How Robert Moses and Lyndon Johnson Built Power: Lessons from Robert Caro

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Overview

Robert Caro spent seven years writing a biography of Robert Moses, the master builder of New York, and then the last 50 years on a four-volume biography of Lyndon Johnson. These books are widely regarded as the best explorations of political power ever written, and Dwarkesh calls them their favorite books of all time. For six years, whenever someone asked who they most wanted to interview, the answer was Caro. They tracked down his agent, called his publisher, contacted the museums that hold his archives, and sent him handwritten letters. Eventually the interview happened.

21 min read

While preparing for it, Dwarkesh reread the biographies and noted every lesson they offered about how power is gathered and used. This video essay collects those lessons. It asks two questions. How did an unelected official become the most powerful person in New York for three decades? And how did Johnson turn a job with almost no formal authority into the second most powerful position in America?

1:05

The Scale of Moses's Power

The essay begins with the size of what Moses built. He built more of New York's physical city than anyone before or since:

  • The Triborough and Verrazzano bridges
  • The Cross Bronx Expressway
  • Jones Beach, Lincoln Center, and Shea Stadium
  • Two giant power dams upstate
  • Hundreds of parks and pools

New York State had completed 899 miles of highway by 1964, and Moses had built 672 of them. His projects together cost hundreds of billions of dollars in today's money.

For more than 30 years, the essay argues, Moses was more powerful than any elected mayor or governor, though he never won an election. An archival clip shows him answering this criticism. He says he has heard "You don't have to be elected" ad nauseam for the last 30-odd years, and his stock reply is, "You don't have to be, either." The essay then asks how he got that much power and how he kept it.

2:22

Writing the Laws That Governed Him

Part of the answer is that Moses wrote the laws that governed him. He was known as the best bill drafter in Albany. He used that skill to give himself powers the legislators voting on his bills didn't know they were granting.

The clearest example is his use of public authorities. These are government-created corporations that build city infrastructure. In theory, an authority sells bonds to pay for one project, such as a bridge. It then charges tolls until it has collected enough to pay off the bonds. After that, it removes the toll booths, hands the bridge to the city, and goes out of existence.

Albany expected exactly this when it passed the Triborough Bridge Authority Act of 1933. Buried in the final version, among pages of legalese, were a few minor-looking changes Moses had drafted. Section 1 said plainly that the authority would dissolve once its bonds were paid off. Bonds could run at most 40 years, and toll revenue would repay the cost much sooner, so the authority seemed to have a built-in expiry date.

Moses changed that with one sentence in a subsection of Section 9. It let the authority, "from time to time," pay off old bonds by issuing new ones, and the new bonds could be "for any other corporate purpose." Just before the original bonds expired, the authority could issue a fresh 40-year note for a completely different use.

3:52

From Two Bridges to Most of New York

The original act let the authority build two bridges and their approaches. Moses's amendments added the right to build connecting roads and "facilities not inconsistent with the use of the project." Read as creatively as Moses intended, the essay says, this let him alter most of the roads, parks, and housing in New York.

The logic worked like a chain. Suppose a road connected to a road that connected to a road that connected to the bridge. Or suppose a park lay along such a road. Then surely the Triborough Authority was entitled to improve it.

All of this could be paid for with the bridges' large toll revenues and the authority's right to borrow against them. The essay gives a comparison. In 1946, the entire New York City government could borrow only $150 million before hitting its legal debt limit. That same year, Triborough could borrow $360 million. Moses's bridge authority had access to more than double the borrowing capacity of the largest city in America.

5:31

Locking Power Into the Constitution

Moses also planned for the day a governor or mayor might discover all this and try to take it back. The essay calls his solution so clever that no lawyer or lawmaker in Albany saw it coming.

The U.S. Constitution forbids states from passing "any law impairing the obligation of contracts," and a bond issued by a public authority is such a contract. Moses slipped in a clause letting him add "any other matters of like or different character, which in any way affect the security or protection of the bonds" to the bond contracts. Among those matters: Triborough could charge whatever tolls it wanted, for as long as it wanted, and keep the surplus.

