Josh Woodward on Running Google Like a Lab: "Almost Possible" Ideas, Reading Eyes, and Knowing When to Quit

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Overview

Josh Woodward leads Google Labs, the Gemini app, and AI Studio. In this conversation, host Lenny Rachitsky opens with a thesis: every company now needs to think and operate like a labs team. The models underneath products change so quickly that what can be built keeps shifting, so companies have to keep trying things with the latest models and find out what has just become possible before a competitor or startup does. Woodward agrees with the premise and adds that "the devil's in the details." In his view every startup is already a lab. The harder question is how to bring that methodology, energy, and excitement into medium-sized and large teams, and how to build an environment where both the ideas and the people who generate them can thrive.

31 min read

The rest of the conversation covers where Woodward has seen good ideas come from, how Google Labs tracks what is "almost possible," what early product-market fit looks like, when to kill a project, which skills Woodward thinks are rising in value, how planning has changed, and why most corporate labs fail.

5:56

Good ideas don't come from scheduled sessions

Asked what patterns explain where the best ideas come from, Woodward says he wishes there were "an answer in the back of the book." In his experience, ideas come from many places. He draws three lessons.

The first is to stay on alert for anything that catches your eye. Good ideas have very rarely come from design sprints or from time blocked on a calendar to "come up with our next idea." They tend to show up in hallway conversations, on weekends, or over breaks. Woodward describes Labs team members who "just can't help themselves" and come back from time off with something they built, or who share a video and say, "look at this amazing thing."

The second lesson is that ideas don't appear in conventional places. "You can't microwave good ideas," he says.

The third lesson is that the idea often matters less than the people and their side projects. Over the past four or five years in Labs, Woodward says, projects such as NotebookLM, Flow, AI Studio, and Google Beam all began with very small groups of people who were obsessed with and curious about something and "just won't stop." The leadership job is to create a space where that can happen, notice it when it does, and help move it forward. Lenny notes that brainstorm meetings were also missing from Woodward's list of sources.

8:12

The "almost possible" list and 82 predictions

For people who want something more actionable, such as a founder or someone inside a large company, Woodward describes how his team gets to the frontier. That means playing with the models and also watching which experiences have just become possible. The team uses the phrase "what's almost possible" and keeps an actual list of such things. When an item crosses over, Woodward compares it to a phase shift, like a substance going from liquid to gas. He says he saw one of these two days before the recording and can't stop thinking about it, but declines to say what it was beyond "maybe soon." Once something crosses that line, the team tries to put people around it "and just go."

Technology alone isn't enough, he adds. The capability has to be matched to an interesting user problem, and ideally combined so well that people will pay for it. That combination is what Labs looks for early.

Asked for examples from the list, Woodward describes the team's approach rather than specific items. Labs runs thought experiments about the future of particular domains: software design and development, creativity, work, knowledge. One area they are watching closely now is entertainment, especially immersive entertainment. Under that heading the team keeps sub-lists such as "if a model can get to this kind of latency and this amount of languages in this amount of modality," which helps them reason about what becomes interesting technically. Alongside the technical side, Labs studies where behaviors and trends are heading. Woodward says he keeps pushing teams to look well outside the Bay Area, to other cities, classrooms, and places where they can "mine for ideas" and observe behavioral change.

Lenny sums this up as preparation rather than waiting for inspiration. Woodward confirms it and adds a detail: the document he mentioned contains 82 predictions, each starting with "we believe the future is" or "we predict." He admits making even one prediction is dangerous. Still, he argues you need a point of view about the future while accepting that nine out of ten, "or maybe 9.9 out of 10," will be wrong. "Chasing the future" is one of the team's values, and he says doing it requires throwing yourself out there and trying to live in that future a little.

11:54

Separating a real opportunity from a dazzling demo

How does Woodward tell whether an idea is worth pursuing? Part of his signal is personal. Being at the frontier and noticing what surprises or excites him, like the demo he left 48 hours earlier thinking "this is so exciting," and then feeding off that excitement with the team.

