Jen Abel's 15-Step Map of an Enterprise Deal, From First Message to Signature

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Overview

On her third appearance on Lenny's Podcast, Jen Abel, co-founder of JJellyfish and GM of enterprise sales at State Affairs, walked through one enterprise deal from the first outreach to the signed contract, step by step. Her central claim is that most people treat enterprise sales as a five-stage process (intro, demo, proposal, contracting, closed won or lost), when a real deal involves closer to fifteen distinct steps, several of which most sellers skip. Abel's recurring theme is information edge. Each extra conversation is a chance to learn something competitors don't know, and a chance to make the buyer feel they are building the purchase themselves rather than being sold to.

30 min read

Why a playbook is only 80% of the job

Lenny Rachitsky asked why Abel gives this material away. Her answer was that the playbook only goes so far. Sales is one-on-one, and the variable is another person. Some buyers want small talk, some want to get straight to business, some are technical and some are not. If you ran the same flow every time, Abel said, it would probably miss about one in four times. The steps cover roughly 80% of the work. The other 20% is how you make someone feel, whether they feel heard, whether the conversation was fun, and whether you told a good story. She added that she posts this material on X partly because it works like a diary that keeps the ideas fresh for her.

She also argued that the process is the same whether the deal is $100,000 or $1 million. Her explanation is that enterprise organizations are more sensitive to the process a seller takes them through than to the product demo itself.

6:00

The case study: AI legal tech sold to SpaceX

To keep things concrete, Abel chose a hypothetical: selling an AI legal product to SpaceX's legal team, at a deal size of about $100,000. She picked SpaceX because it has been in the news and everyone is probably targeting it, so it is a hard logo to win. It is a technical company, but the target is a non-technical team. She picked legal because, in her view, it is the largest line item in enterprise budgets, sometimes three to four times other budgets, and "there's always more money for legal." Rachitsky joked that this explains why there are so many legal AI startups.

9:14

Step 1: Landing the meeting with the "pincer" model

According to Abel, there are only two useful entry points. The first is the top executive, which in this case is the general counsel or chief legal officer (titles vary, but the weight is the same). The second is the "N minus one," the person one level below, usually a VP or director. She acknowledged that others would disagree, but she would not target anyone further down. Her reasoning: below that level, the storyline turns into a game of telephone. You end up learning about user value from someone far from budget and executive discussions, when a $100,000 deal needs an executive sponsor to allocate the money.

She calls the approach the pincer model. The founder goes after the executive and the account executive or enterprise sales lead goes after the N minus one, working from the top and the floor toward the middle. The goal is for at least one of them to respond. Because the two contacts are only one step apart, whoever responds usually pulls in the other. The founder can ask who else on the buyer's team should join, or the AE can offer to bring in the founder and suggest including the boss. She described this as a parity rule: each side matches the other's seniority. Abel was firm that the founder is the best person to reach a corporate executive one-on-one, even at a Series B or C company, and that any founder building something meaningful should be "ecstatic" to get in front of SpaceX's chief legal officer.

To find names, Abel suggested asking OpenAI's or Anthropic's models who the chief legal officer and their deputy are, then gut-checking and searching from there. For channels, she said cold calling works for non-technical roles but not for highly technical people. Email, LinkedIn, and X also work. Enrichment tools such as Lemlist can find email addresses. She sometimes sends a LinkedIn note and then follows up saying she sent one, since most people don't check LinkedIn daily. C-level executives, she said, might notice a brand but won't respond to a marketing campaign. They respond one-on-one.

17:26

The two-to-three-sentence message: sell the alpha

The first message should be two to three sentences at most. Abel described two levels. Level one is the specific problem you solve, which has to go beyond "we're an AI tool," since every company has an AI mandate. What matters most is the second level, the alpha: what the executive can uncover or unlock by bringing in a new tool. New tools are risky and "no one wants it," so an executive who sponsors one and pushes it down through their organization needs something bigger than saving time on some activity. She compared these executives to founders of their own business units, who want to grow their influence, budget, or headcount. Rachitsky summarized it as selling an unfair advantage, and Abel agreed.

She also warned that "10x better" still sounds like a commodity. What breaks through, in what she called a "flood the zone" moment of everyone pushing into the enterprise, is a message about rethinking the business model or how the team is structured in the age of AI, not simply reducing resources. Her litmus test: if the executive brought this product to a board meeting, what would they say it lets them do? How would they show needle-moving impact to the COO or CEO? Because everyone is emailing the same people, the message has to feel different, and it should be refined over time as response rates come in. She added that if you cannot get an executive excited by your value proposition, you probably shouldn't be pursuing a top-down enterprise strategy. In her view, this is why founder-led sales matters: founders are the ones who work out that storyline.