In effect, Moses could make his powers permanent simply by writing them into the bonds he issued. Once the bonds were sold, neither the legislature, the governor, nor the mayor could revoke those powers. Nothing short of a constitutional convention could. The powers lasted as long as the bonds, and refinancing could always extend the bonds. With a few small edits, the essay concludes, Moses turned an act meant for two bridges into an institution that could build almost anything anywhere in New York, with that authority protected by the U.S. Constitution.

7:15

Keeping the Chairmanship

The bond covenants made the authority's powers permanent, but they didn't guarantee Moses would stay its chairman. How did he keep the position for 30 years?

Again, part of the answer is the law. Moses drafted the act so commissioners could be removed midterm only on "stated charges after a formal hearing." His conflicts with mayors and governors were about what he built and whom he displaced, not about his personal conduct. Caro writes that Moses "was not himself corrupt." He was "as uninterested in obtaining payoffs for himself as any public servant who ever lived," or in the politicians' phrase, "money honest." So there were never any formal charges to bring.

That explains why he wasn't removed midterm, but not why he was reappointed every six years. One reason was structural. At his peak, Moses held 12 government posts at once, including:

  • City construction coordinator
  • Chairman of the State Council of Parks
  • Chairman of the State Power Authority

The essay calls him "a hydra with a dozen heads." The mayor appointed some of these posts and the governor appointed others, so no single person could cut off all the heads at once. Removing him from any one post meant making an enemy of a man who would still be the most powerful person in New York.

8:28

Popularity and Speed

The more important reason, the essay argues, is that no mayor or governor wanted to fire him. Dwarkesh says today's view of Moses hardened in the 1970s. That was when Caro's The Power Broker came out, subtitled Robert Moses and the Fall of New York. It was also when the city was going through crime, deindustrialization, and white flight, and Moses took much of the blame. In Dwarkesh's opinion, that crisis owed more to larger structural forces than to Moses. They point out that Detroit and St. Louis, which Moses had nothing to do with, collapsed far more dramatically.

For most of his career, Moses was very popular. In the 1930s and 1940s, New York high schools voted him the most admired New Yorker. He had repeatedly delivered public works that millions of people used and enjoyed, especially beaches, parks, and pools. He did it at unprecedented speed and scale. In his first four months as the city's parks commissioner, he kept crews working around the clock and finished 1,700 park renovations, without a hint of personal scandal. Caro writes that it "was not unusual at park and playground opening ceremonies for children prodded by their parents to break into the cheer": "Who do we appreciate? Mr. Moses."

Speed mattered politically. Moses could finish large, popular projects within a single election cycle. A mayor who gave Moses the power to build something could expect to attend the ribbon cutting before facing re-election.

Dwarkesh contrasts this with today, when it is almost unimaginable for government to build something big in a year or two. Construction on New York's Second Avenue Subway began in 1972, and the first section opened in 2017. Those first two miles cost taxpayers $4.5 billion.

Control Over Federal Money

Moses also controlled where money went. Much public-works funding comes from Washington. The cities that get the most are the ones with finished blueprints, ready to break ground as soon as a federal program is announced.

Moses had the largest and best team of planners and engineers in the country. As a result, by 1936 New York was receiving one-seventh of all federal Depression-era work-relief money for the entire nation, and Moses chose the projects. A mayor with different ideas would need his own plans, and he lacked the technical staff to draw them up. In practice, he could build what Moses wanted or build nothing.

11:32

Threatening to Quit

With his record, his popularity, and his control over money, Moses had a great deal of leverage. He used it freely. Instead of fearing dismissal, he constantly threatened to resign whenever he didn't get his way.

One aide to Mayor Wagner said "it seemed like he was resigning about one thing or another about twice a day." Moses threatened Mayor La Guardia so often, over such small things, that La Guardia's lawyer printed a stack of forms reading "I, Robert Moses, do hereby resign as so-and-so," to save him the trouble of writing it out each time.

Behind the joke, the essay says, was real fear. A mayor who accepted the resignation would lose the projects underway and the money attached to them. He would also start a public fight with the most respected official in New York.

Moses had spent years befriending newspaper owners, including many weekends at the summer home of the Sulzbergers, who own the New York Times. A mayor knew that if Moses resigned, every front page the next morning would tell the same story: a man above politics, driven out by a cowardly politician because he refused to compromise the city's interests.