Lenny objects that excitement is a low bar now that so much feels magical, or that people have become numb to it. Woodward agrees that excitement is mostly a technology signal and that "there's dazzling demos every other day or every other hour right now." So he also looks for a user behavior that is either universal or shifting, and for monetization: can you reach a group of people who can't live without the thing and will pay because it is so valuable to them? A good idea, he says, has to start from at least one of these areas, and the work is putting them together.

He gives two examples. The first is hearing the first NotebookLM-style podcast. He remembers where he was standing, right outside the room where the interview was recorded, around 6:30 p.m. on what he thinks was a Tuesday. Two team members came over and told him he had to listen. The source material was the proceedings of British Parliament debates, "not known for its riveting material," yet two AI hosts discussed it in a way that was genuinely interesting. The team's reaction was that they had to do something with it.

The second example is from Google Flow. Before Flow there was a project called Whisk, which let users "whisk together" multiple images and then animate them. Woodward describes the level of creative control, and how accessible it was, as something that had never been possible before.

He adds that there are also cases where the team gets excited, builds something, and the product "is just not good." Part of the work, he says, is a numbers game.

14:43

Early product-market fit: watching people's eyes

Woodward's first point about product-market fit is that it is "way more art than science." He wishes it were science, since teams know how to run experiments, make data-driven decisions, and set OKRs. But early on, it can come down to a couple of people with conviction who think the future will look a certain way and can't fully explain why. He acknowledges this isn't very useful advice.

His more practical advice is to get outside the building and show people prototypes. When he does, "you're looking at people's eyes and like that is the metric." It isn't DAU/MAU or D7 retention. It is whether someone's eyes light up and whether they lean in. Lenny mentions someone else describing this as pupils dilating, and Woodward agrees. You can tell, he says, whether someone is enjoying it or "bored out of their mind" while you show them "some dumb product." The question is whether you've hit a nerve, a pain point where the person thinks "I want that."

His third point is to fall in love with the problem rather than the product. He finds it takes three, four, or five pivots before a team either has something or concludes it didn't work. In his experience, people who fall in love with a specific product solution first are headed for "a bad time."

He agrees with the common saying that you know PMF when you have it. Over roughly the past year, he lists moments when Nano Banana went viral in Gemini, when NotebookLM's podcasts spread, and when Flow, Stitch, and other projects had "mini moments." In those moments the team is "literally just swarming it and holding on for dear life," which he calls both exhausting and fun. His overall advice is to take many shots, accepting that the early stage is driven more by art and passion than by science.

18:04

When to kill an idea: the team usually knows first

Woodward says teams sometimes expect the leader to make the decision to stop a project. He has found the opposite: "The team usually knows before the leader knows." The signs are that passion runs out, or that people have tried everything they can think of and it still isn't working. He compares it to sensing that a relationship isn't working. As a leader, his job is to build an environment where people can ask uncomfortable questions and say, "I don't think this is working."

He gives an example from the day before the recording. The Gemini team had a feature they were excited about and planned to launch. Early data came back, people went out and "looked in the eyes," and the response wasn't there. The PM, whom Woodward refers to as "she," said she didn't think they should launch because it wasn't good. Woodward says he was proud of her and replied-all to thank her. The broader goal is a culture where the team can call out both good and bad results. He says he trusts his teams heavily because they work on the product every day, and if they say it isn't working, the response is to pivot and try something different.

Why one person runs both Labs and the Gemini app

Lenny asks why one leader oversees both Labs, which does zero-to-one experiments, and the Gemini app, which Woodward says has more than a billion users globally. Woodward acknowledges they sit at opposite ends of the scale. He jokes that Labs teams get excited about 10,000 monthly active users, a number most product dashboards don't even show.