18:47

Step 2: The intro call, the most important call of all

Abel called the intro call the most important one. It sets how the buyer thinks about and respects you, and it is the call where they are most open. Once things start to feel like a sales process, she said, buyers clam up. Almost all the information edge a seller can gain comes from this first call.

Her rules: keep it super informal. No demo, no slides. Have a one-on-one conversation for 30 minutes. If a C-suite executive is joining, the founder should be there too. She typically opens by saying she doesn't know if they even need the full 30 minutes, which puts the buyer at ease that she isn't trying to take their time. She frames the call as swapping intros, then asks the buyer to go first. The more she hears before speaking, the more precisely she can frame her pitch. Rachitsky noted this also means the buyer isn't sitting through the same pitch they hear from everyone.

Buyers usually give a short overview at first. Abel then asks broad questions: Do you have an AI mandate? How are you thinking about how work gets done today? What needs to change going into 2027 compared with 2026, if anything? She said the answers usually reflect conversations that have happened above the person, since change tends to come from the top. She avoids anchoring the buyer toward her product, because the more they talk, the more strings she can pull. In a made-up example, the legal lead says they want to bring more work in-house and rely much less on outside law firms. Abel would follow up by asking whether that is measured, what success would look like, and why now rather than next year, especially given everything else going on (in her role-play, a large IPO). The "why now" question is usually where buyers open up about how they want to restructure their team, and at that point the seller can present the product as the vehicle to get them there.

She spends roughly the last ten minutes explaining what her company does, while continuing to ask questions. Two more instructions stood out. First, do not record the call. Buyers may assume they are being recorded anyway, but they will not be open or vulnerable with a recorder present. Second, keep digging with "off the record" questions about what really matters to them, what they want to own, and how things unfolded. She cautioned that you can't simply pepper someone with questions; some people are poker-faced, and reading how far to go is improvisation.

Abel does not use a scripted pitch. She said every storyline she tells comes out slightly different, because scripts feel artificial and buyers sense they're being put in a box. This is why she thinks enterprise sales is so hard to hire for. In her words, "the most successful salespeople are not trained salespeople," which is why founders are good at it. They may be bad at following process, but they excel at pulling out information and getting people excited by a vision. She was equally blunt about frameworks: "the fastest way to commoditize yourself is to go into some sales script." BANT (budget, authority, need, timing) should stay in the back of your mind, but you should never ask those questions directly.

25:39

Qualification, vulnerability, and cost-driven buyers

Asked how often an intro call goes nowhere, Abel said two to three out of every four calls turn up something real. About one in four ends with her saying the gap between the buyer's maturity and her product is too big, and offering to revisit in a year. She attributed this mainly to maturity rather than talking to the wrong person, since knowing who to talk to is the enterprise AE's job, and so is disqualifying quickly.

Rachitsky raised the worry that drawing buyers out might feel manipulative. Abel's response was that buyers have budgets precisely to buy solutions to their problems. She also values it when buyers ask probing questions back, because that signals a real relationship. She recalled a client asking the previous week what her team's biggest learning of the year had been. Every product has bugs and gaps, she said, and being honest about them makes the process feel less like sales.

On buyers who only want to cut costs, she described two motions. In one, the buyer wants the cheapest way to do something low on the priority list, where 60% of the way there is fine and "no one's getting fired over it." In the other, the problem is high-risk, such as missed information, delays, or unfamiliarity with a new regulation in legal, and the seller can charge a $250,000–$500,000 land. Marketing and sales are driven by numbers, she said, while legal needs to stamp out risk.

30:10

Step 3: The follow-up call that co-designs the demo

In the standard pipeline, the intro is followed directly by a demo. Abel called the demo the carrot, since everyone wants to see what you described, and said you should use it as leverage to get the right people in the room. The purchase should never feel like one person's pet project. A director or VP needs the executive's fingerprints on it, and executives want the actual users to feel bought in. There will be a champion who drives the deal, and she noted that most champions are one step below the executive, but the effort has to feel collective.

So before the demo, she schedules another call with the champion. She asks for 30 minutes and expects about 15. On the call, she says she wants to make sure the right people attend and that she demos the right things, then asks what will resonate with the team. She might lay out five things the product can show, note that two seemed to matter in the first conversation, and let the champion decide. Often the champion wants those two plus a third that ties to their mandate. She may even ask the champion to raise a specific question during the demo, and the champion may suggest a better question. According to Abel, none of the competitors are taking these extra steps. The call ends by getting the demo on everyone's calendar for an hour.