12:56

A YIMBY Machine

According to the essay, the power Moses drew from public popularity was small compared with the power he drew from New York's private interests. Today we are used to NIMBY ("not in my backyard") politics, where small but powerful groups block projects that are broadly popular. Moses built the opposite: a concentrated faction for YIMBY ("yes in my backyard").

He did it with what the essay calls a graft machine, which made sure the state's most powerful people benefited whenever something was built:

  • Banks bought his bonds at a steep discount without competitive bidding.
  • Unions got more jobs.
  • Politically connected lawyers got legal fees.
  • Party bosses were paid to broker insurance on bridges with no plausible risk of falling down.

When anyone stood in the way of a project, from a borough president to the governor, Moses could rely on these beneficiaries to call them.

14:00

From Idealist to Addict

Caro presents Moses as someone who began as an idealist, not someone who craved power from the start. In the 1910s, Moses was a brilliant young reformer in the good-government movement, which aimed to replace Tammany Hall's patronage with honest, competent administration. He fought the machine for years, and it killed his reforms. From that defeat, Moses learned that ideals are useless without the power to achieve them.

Caro writes that for decades, the power Moses gathered "was the servant of his dreams, amassed for their sake, so that his gigantic, city-shaping visions could become reality. But power is not an instrument that its possessor can use with impunity. It is a drug that creates in the user a need for larger and larger doses, and Moses was a user."

14:53

Johnson: The Opposite Path

Dwarkesh presents Lyndon Johnson's story as the reverse. For most of his career, there is little evidence that Johnson held a coherent political ideology. He was a ruthless power seeker who did whatever was most expedient at the time.

When he entered the Senate, he saw that the most powerful members were the conservative Southern Dixiecrats, and he shaped himself to fit them. While writing Master of the Senate, the third Johnson volume, Caro interviewed former Georgia Senator Herman Talmadge. Caro asked what impression freshman Senator Johnson gave about the proper relationship between white and Black people. Talmadge answered, "Master and servant." Caro asked whether Johnson had any sympathy for Black people or any desire to improve their lives. Caro's notes record a long pause, then Talmadge's reply: "None indicated." After another pause, Talmadge added, "He was with us in his heart. I believed him. I believed him."

Yet as president, Johnson led the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the most important civil rights laws since Reconstruction. In Caro's telling, Moses began as a naive idealist and ended up seeking power for its own sake. Johnson was an opportunist from the start, and only once he held real power did he use it for ideals few people knew he had.

16:22

Taking Over a Powerless Job

Before the presidency and the vice presidency, Johnson was Senate majority leader. Caro calls him perhaps the most powerful legislator in American history: "master of an institution that had never before had a master, and that at the time almost half a century later, when this book is being written, has not had one since."

No earlier leader had held this kind of power because the founders deliberately designed the Senate not to be led. When Johnson asked the Library of Congress for a list of the majority leader's formal powers, it found exactly one: the right to be recognized first on the floor.

Before Johnson, the essay says, the majority leader was more a lightning rod than a leader. He was blamed nationally and at home for everything the Senate failed to do, yet had no real power to fix it. The position was so politically toxic that Johnson's two predecessors both lost their own Senate seats.

That is a large part of why Johnson became his party's leader at 44, in a Senate whose average age was around 60. Hardly anyone else wanted the job. In other hands it would have stayed useless. From it, Johnson made himself the second most powerful person in America, using three tactics.

17:50

Tactic One: Leverage

First, Johnson made sure he had things to promise and things to threaten. He changed the Senate's rules, institutions, and norms so that he alone could grant important favors:

  • Passing bills: If a senator needed a bill passed, Johnson could get it scheduled and persuade the committee chairman to report it out.
  • Help in the House: If the bill needed support there, Johnson had a direct line to Speaker Sam Rayburn.
  • Campaign money: If a senator needed funds for re-election, Johnson could put in a word with the oilmen of his native Texas.
  • Committee assignments: Johnson also took control of these, which the essay calls the single biggest factor shaping a senator's career.

