Robert Caro on Power, Ruthlessness, and Fifty Years of Research

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Overview

Robert Caro has spent roughly half a century writing about two men who accumulated and used power on an enormous scale: Robert Moses, the subject of The Power Broker, and Lyndon Johnson, the subject of a multivolume biography that is still unfinished. In this conversation, the host opens with the maxim Johnson lived by, "If you do everything, you will win," and suggests it describes Caro's own research method just as well. Over the interview, Caro reflects on how he gets reluctant sources to talk, whether America needs "a little Moses" today, what it was like to watch Moses lose power, the real source of Johnson's effectiveness, and the costs of a working life spent mostly alone.

26 min read
0:51

Sharing a Path With the Subjects, but Not Their Ruthlessness

The host's first question is whether Caro writes so compellingly about Johnson and Moses because Caro shares some of their qualities. Caro answers carefully. Caro hopes there are qualities of both men that Caro does not share, chief among them what Caro calls their ruthlessness, their willingness to do anything to win, which Caro also sees as part of their greatness.

Caro does recall a moment of uncanny identification. While researching Moses, Caro went to the papers of Mayor La Guardia, which the Municipal Archives stored in the 79th Street Boat Basin on the Hudson River, three levels down, in a row of file cabinets against a wall. Sitting there day after day going through the documents, Caro would occasionally find a note Moses himself had written and realize that Caro was following the same path Moses had once taken. Caro found that fascinating.

The host presses the point: the shared quality is a refusal to take no for an answer. If someone refuses an interview, Caro does not stop. Caro accepts this "as a compliment." Some people, Caro says, simply have to be interviewed, and if they don't want to talk, Caro feels unable to accept that. The example is Johnson's first secretary, the man who rode in the car with Johnson on his campaigns. Caro remembers thinking that no other human being on earth knew what Johnson was doing during all those hours driving back and forth across Texas, and that Caro had to get him to talk honestly about it, whatever it took.

3:25

How Caro Gets People to Say What They Shouldn't

Many of Caro's sources must have known it was against their interest to reveal what Caro wanted to know, yet they did. Asked how, Caro does not describe a technique so much as an approach rooted in prior research. The example is John Connally and the question of how Johnson used money to build political power. Caro knew from the documents that Connally had collected money and distributed it on Johnson's instructions, which made Connally the only person who could explain how Johnson decided who got funds.

The documents themselves offered openings. When a congressman requested money, say $1,500, Johnson would write a response on the request: "Okay, 1,500," or sometimes 500, or sometimes no. But sometimes he wrote "No, never." Caro asked Connally what that meant, and Connally explained that the man was never going to get money from Lyndon Johnson. The truly fascinating stories, Caro says, emerge when you then ask why Johnson felt that way about that particular congressman.

5:17

Is It Too Hard to Build Today?

Turning to Moses, the host raises a current debate. Critics argue that it has become too hard, especially for government, to build anything. The Second Avenue subway has been under construction for around 50 years, according to the host, and has opened about a mile and a half at a cost of more than $4 billion. Some people trace this partly to The Power Broker itself: alarmed at how much power had been concentrated in one man, the argument goes, Americans created environmental review, land-use review, community boards, and litigation, and have now overcorrected. They also say Moses could not operate the same way today.

Caro pushes back on the premise. When Moses started in the 1920s, Caro says, there were also safeguards, and people were also saying that nothing could be built. It was the age of the automobile, everyone was getting cars, but the roads were the same old roads, and nobody could build new ones because property owners did not want roads cut through their land. Then Moses came along, and those obstacles seemed to vanish because, despite all the safeguards, he simply built.

Jones Beach is Caro's central illustration. Moses saw the beach one day and judged it the greatest beach he had ever seen, only 27 miles from New York City. If he could build a road out to it, he could give it to the people of the city. But building that road seemed impossible because the farm and property owners in its path objected, and Moses, Caro notes, did not have the power of eminent domain at that point. Moses essentially declared that he was going to build it anyway, and he overcame each of the many obstacles one by one until suddenly Jones Beach was open and accessible to New Yorkers. Caro calls it an act of political genius and also an act of will. Asked whether a Moses-type figure today would find a way around modern constraints, Caro's answer is that people said the same things in Moses's time, and he did it, so someone today would come along and do it too.