She also asks whether to hold a pre-demo with one more colleague before the group session. The decision depends on how far along the buyer is: less certain buyers usually want to bring someone else in first. Abel pushes for a pre-demo because it means more intel. On that call she spends five minutes recapping what she has learned and asks the new person to add to it. By this point, two or three people are excited before the group demo, and the buyer feels they are building their own business case.

She described two ways to fail. One is jumping straight into a demo with no groundwork. The other is agreeing when an enterprise reaches out during due diligence and asks you to present to four or five people. Don't do it, she said. You are either a checkbox, or you are demoing with no competitive intel, and "you just lost the deal at that point." She summed up what wins: the buyer feeling the product is so close to who they are that it seems built specifically for them. You are always up against something, whether a competitor, an incumbent (most often), or doing nothing at all.

Asked where the time actually goes, Abel said she spends a lot of it reading between the lines of what buyers said, then confirming her interpretations on these smaller calls. She compared it to prompting a model: keep going deeper and the answers become more refined. "The whole game is to slow down to go fast," she said. All of this should fit within a 90-day sales cycle, depending on the buyer's maturity. The alternative, she argued, is selling the enterprise a $15,000 solution with nowhere to expand. In her view, if you are not growing from $100,000 or $250,000 to $350,000 or $500,000 the following year, it is not an enterprise motion.

38:23

Steps 4 and 5: Framing and running the demo

Step four is preparing the frame. On the preceding calls, Abel asks who will attend, what each person cares about, and what to avoid. The champion is now invested, since this is their chance to be credited with finding the tool. She also asks what a good demo looks like in that organization, for example how to split time between discussion and product.

In the demo itself, some attendees will not have been on any earlier calls. Abel restarts from the top (who we are, why we're doing this) but frames it entirely in the organization's terms, so newcomers feel it was built for them. She invites those newcomers to say what they want from the session so they "feel the love." She wants the process itself to feel different, not only the product and the pitch.

Her main instruction for the product walkthrough: 80% of the value comes from 20% of the product, and the earlier calls reveal which 20%. Don't demo everything without a reason. Showing extra features can unravel a tight narrative, because attendees start noting what they would never use, and enterprises then question paying for a tool when they would only use half of it. If buyers ask whether it can do something else, that's different; a response like "funny you say that, we just released it" reinforces the sense of fit. She described enterprise sales as very tight project management combined with very tight narrative and framing, and "a lot of improv," but she said it is doable because "it's just psychology."

On people who derail meetings, Abel said this is rarely a problem with executives, since it is hard to reach those titles while being long-winded. When someone does wander, she suggests parking the topic for a dedicated call.

Signs a salesperson is struggling, and whether AI replaces this

Rachitsky asked how a founder or sales leader can tell that a salesperson is underperforming. Abel pointed to three things: the time from intro call to demo, how many conversations happened between those stages, and whether the salesperson can say exactly what they will demo, why, and how they will open. Because every demo she has run has been different, she rejects the idea of a single scaled playbook for deals of $100,000 and up. When you are going after the logos every startup wants, you have to take a different approach, not "cram the pitch down their throat."

She said she isn't worried about AI replacing the role, because so much of it is human, such as whether you click with the person. She admitted she has had intro calls where the buyer did not appreciate how she ran them, and that this is fine.

46:58

Step 6: The post-demo debrief

As soon as the demo ends, Abel texts the champion and asks to call within five minutes for a raw reaction before they have talked to anyone else. Where did we lose someone? Where did it land? Does anyone need more time? She said there is always someone in the organization who could kill the deal, and the debrief is how you find and protect against that person. The information also helps later. If the deal goes quiet for two or three weeks, she can ask whether it would help to spend 15 or 20 minutes with a specific person to hear their concerns.

She defined the champion as the person who really wants the deal to happen and has been there from day one. That can be the executive, but in that case the executive still has to bring along the people below them.

49:05

Steps 7 through 9: Designing, preparing, and running the pilot

Step seven is agreeing on how a pilot and decision will work. Abel's preference is a very short pilot: two to three days, for three or four users. The champion (or the person closest to the executive) should be included, but not the C-level executive, who is not the real user. She will give up the pilot fee in exchange for this, because a short pilot lets her control the sales cycle. From experience, she said, people often spend about half a day in the product and get what they need, so a 48- to 72-hour pilot can cut two weeks off the cycle. If the product needs setup, she asks whether a sandbox can show the value even without the customer's data.