For about a century, committee seats had been assigned by seniority. Almost overnight, Johnson changed the system so that many seats were negotiated by the party steering committee, which he controlled. If you wanted a good seat, you did what Johnson wanted.

In 1957, Estes Kefauver voted against Johnson on an important motion. That same week, a coveted open seat on the Foreign Relations Committee, which Kefauver expected to get, went instead to a much more junior senator, John F. Kennedy.

Johnson's real genius, the essay argues, was finding and controlling every possible source of leverage over his colleagues. Whatever a senator needed to survive, whether money, committee seats, or bills that mattered to his home state, Johnson could give it or withhold it.

19:42

Tactic Two: Setting the Agenda

What a law ends up saying depends on which version comes to a vote and with what final changes. Whoever controls that agenda controls the outcome, and Johnson took that position.

His main tool was the unanimous consent agreement. By default, Senate debate is unlimited. A senator can talk as long as he likes and offer unrelated amendments, each of which can stall a bill further. A unanimous consent agreement suspends those freedoms for one bill, fixing the debate time and limiting amendments.

Earlier leaders rarely used such agreements, and only after weeks of exhausted debate. Johnson made them standard. He would not let a bill reach the floor until an agreement was in place. He wanted to control which bills reached the floor, and he wanted floor debate to change no one's mind. Every vote was to be settled in private beforehand, through the dealmaking where his leverage worked best. The last thing he wanted was a long public debate swaying a senator at the last minute, or a surprise amendment undoing a deal he had spent weeks building. As Senator Paul Douglas put it, under Johnson all the action takes place offstage before the play begins.

21:12

Tactic Three: Brokering Every Deal

Third, Johnson made sure as much of the Senate's information as possible flowed through him:

  • Every committee assigned a staffer to tell him what was being drafted.
  • His aides tracked what every senator was doing.
  • He spent his own days in the cloakroom and hallways, persuading and listening.

As a result, he knew exactly what each senator really wanted and what he would or wouldn't trade to get it.

In any session, the Senate faces hundreds of possible bills and amendments. Votes on one bill can be traded for votes on another, and any bill can be amended a dozen ways to win someone over. The possible deals are almost endless. Johnson made sure he was the one starting and brokering most of them, so every deal left him ahead.

21:56

The Civil Rights Act of 1957

The essay's main example is how Johnson got the Civil Rights Act of 1957 through the Senate. He was desperate to pass some civil rights bill that year, even a weak one. He wanted to be president, and no Southerner with his record of voting against civil rights could hope to win the Democratic nomination in 1960.

The problem was that no bill seemed strong enough to win Northern liberals yet weak enough to avoid a Southern filibuster. The sticking point was who would decide cases in which Southern election officials were accused of suppressing Black voters. Southern senators insisted on jury trials. Northern senators were furious, believing this would gut the bill. The law's purpose was to stop Black citizens from being excluded from voting rolls. But Southern states required jurors to be registered voters, and an all-white Southern jury would never convict a white registrar for turning away Black voters. Any version one side accepted, the other rejected.

A less creative legislator would have given up, the essay says. Over seven months, Johnson built a deal that brought together unrelated factions, with the civil rights law as a byproduct:

  • Western senators got a vote on a federal dam between Idaho and Oregon they had wanted for years.
  • Midwestern Republicans with powerful railroad unions in their states got the right to a jury trial extended to striking workers.
  • Moderates got a clause guaranteeing Black citizens could serve on federal juries, so they could tell voters they had created a new civil right.
  • Southerners kept the jury-trial guarantee for election officials, which kept the bill weak enough that they agreed not to filibuster.

A dam in Idaho, protections for union workers, and federal jury rules had nothing to do with Southern voting rights. That was true, the essay notes, at least to anyone who lacked Johnson's inside knowledge and political creativity.

Why Stop and Extract the Lessons

Dwarkesh closes with why they made the essay. Caro's books are the best-written accounts of how political power actually works. But they are so compelling, with characters more vivid and stories more gripping than any novel, that it is easy to keep turning pages without asking what the stories teach about power. The essay was a way for Dwarkesh to work out those lessons, and to give viewers the context to get as much from the interview with Caro as they did.