't know what product teams will look like everywhere. At Whatnot, they expect the core to look much as before: specialist designers, engineers, and PMs working together on specific high-priority projects, or where the company has high conviction it has a path forward. Around the edges, there will be more free space for anyone, whether designer, engineer, PM, or data scientist, who is confident they can meaningfully improve something. "If you're sitting there on a Friday afternoon and you can't focus on the PRD you're writing, but you're pretty sure you can go and fix something, go for it."

Lenny brings up their own essay from about two years ago arguing that PMs are best positioned to thrive with AI because the key skills are PM skills: deciding what to build, communicating requirements, prioritizing, giving design feedback, and understanding go-to-market and business strategy. Verrilli agrees that product skills are probably the most durable. Their addition is that the industry hasn't rewarded those core skills much over the past five years. It rewarded storytelling, alignment, and strategy frameworks for leadership. Many people with the PM title haven't been building the core skills: understanding the customer, the business, and the technology, and connecting them. Lenny mentions Marty Cagan's term "product theater." Verrilli admits they're guilty of it too and says it's unsurprising after years of being rewarded, but "there's not a lot of place to hide in that anymore."

49:35

Why "hire great people and get out of their way" fails

Verrilli calls the maxim wrong, "nuance required." They think it became cover for letting teams set the roadmap and define the problems with near-total delegation. Better hires do deserve more trust, but Whatnot operates on "verify then trust," not full trust or "trust but verify." Verrilli is probably better placed than their direct reports to see how buyer, seller, and trust pieces fit together. The reports are almost certainly better placed to understand how individual features work. Verrilli says they'd get the discovery model's weightings wrong compared with anyone on that team. But they consider it their responsibility to learn this over time, since they approve the team's work and ask the team to make decisions.

The example comes from founder-CEO Grant LaFontaine. In a review, he'll say he doesn't think something is right, pause, and say he's clearing the rest of his day so they can figure it out together. Then he sits with the team and goes through tickets, code, and data line by line, which AI data tools make easier. Verrilli says this keeps him current and sets the tone that the goal is seeking truth. They contrast it with review cultures where PMs just try to get a green light for credibility with their engineers. Planning aligns the company on priorities and is mostly about resourcing, which Verrilli is accountable for. But they can't know resources are in the right places without periodically going deep, down to details like what logic fraud detection uses to invalidate a referral, and whether address signals come from normalized addresses or free text. "You can't make good macro decisions without the micro." Verrilli describes trying to be T-shaped: broad in general, very deep when needed.

Lenny summarizes this as top-down, founder-led involvement producing better results despite micromanagement's bad reputation. Verrilli adds a condition: top-down works when leadership is in the details and "specifically correct." It fails, and becomes what people call micromanagement, when leaders manage from above without knowing ground truth. They don't know any junior engineer or entry-level designer who isn't excited to work directly with the CPO or CEO, since there are no alignment meetings and the feedback is better. The open question is how to do this in enough places. Grant can go deep because work is divided up. He owns three or four top priorities at a time, and anything besides hiring can be cleared so he can nail those.

53:34

Working as CPO under product-minded founders

Verrilli has worked for three product-minded founders in a row, and Whatnot has two, Grant and Logan Head, which they call a blessing. Their first rule is not to double up. If Grant or Logan is on something, Verrilli confirms they're accountable and steps back. A PM once jokingly called the alternative the "two dads problem," with conflicting instructions and repeated reviews. So there are long stretches where half of Verrilli's team is on work whose daily status Verrilli couldn't report, and they're fine with that. The second rule: in a founder-led company, "it's not your company, it's theirs." You find a rhythm by asking whether the founder is open to feedback or has decided. Verrilli credits founders' insight and customer intuition as a big reason founder-led companies do well, and sees their job as covering the areas the founders aren't in.