The other option applies when the product needs real integration with the customer's data. In that case, she recommends a one- to two-month pilot that the customer pays for, with the fee credited back if they move forward. A willingness to pay is "a huge, huge signal." She noted that the fee usually ends up coded as services anyway, and the credit starts the relationship on a good footing. The trade-off, she said, is a sales cycle roughly a month longer, which is acceptable because the price is probably higher. She tied pricing to cycle length: if you can close $100,000 in 90 days, do that repeatedly; if a deal takes nine months, you should probably charge $250,000–$300,000.

To keep a short pilot working, she onboards each user separately beforehand and gives them three specific, clearly described tasks. Success criteria are co-authored with the buyer. Users should not simply log in and wander, since that shifts the work back to them, and she said the seller's job is to take 99% of the work off the buyer's plate. When a user doesn't like the product, she asks what wasn't clear and where they got lost. The tighter the structure, the more consistent people's experiences are.

Before anyone enters the pilot, Abel works backward from a successful outcome. When do we want signatures? Can we close by the end of next month? Should procurement be involved now or later? Is there a security lead for due diligence? Whose paper will the contract be on? If the answer is that a commitment is a quarter away, she recommends delaying the pilot rather than burning momentum. Once the stages are used up, you have nothing left to move the deal forward.

55:24

Pricing, worked out with the champion

Pricing comes up after the demo and before the pilot. Abel avoids discussing it earlier because people who missed the initial conversations may see a number three times their current spend without understanding why. By this point, she said, a buyer who was really worried about price would have raised it. If pressed, she gives a ranged ballpark, for example "somewhere between 150 and 250," with many dependencies.

The detailed pricing conversation happens one-on-one with the champion. She tells them the price, asks how they will make the case internally, what they would cut, and whether a slide showing ROI would help. She expects one of three responses: full alignment, no strong concern, or "I don't know if I can go to bat for this number." In the third case, she doesn't offer a discount or name a number. She asks the champion to help figure out what would work. This is the one point where she puts the burden on them, because they might ask for $20,000 off when she would have gone much lower, and "you don't want to negotiate with yourself." One option is a two-year deal that steps up to full price in year two.

Forward deployed engineers

Rachitsky asked about forward deployed engineers (FDEs). Abel said her views go back and forth. If an FDE is there to take work off the customer and speed up the deal, she is fully in favor. If the FDE is needed because the product is too complex for customers to use alone, that is a bad sign. She said the model makes sense for a company like Palantir, whose multi-million-dollar deals support it, but a full-time engineer on a $100,000 deal makes the economics messy. She thinks FDEs fit better for expansion than for landing. Rachitsky noted that some account managers now simply use the FDE title, and mentioned that Palantir people have called FDEs at most companies "sparkling sales engineers."

1:02:50

Why the five-stage CRM pipeline is not a sales process

With nine steps done, Rachitsky returned to the five-stage pipeline. Abel said those stages exist for weighted forecasting. For example, an intro might be weighted at 10% of deal value, a proposal at 50%, and contracting at 80%. They are buckets for the pipeline, not the steps you take a customer through. In reality, she said, there are three to five critical meetings inside each bucket. Asked what share of founders and salespeople get this wrong, she said 90%. Her explanation is that enterprise sales should mirror, and try to control, the customer's buying process, rather than forcing customers into the vendor's process. For a $1 million deal, she would add more upfront meetings. For a $100,000 deal, a seller can move somewhat faster as long as qualification holds.

1:04:51

Step 10: The post-pilot session

After the pilot, feedback can come through a survey, one-on-one conversations with users, or the champion checking in internally. Abel stressed understanding what users actually did: time spent, bugs, which features they used. If most users only tried two of the three tasks, you want to know why before the review, so that a complaint like "we wish it did this" can be answered with the fact that it does and nobody tried it. During the pilot, she may tell the champion that someone logged in for 15 minutes and never got past step one, and ask them to check in, without telling users how to do their jobs.

She described the enterprise as built to have as much friction as possible: people who can kill the deal, procurement, legal, and finding the executive sponsor. The insider champion is the key to getting through it. When the champion goes quiet, that's the warning sign. A champion who has spent enough time with you will often call and say, "if I'm reading the tea leaves, we should sit on this for a minute." Rachitsky noted that silence is an easier way for a buyer to say no than confrontation.

1:07:49

Win rates and funnel benchmarks

Abel defines a qualified opportunity as one where you are talking to the right person, they are excited by the alpha, and they admit change needs to happen. She deliberately said "change" rather than "problem," because everyone pitches the same problems and that commoditizes you.