He names three things the two share. First, the people. Despite its size, Gemini still has "a zero to one heartbeat," and both attract similar builders, with lines blurring between what each requires. Second, everyone involved is "AI kind of nuts and maniacs" who are building constantly. Third, a shared ordering of priorities: users first, Google second, and their own product (Labs or Gemini) third. The team considers itself "very much part of team Google," and the test is whether someone on the other end loves the product.

Woodward also confirms that all of Labs is currently AI-focused. When the current Labs began four or five years ago, it explored a few other areas, then decided to go all-in on AI for the foreseeable future. The work isn't only software. He points to Google Beam, which he describes as a "magic mirror" that creates a 3D version of the person you're talking to, so the experience is almost like talking to a hologram. He calls this adjacent to AI, "almost like AI hardware." He offers to get Lenny one, and Lenny accepts.

22:28

Where consumer AI goes next, and the personal assistant question

Lenny suggests consumer once seemed "dead," dominated by incumbents, and that AI has reopened it. Woodward says consumer feels to him like one of the most exciting and competitive areas right now. He names three areas.

The first is entertainment. Will people keep looking at different kinds of feeds, or can the technology bring people closer together in the real world? He notes there are competing views on whether that future centers on bots or on people.

The second is messaging and chat. That space once felt "sort of maybe solved," but he sees many experiments happening inside and outside Google, so it no longer feels as settled.

The third returns to big problems and scarce things: time on earth, how much money people have and how they can save it, and memories and in-person experiences people share. He thinks new consumer products could address these, and says the form factor, whether a chatbot, a personal agent, or something else, is largely "yet to be invented."

Lenny then asks what he calls a spicy question. Many AI assistants plug into Gmail, Google Calendar, and Docs and do impressive things with that data, while Google, from Lenny's perspective, hasn't shipped an equivalent assistant. Is the obstacle privacy, bureaucracy, or is it coming?

Woodward says parts of it already exist. In Gemini Spark, users can connect all of that and it is "quite powerful." Where Google is iterating is the interaction model. He says the industry has relied on separate modes users switch into, and the lesson "even from the last couple of weeks" is to "forget the modes and toggles" in favor of one prompt box where you say what you want and it does the work. He describes this as a UX simplification happening across the industry, not only at Google. On data, he says one of the most common requests he hears is some version of "Google, I've got all my stuff with you. Just make the thing work," and that many people are reluctant to connect that data to competitor products. "Watch this space. We hear you loud and clear," he says. He points to Google's "personal intelligence" work, a Gemini that is personal, proactive, and powerful, as the vision for roughly the past year, and says a lot of what the team is working on will be out soon. Lenny comments that Google's advantage is distribution and mentions Meta's Muse and Google's AI Mode as examples of products that grew easily on existing distribution.

27:25

Underhyped: principles. Overhyped: benchmarks.

For underhyped, Woodward points to discussion of principles and values. Over the summer he wrote an internal document on Labs principles, covering how and why the team builds what it builds. He believes strongly that, whether at Google or a startup, "you speak through your products," and that products encode their makers' principles. He wishes the industry talked more about what it wants to build and what future it wants. Lenny connects this to an earlier conversation with Tara Seshan of OpenAI: when almost anything can be built, the question becomes what world we want, not just what we can do.

For overhyped, Woodward repeats a position he says he has held for about a year: model benchmarks. He says friends at many AI labs still look at mostly the same benchmarks. But given where he grew up and how he approaches product development, he believes most people in the world will never care about an Elo rating, and "they may not even know how to pronounce" it. He sees industry talk dominated by "speeds and feeds and benchmarks." He accepts these are proxies for capability but thinks the industry over-rotates on them and loses sight of whether something is useful and which product or feature will deliver real value. Lenny adds that it's hard to tell whether a new "best model ever" is meaningfully different in practice. Woodward's message to product people is to build great products, since all that intelligence ultimately has to become something people want. With so many "almost possible" things becoming possible each week, he calls this "what a time to be alive as a product person."