For someone considering a CPO or first-PM role under a founder, Verrilli's advice starts with asking why you want it. The idea that a CPO decides all the roadmaps is "not strictly true." Spend time with the founder to learn how they discuss ideas and how they like to be pushed. Before joining Whatnot, Verrilli had five or six coffees with Grant, went through interviews, and then spent a full day in LA with Grant and Logan working through problems and the roadmap. They tried to be their "most ordinary self" rather than their interview self. Verrilli says they enjoy product leadership because it translates a founder's vision and intuition into reality. The skill is pushing without competing. They've seen CPO-CEO relationships fail when the CPO competed for the vision.

On pushing back effectively, Verrilli says not to treat it as a trick. The aim is to seek truth, not to get a yes. Start with curiosity: does the other person have context you lack? Verrilli asks whether they're understanding the other person's prior correctly and whether some missing context informs it, and they coach their PMs to do the same with them. Then ask whether the person's mind is made up or they're open to input. If it's made up, don't "pick a fight for the purposes of picking a fight." If they're open but want data, bring data or go get it. If there's no data and it's two opinions, "the CEO's opinion is going to win," and that's fine: "check your ego at the door." Finally, make sure you're debating for the right reasons. Wording sometimes matters, but often it doesn't, and fighting over framing can be part of product theater.

1:01:45

"Play the accordion"

Colleagues of Verrilli's mentioned the phrase "play the accordion." Verrilli says they aren't big on frameworks but find this mental model useful. It targets two failure modes. One is iterating forward and "throwing spaghetti at the wall" without a sense of direction. The other is writing long multi-year roadmaps and vision documents, which throws away what Verrilli sees as software's advantage over other industries: learning, such as updating your understanding through A/B tests. With an accordion, you pull it open to take in air before playing, which here means deciding what you're trying to do. But you only make music when you press the keys and push it closed, meaning shipping V1. For the next phrase, you pull it open again (what did we learn, what do we do now?) and then build again. Pulling it open doesn't create value by itself, but without doing it repeatedly you're probably playing the wrong thing. Verrilli's summary: "you've got to do both. You can't over-index on either."

Verrilli's example concerns listings. Most marketplaces depend on listings. Amazon without them would be nearly empty. In live commerce, a seller can hold up a pair of AirPods, describe them, and start bidding at a dollar, and the buyer has what they need. A listing takes about three and a half minutes to create. Showing an item takes zero. So a first conclusion might be that listings aren't needed. Zooming out, though, new buyers will expect search to work, and if Whatnot doesn't know what a seller is offering until it's sold, it can't send someone looking for AirPods to the right stream. The next idea is to require listings for everything. Zooming out again, three minutes per listing drastically reduces how much a seller can sell per hour, which hurts sellers. The point is to keep stretching toward longer-term implications and knock-on effects.

1:06:37

Live commerce versus agentic commerce

Lenny asks how agentic commerce, where AI agents buy on your behalf, relates to Whatnot's human, live model. Verrilli welcomes agents for routine purchases like light bulbs and air filters, and for high-intent searches, such as a specific computer cable, outdoor lights, or black shoes that must arrive by Thursday for a wedding. But they argue most commerce isn't high intent. By their account, about 30 years into e-commerce, it has never exceeded 20% of US retail spending. They put the UK at roughly 75/25. Much shopping is low intent: going to the mall to see what's available. Verrilli describes the value of a shoe store owner's taste, curation, service, and window display, and says shopping is pleasant and social.

With US retail at what Verrilli says is $7.5 trillion, they don't see it as winner-take-all. They describe live commerce as the first combination of the internet's scale and convenience with the social and cultural experience of physical shopping. At Twitch, they recall, a stream under about a thousand viewers was assumed to be uneconomic because of CPM-based economics. On Whatnot, a stream might have 30 to 50 people, and if a mall shoe store had 50 people inside, "you'd never close," because commerce economics differ from entertainment economics. Verrilli sees live commerce as meeting a different customer need rather than competing with agentic commerce.