Searching for a Middle Ground

The host frames this as a profound question for democracies: how to land somewhere between the extremes of 1950s–60s Moses and today's paralysis. The host cites California, where, in the host's account, something like $15 billion has been spent over the past decade without yielding a single new mile of railway. China, the host suggests, resembles New York in the 1940s and '50s, with a Moses-like attitude that has produced tens of thousands of miles of railway in 10 to 20 years, but at the cost of comparable displacement and recklessness.

Caro's reply is blunt: "I'm not sure there is a good spot." Any large-scale project confronts dozens, scores, or perhaps hundreds of property owners who don't want it, so the question becomes how anything gets built at all. Caro's answer is that every so often someone appears who is a genius, "if that's the right word," at getting big things built for the public. Decades may pass with no one like that, during which people conclude that nothing large will ever be built again, and then someone arrives and things get built. That, Caro says, is the nature of political genius. Caro notes having written about two such men, Johnson with civil rights and Moses with public works, in areas where people insisted it couldn't be done.

11:53

"A Little Moses" and the Young Idealist

The host offers an interpretation: it sounds as though Caro thinks we need a little Moses today. Caro calls it a great insight and says Caro sometimes wonders about exactly that. Caro does not want anyone as ruthless and as disregarding of public opinion as Moses, but at the same time believes you need someone who will find a way to get things built despite the fact that so many people don't want them built.

The host observes that many people who haven't read the book assume Caro thinks everything Moses did was bad. Caro's response to that is: "You didn't read the book." The early portion, hundreds of pages, describes a young idealist who sees a great need for recreation and beaches for city people and finds a way to make Long Island's shoreline accessible to them. Before Moses built anything, Caro adds, he was an expert in the technicalities of the civil service and devoted all his energy to reforming it so that people would be promoted on merit rather than political pull. Caro sees real idealism in that work and in his early projects.

That idealism did evolve, Caro says, into an attitude of "there ought to be a highway here no matter what anybody says, and no matter how many thousands of people are in the way." The Cross Bronx Expressway is the example. People told Moses not to build it before he did, and the moment it opened, Caro says, it became the world's longest traffic jam. Not thousands but tens of thousands of people were evicted from their homes by him without any relocation provisions. For Caro, this transformation is a big part of the story of The Power Broker: a young man who wanted to build to make people's lives better becomes someone who builds simply because he thinks something should be built, no matter how many people he must evict or how bad the idea. Caro describes it as a story of what power does to someone, hesitating over the word "corrupting" and preferring to say it hardened him against any opposition.

18:09

Watching Moses Lose Power

Caro began writing the book around 1966–67, while Moses was still in office but losing power, so the story was changing as Caro wrote it. Caro admits to being young then and not really knowing what Caro was doing, but having learned enough about Moses to know how sad the decline would be.

After a pause to recall it, Caro describes a specific moment. Moses still had his office at the Triborough Bridge Authority, and Caro had interviewed him there several times while he was in power. You could feel his power, Caro says; outside sat all the people waiting for his decisions. Whenever an interview ended, the secretary would come in with a list of phone calls from people who had called wanting something from him during the conversation. At one long interview, perhaps the last, Caro realized when it ended that there had been no calls. The secretary had nothing to tell him. Whatever you thought of Moses, Caro says, you felt the poignance of someone losing power, and couldn't help thinking it was in a way tragic that no one was calling to ask him for favors anymore.

Did Moses Understand What Was Happening?