31:38

Skills rising in value: unlearning rate, explosive endurance, and trust

Woodward says much has been said about taste, judgment, and vibe coding, so he looks for "mispriced signals." He names three.

The first is unlearning rate. People often talk about someone's learning rate or growth mindset. Woodward is looking for how fast someone can learn something and then walk away from it, for example based on what they see when they test their product.

The second is explosive endurance, a phrase from a book about Roger Federer that he read about a year earlier. He takes it to mean the ability to go very hard (the explosive part) and sustain it over a long period by taking care of yourself and the people around you and finding ways to pace yourself.

The third is collaboration and trust. Even as coding moves toward directing many agents and working with fewer people, Woodward thinks how you work with people matters more now. He looks for people who can be excellent collaborators with an agent or a swarm of agents and also with humans. The Labs and Gemini teams believe there is still "so much joy in working with people." The underlying skill is the ability to build and scale trust, and how quickly someone can do it.

Asked why trust is gaining importance, he says part of it is specific to Google as a large organization. He gives two reasons that aren't. As the cost of executing on products falls, more products will be made, and people will team up with different collaborators more often. Labs project teams used to be about five to seven people. Now, he says, they are about two to three, maybe four. He compares the strongest people to talented musicians who form different groups and play different songs. The most valuable people in Labs are those you can drop onto a project, such as a PM who can also code and design, and who can jam with others. With more products and more of these "free agents," he predicts trust-building will become even more important.

35:52

Roles aren't blurring into one universal builder

Lenny asks whether any function has become more successful at leading Labs projects. Woodward says the team has been studying and testing this. PM, perhaps because it is more horizontal, seems to have adapted to other functions faster. This shows up in "builder pilots" run across the company. He suggests PMs are used to simulating other perspectives in a meeting, such as legal, business development, or sales, and that the kind of person who chooses PM may be predisposed to this. Still, he says the best people come from every function, including strategy, operations, business development, and marketing, all of whom have become strong builders in Labs.

He then offers another overhyped item: the idea that "everybody's a builder," that this is one new job function, and that all roles are converging. What he sees is that people keep their specialty, which he compares to a college major or minor. If everyone becomes a generic builder, he worries the field loses respect and appreciation for specialties and the expertise behind them. Even when Labs assembles "more of like a builder crew," it still plans for which specialties each team needs.

His advice to new PMs and APMs is that vibe coding and prototyping are great, but they should serve the goal of becoming an exceptional PM. "Don't lose that major," especially early in a career.

38:45

Rhythms for sustained intensity: seasons, naming the mode, and fallow periods

Lenny notes a recurring theme on the podcast: everyone feels like they're running a marathon and a sprint at once. Woodward describes how Labs handles this. At any time there are 20 or 30 experiments running, and for each small team the goal is milestones and a rhythm. Some periods are "flat out full-on." The most useful lesson he has learned as a leader is to name and declare those periods, let people opt in or out, and be equally clear when a team is not in that mode. He gives an example: a big model is coming, five products matter for showcasing it, and that is "explosive time." He says PMs are often effective at creating the shorthand or common language that makes these modes clear.

After intense periods, the mode changes deliberately. After Google I/O, many Labs teams sprint, and then June becomes a time to "just go hack, go rediscover what's new, go just go build," and have fun. The temptation, he says, is to see June as unproductive because nothing ships, but that's where the seeds for the next season come from. He admits the team doesn't always get this right. He prefers framing like explosive endurance over older "work-life balance" framing because the goal is to do this as a team for many years: "you can't just like empty the tank in 9 months," but you also have to recognize that the current moment is fast.

Lenny adds that the opposite is also dangerous, since people with too little to do get bored and start looking for other jobs. Woodward agrees and mentions a team saying, "never waste an event": whether it's I/O, a model release, or for a startup some outside moment, it helps to plan around where you want to intersect with the world.