Her number for a healthy enterprise win rate, from qualified opportunity to signed contract, was about 30–35%, which she later adjusted to 25–35%. Her reasoning: if your win rate is higher than that, your price is too low. Some of the market isn't mature enough to buy, and those gaps are normal. Keeping prices consistent also matters because "the market talks." Charging one buyer's friend $50,000 and another company $500,000 will come out, especially among executives. Rachitsky said he sees exactly this kind of price comparison in founder WhatsApp groups. Abel added that roughly another 25% of lost deals come back a year later.

She gave rougher numbers for the funnel stages, and they shifted as she spoke. If targeting is good, about 50–75% of contacts become qualified leads. About half of those reach a demo, and a quarter advance beyond that. After that, she said, you shouldn't lose many if qualification is solid. From the pilot stage, she expects about 80% to succeed. If fewer do, either qualification is off or the seller has oversold a product that isn't ready. Smart buyers always want a pilot, she said, so it should be a standard part of the process.

1:11:46

Steps 11 through 14: Procurement, redlines, and signature

Step 11, papering prep and procurement timeline. Abel writes up the pre-pilot agreement in an email the champion can forward to procurement: what was agreed, pricing tied to signing by a certain date, and an incentive for hitting that date. "There's always got to be a reason to create urgency." She sends the contract as a Word document, not a PDF, because the buyer will redline it (and most enterprises can't access Google Docs). She asks whether they want to use her paper or their own, since using theirs is sometimes faster. She also warned that buyers often blame procurement to avoid giving bad news, saying the deal is "lost in procurement." In her experience, procurement is usually a roughly 30-day process, and its job is not to kill deals but to make sure the purchase matches how the company buys. Procurement is also the only path to getting paid, since business unit leaders can't pay you directly; payment comes from finance. Her advice is to start no implementation or onboarding until the contract is signed.

Step 12, paper review. Redlines will come back. Accept the easy ones. If there are many, ask to get the buyer's legal team on a live call instead of trading documents back and forth. Push on the terms that affect the business, let the rest go, and have your own lawyer review. ("Paper," she explained, is corporate-speak for the contract.)

Step 13, the procurement process. On the live call with procurement and legal, you work through the terms you can't accept. If the buyer's paper is used, it will contain "the kitchen sink." For example, if they ask a small company for $10 million in liability insurance, you can argue their exposure isn't that high. Everything is negotiable, but pick your battles. At this stage, she said, a deal won't fall apart over a clause; the work is making sure they understand your position.

Step 14, signature. Find out ahead of time who the signatory is, which is sometimes the CFO rather than the executive sponsor, so the champion can nudge them if signing is delayed. Asked how salespeople celebrate, Abel said the good feeling lasts about five minutes before they ask "what's the next one?" In sales, she said, you are only as good as your pipeline.

1:17:58

After the signature: expansion and services

For expansion, Abel said that a mature company will already know which products a customer can grow into. For companies closing their first ten enterprise customers, she thinks the founder should be involved after the deal to see which parts of the product are custom to that customer and whether to charge for services. Even though most companies focus on recurring revenue, she noted that services remain the largest line item in budgets. Enterprises know how to buy consultants and lawyers, so there is always money for services.

How buyers can say no without wasting time

Rachitsky asked the reverse question: how should a buyer end a process that isn't a fit? Abel's advice was to explain as early as possible why the timing isn't right or why the organization isn't mature enough. She said the team has to be structured to take on the technology. As mentioned earlier in the conversation, she noted that sometimes it's easier to sell services first and guide the customer toward the technology later, though sellers further along in enterprise maturity should lead with technology.

Buyers should also expect pushback. Abel has told hesitant clients that "you are a liability not closing this gap," while acknowledging you have to be in a position to say that. She reminds them of what they said on the first two calls, and if they are just "in a weird spot," she suggests starting smaller. But when there is a real barrier, such as an acquisition that freezes new vendors, she said you have to respect it.

Sales as product management, and where AI fits

Rachitsky observed that the whole process looks like product management: staying on top of many small tasks and trying to understand people's pain points so you can solve them. Abel agreed that the two roles are surprisingly similar. He also pointed out that AI barely came up in the conversation. Abel said that AI-generated reports or imagery sent to clients feel salesy because anyone can make them, and Rachitsky tied that back to the episode's question: what is your alpha? She also repeated her earlier advice to write your own emails rather than using boilerplate or AI, saying emails are "living and breathing" and recipients can practically hear you reading them aloud. She ended by inviting questions and noting that State Affairs is hiring for multiple enterprise sales roles, promising to teach new hires everything she knows.