Asked whether Moses realized his power was slipping, Caro says in a way he surely did, but he was by then deeply insulated. He was in his 80s and deaf. At the Triborough headquarters on Randall's Island he was still surrounded by loyal "Moses men" who treated him with the same deference as always. He knew his projects weren't getting done, but Caro believes Moses felt he would keep pushing as he always had and would win again. On balance, Caro's answer is no: Caro doesn't think Moses ever truly realized it.

The host brings up the episode, around 1962, in which Moses tried on Governor Nelson Rockefeller the tactic he had used on countless mayors and governors before, threatening to resign if he didn't get his way. Rockefeller said, in effect, that he regretfully accepted. Could earlier officials have done the same? Caro says the answer is partly yes: they had the power to fire him, since he was not elected. But in practice, for decades, the answer was no. Moses was simply too popular; firing him would have been like firing the idol of New York. Beyond that, Caro says, Moses had used his genius to build an interlocking web of positions, among them chairman of the State Power Authority, chairman of the Triborough Bridge Authority, Parks Commissioner, Long Island Parks Commissioner, and Jones Beach Commissioner, with terms ending at different times and some posts from which an official had no power to remove him. You couldn't fire him from everything. It was almost impossible, Caro says, until cracks appeared in the armor as he aged. By then, if you were willing to brave criticism from every newspaper and the public, you probably could have done it, and Rockefeller did.

24:13

The Question Caro Would Ask in an Eighth Interview

Caro interviewed Moses seven times. In the seventh, according to the host, Caro mentioned knowing about a donation to Moses's commission from a millionaire whose golf course was spared by a new parkway route, and Moses never spoke to Caro again. Given one more interview, what would Caro ask? Caro, speaking off the top of the head, says the question would be: "Did you realize you were changing?"

Asked to answer it on Moses's behalf, Caro says no. Caro thinks Moses believed from the beginning that his vision of roads here and parks there was the best thing to do, that it should and would get done, regardless of how many hardships he inflicted or how many thousands he evicted. What Caro sees is increasing, ultimately utter, ruthlessness: anyone in his way would be removed as an obstacle.

Caro offers an example. Henry Epstein, a Bronx politician, opposed the Cross Bronx Expressway, telling Moses that the route went through a neighborhood requiring the eviction of tens of thousands of people when moving it two blocks south would require evicting only a couple of hundred. Moses set out to destroy Epstein, Caro says, and basically did, by making it known that Epstein was having an affair. If Moses could find a weakness in someone, a mistress or taking money, he would use it.

Caro's view is that Moses learned this by failing when he was very young: he wanted things done, they didn't get done, and the awareness came over him that he had to find people's weaknesses. Caro says the book tries to show that learning process and the hardening that followed, in which the only thing that mattered was getting the project done, and anyone who stood in the way would get whatever it took, including destruction.

28:09

The Great Depression as an Engine of Building

The host notes that Moses's most productive period coincided with the Great Depression, when he hired thousands of architects and tens of thousands of workers for very little, and asks how much of his early achievement came from government suddenly being able to compete with the private sector for talent and labor. Caro says it played a big role. Caro recalls, without remembering the specific project, that thousands of out-of-work architects lined up on Fifth Avenue for jobs Moses could fill at very low wages. More important than the wages, Caro says, was simple availability: they had nothing else to do. Moses could hire and fire ruthlessly and drive workmen hard because they had no other jobs to go to, and he used that.

The host follows with a broader question: why do buildings from around the turn of the twentieth century, such as Grand Central, look so much more beautiful than those of the century's second half, despite being built by a much poorer country? Caro points to one factor: there were many out-of-work artisans who could, for instance, carve stonework. Caro lives on the 15th floor of an apartment building, and across the street is a building of 15 or 16 stories with beautiful carving on its stonework up near the roof. The only people who can see it, Caro observes, are those in Caro's apartment and the one next door. Someone was willing to pay for decoration on floors nobody would see because skilled people could be hired so cheaply.

32:53

Johnson: Persuasion Backed by Power

On Johnson, the host reads Master of the Senate as describing two sources of effectiveness: personal persuasiveness, and a position of leverage that let him promise or threaten. Which was the real source of his power?