42:21

Planning on six-month windows and 100-day milestones

Woodward says someone recently asked about Gemini's two-year roadmap, and his answer was that it has a six-month roadmap alongside a multi-year vision. The world changes too fast, he says. The thing he saw two days earlier became a project within 48 hours, which can't be planned for in advance.

Labs typically plans on a horizon of about six months. He ties that to the "almost possible" window: he assumes each AI lab produces new pretrained models a couple of times a year, with smaller releases in between, which sets an overall cadence. Within that, the team thinks in roughly 100-day chunks about how far a product can move. He says the best Labs teams go from idea to a meaningful milestone in 50 to 100 days. Making that possible means designing a culture that removes blockers so teams can "just let people cook." He describes the overall approach as "rolling six months."

43:50

Frontier teams, and why most corporate labs fail

Lenny brings up a talk Dan Shipper gave at the Lenny & Friends Summit, which argued that companies should have a frontier team whose job is to try new tools and report back, so the rest of the company can stay focused. Woodward agrees that every company needs such a group, however it's structured. These people should be so plugged in that if they haven't heard about the latest viral thing on X in the past 24 hours, you'd wonder what they're doing. "They're the people who have like eight $200 a month subscriptions on everything."

He says that is only the first of three requirements. The second is an environment where those people can actually build. The third is the one he thinks most often decides success. He has read several books on the history of corporate labs, and he says the data shows that when a large company starts a lab, it is usually ineffective and fizzles out after three to four years. If it does last, the company often can't commercialize its output, and someone sees the future there and builds it as a separate company, which he says has famous historical examples. The hard part is building a frontier team that can connect to the larger company so it isn't dismissed as "some weird R&D group always coming up with like gimmicks and toys." That takes people who can say, "that thing looks like a toy right now. That's going to be essential to our future in five years." In his reading of history, teams can get the first two parts right, fail on the third, and then none of it matters.

Lenny notes that even Anthropic, already at the frontier, has a labs team. Woodward then describes an internal risk at Google Labs. As some projects such as NotebookLM, Flow, and AI Studio grew large, they risked crowding out new zero-to-one work. So the team now talks about "zero to one labs," "one to 10 labs," and "10 to 100" labs as distinct lifecycle stages. All should share the same innovative energy, but each faces different challenges and optimizes for different things. At zero to one, you're looking at eyes. At 10 to 100, you're looking at conversion waterfalls and CPAs and at how to get people to the product's "magic moments." He calls the later stage "a scaling game."

47:45

Setting up an internal lab: independence, a clear game, and "good trouble"

Woodward offers three tips for companies starting a lab.

First, create a space "where weird things can grow." He says you can't place it under an existing business unit. It needs independence, which in some companies means reporting to the CEO or reporting far enough away from the core business.

Second, set the right mindset and be clear about the goal. At Google this is the "users first, Google second, labs third" ordering: the lab exists to make users and Google successful, not itself, which requires humility and collaboration. Companies should decide whether the lab's purpose is to graduate things into existing products or to invent new product lines and categories. Google Labs started as a graduation lab and has broadened over time as the team realized AI transforms and blurs categories. Knowing which game you're playing defines winning and losing. Lenny summarizes this as being isolated in some ways but still part of the same team.

Third, use the lab to challenge how the company works, not just for products and technology exploration. The team's phrase is that Labs sometimes creates "good trouble" at Google. His example: Labs was one of the first teams to say job roles were blurring and that it needed a builder job ladder, and it used Labs to pilot the ladder before rolling it out across Google.

On hiring, Woodward says the team looks for people who "can't stop themselves from building." He describes a "Labs in a nutshell" document, plus a "Gemini in a nutshell" one, which he emails to new team members in their first week and which many have already seen during hiring. Among the traits it describes: they build constantly, they are intellectually curious and consume a lot of reading and podcasts, they care about solving people's problems rather than their own ego or glory, and they add energy, so you'd "run through a wall with that person." He says there are 17 or 18 such traits and offers to share them for the show notes. In interviews, a candidate who says "let me show you this thing I just built" gains instant credibility. He also asks about "unknown unstructured dark caves," situations where the way forward is unclear, and looks for people energized by them. He notes that zero-to-one people differ somewhat from one-to-ten and ten-to-hundred people.