1:09:51

Lessons from Twitter

Verrilli compares asking someone about Twitter in 2015–16 to a therapist asking about childhood. They say Twitter had nine heads of product in their two years there. A colleague on the partnerships team described it as "chaos which had lived in the events." Besides lasting friendships and what they call a remarkable product diaspora, they took away two lessons.

The first: when you truly achieve product-market fit, it doesn't matter how badly you mess up the organization. Twitter had PMF strong enough that "you could emotionally feel how much people loved your product," and Verrilli found it valuable to learn early that this is what PMF means, not graphs that look okay. Lenny adds that Twitter's network effects survived Elon Musk changing almost everything, and Verrilli agrees.

The second: when people say something is really complex, it often isn't. "Leadership's just weak." During their two years, everyone knew the 140-character limit had to go. There were repeated working groups under the "beyond 140" project, and the team knew, for example, that Japanese users tweeted six times as often as Western users, which conversations with those users attributed to kanji fitting more meaning into the same character count. But no one would make the call, so there was sprint after sprint. Verrilli says it happened roughly a year and a half to almost two years after they left, "and it turns out, you know, nobody died." They imagine editing tweets went the same way.

1:13:08

Failure corner: averages mean nothing to the individual

Asked about a failure, Verrilli says they've probably failed more than they've succeeded. The internal "how we build" document attached to their blog post sets batting .500 as the goal. The common thread in their worst mistakes is: "averages mean nothing to the individual." It's tempting to see that only 3% of users use a feature and remove it. But for some group, that feature may be 100% of what they do, and removing it for convenience can wreck their use case, with network effects amplifying the damage. In e-commerce, where the platform is someone's business, Verrilli compares careless deprecation to a mall "turning off the power in the lead-up to Christmas." Their decisions they're most disappointed in usually came from trusting averages without looking at the individual use cases hidden beneath them. Lenny cites Jeff Bezos: when data and an anecdote disagree, trust the anecdote. Verrilli agrees.

Closing caveats and lightning round

Verrilli closes with a caveat. There isn't one way to do product management, and they don't think AI will shape the industry in one way. They're confident that fewer, more senior, more autonomous PMs is right for Whatnot's product and culture, but they don't assume it holds everywhere, and they acknowledge people who love management and places where that remains valuable. What they believe is broadly true is that this is the best time to return to the core of product work and leave the theater behind. They add that listeners should "assume that at least half of what I've said is wrong," just as, in their estimate, half of what they've shipped wasn't right.

In the lightning round, Verrilli recommends The Hard Thing About Hard Things, which they call the best book about product management. They also recommend Rick Warren's The Purpose Driven Church, which Twitch CEO Emmett Shear used to make sure people read, as a study of how groups come to invest emotionally in something and useful for anyone building a community product. For fiction, they pick R.F. Kuang's Babel. Their TV pick is Apple TV+'s Star City, which they describe as the Soviet counterpart to For All Mankind. Their product pick is the Service NSW app from Australia, which handles tasks like license renewals and title transfers in one place. They're surprised to be praising a government app. The conversation briefly turns to Australia's solar surplus, and Verrilli credits a regulation from about 20 years ago requiring solar panels on new buildings. Their motto is "I'll figure it out": most things are easier than they seem, and if you won't commit the time and effort to solve something, it probably isn't a big problem.

Their favorite recent Whatnot purchase was a live California spiny lobster. A seller with a seafood store on the San Diego docks live-streams crates coming off the boats each morning, auctions them on Whatnot, and ships overnight on ice by UPS. Verrilli uses it to make a point: they had no intention of buying a lobster that morning, which is why they think e-commerce will be large but not all-encompassing.

Verrilli says the 31,832-to-one statistic wasn't meant to discourage applicants. It was meant to show that the growth of the PM title hasn't produced a matching growth in the skills discussed. Whatnot had hired two people the day before and is recruiting PMs, with payments and logistics as current priorities. That includes, as Verrilli puts it, the surprisingly nuanced product problem of shipping lobsters overnight.