On organizational mistakes, he cites a live debate: whether to give separate small teams their own bets or group them by theme. For interactive entertainment, which he calls "a pond we're interested in fishing in," should one group own it, or should five people take five separate shots? He thinks people tend to rush to consolidate and make the structure clean, and he has learned "maybe the hard way" that sometimes you have to live with messiness, see what emerges, and still be willing to change. The other common mistake is hiring too many people too fast. Headcount growth can be addictive, but he calls it a vanity metric that is "really bad most of the time." He recalls a project years ago that reached 30 engineers, which made him happy, with "zero product market fit but a very inspiring vision." He lets Lenny infer how it ended.

54:07

10,000 products or five?

Lenny passes along a question from Logan Kilpatrick: in five years, will Google have 10,000 products or five? Woodward calls it a long-running debate with Logan and admits his answer keeps changing.

His current leaning is that products may not be thought of the same way. Ten thousand separately branded surfaces seems complex and maybe not desirable, even if a "product factory" could produce them. He is increasingly considering a world of more bespoke experiences, possibly generated by models, perhaps with Labs teams building the agents behind those experiences and delivering them through a common surface. He says he's unsure. Labs is running a couple of experiments that try to make the case for both sides: one imagining consolidation into a super app or set of super apps, the other imagining extreme fragmentation.

For now he leans away from super apps. He acknowledges they have worked extremely well for some uses in some parts of the world, but thinks they can be very complex for many people, which makes it hard to drive behavior that adds value. He also notes that the whole debate assumes humans will be the ones tapping through most of these experiences, which may not hold. Lenny says the uncertainty shows that everyone is still figuring this out, and Woodward agrees.

56:28

An open question about feedback, and the rituals that encode values

Asked what he'd like to leave listeners with, Woodward points to an unsolved problem: how to gather feedback on products and get insight from it. He mentions agents running overnight to summarize everything that's happening, which he assumes Lenny and many listeners already use. But he frames the real question around what makes a great PM: insight into a particular group of people and what will delight them or solve their problem. Lenny restates it as how to make AI as good as a top PM at spotting opportunities. Woodward says that's one branch. The other is whether there's a collaboration model between people and AI that produces more of the insight that flows naturally around certain people. He calls it "an interesting prompt maybe" and asks people to send him ideas on X.

Finally, Lenny asks about the awards Woodward gives teammates. The TPU Harvester goes to people who do the "grungy work" of efficiency and reclaiming TPUs, since growing products need ever more of them. Winners get a miniature rake made on Etsy and a cash award. When Lenny asks whether it rewards using the most tokens, Woodward says no, it rewards optimizing. A golden band-aid goes to people who fix "paper cuts," the small annoyances that add up in a product, and recipients keep it on their desks. The LLM Whisperer goes to people who push models in surprising, frontier ways. They receive a giant set of ears, because "they can hear things from the model that others can't," plus a nice mechanical keyboard. Woodward says these "dorky symbols" encode values: TPU efficiency lets the products grow and reach more people, fixing paper cuts makes products delightful, and model whispering leads to breakthroughs and new products.

He also describes something like a secret society. A meeting invite with four or five team leaders and no agenda appears on someone's calendar, which looks alarming. Woodward opens by saying, "this is not a bad meeting, this is a good meeting," and then the leaders take turns telling the person why they appreciate them so much. He says it surprises people and is reserved for some of the team's most valuable members.

The conversation ends with the questions Woodward is still working through: how AI could help capture the kind of insight great PMs have, and whether Google's future looks like thousands of products, a handful, or something no longer recognizable as products at all.