Caro's answer is that behind the persuasion was the power. When Johnson asked something of you, you knew he had the power to give or deny things you wanted. A senator asked for a vote might disagree and not want to give it, but would know he wanted a particular committee assignment, or a particular law passed, and that Johnson controlled whether he got it. When Johnson put his arm around you and leaned in, Caro says, it wasn't only the force of his personality bearing down; behind it was the knowledge that he could do things to you or for you.

34:45

Coke Stevenson and the 1948 Election

The host calls Means of Ascent, Caro's book on the 1948 Senate election between Johnson and former Texas governor Coke Stevenson ("Mr. Texas"), a personal favorite, and asks whether part of Caro wished Stevenson had won. Caro answers directly: yes. Although Stevenson was an idealist, Caro says, he knew how to get things done and genuinely accomplished things as governor, and Caro thinks he would have been a great senator. You feel the tragedy of his loss, Caro says, because of the way he lost. Stevenson never really grasped that someone could do to him in an election all the things Johnson did, and he didn't come to grips with it.

36:07

Could Kennedy Have Passed Johnson's Laws?

The host poses a counterfactual: suppose Kennedy wins in 1960 but Johnson declines the vice presidency and remains Senate majority leader. Would the landmark laws of 1963–65 simply have happened earlier? Caro says no, because Kennedy lacked an overriding desire to change America. Caro calls Kennedy utterly charming and a good president, good at foreign policy where Johnson certainly was not, but without Johnson's vision.

Caro traces that drive back to Johnson's year teaching poor children in Cotulla, from which he returned determined to change the education system and do other things to help poor people. Caro considers that determination almost unique, and says it is why Johnson was domestically such a great president, producing civil rights and anti-poverty laws Caro believes the country would not otherwise have had. After his election he began with education laws and anti-poverty bills and was on his way, in Caro's account, when his attention turned to Vietnam. Everything fell apart, his presidency was ruined, and the domestic agenda didn't get done the way he would have done it. That, Caro says, is the great tragedy of Johnson and Vietnam.

When the host asks why Johnson kept escalating in Vietnam, Caro declines to answer: Caro is still trying to figure that out right now, for the book in progress.

Energy as Will

Both Johnson and Moses worked 16 hours a day or more. Was that a different physical constitution or sheer will? Caro thinks it was will. Many people have energy, Caro says, but with Moses sleeping very little, tiredness didn't even seem to enter the equation. Johnson would make calls at 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning to get his way. Caro shares an anecdote: Johnson once called a senator at 5:00 AM to ask for his vote, and the senator replied, "Oh, Lyndon, I was just lying here waiting for your call."

41:09

Reducing a Book to One Sentence

Caro spends five to ten years on a single book, with perhaps only an editor and Caro's wife seeing the manuscript along the way. How does Caro know the work is on track? Caro's answer is that you don't know. But Caro does have a device for staying on track, learned the hard way because Caro didn't use it on The Power Broker. Before starting a book, Caro thinks through the whole thing, to the end, and asks what the book is about, sometimes sitting at the desk for a long time before writing a word. The goal is to get it down to one sentence. Caro admits the inner objection that it can't be done, and the counterargument: unless it is done, three years later Caro will be writing and asking, "What am I trying to do?" So Caro tries to reduce each book to a sentence, or at most a paragraph, and make everything hang together around that point.

What Digital Archives Change, and What They Don't

Asked whether digital archives and the internet have made a difference, Caro says they are making a big difference now. For the current book on Vietnam, Caro chose to write in detail about the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley, which Caro says nobody has written about in detail, and could use a computer to find which colleges hold oral histories from soldiers who fought there and what documents exist, in a way that wasn't possible before.

Would that have changed the earlier volumes? Caro says no. It might have made finding documents faster, but given the way Caro works, Caro would have read the documents anyway. Caro had been thinking about this recently, finds it hard to explain, and says Caro doesn't think the work would have gone any faster, while admitting to being unable to say exactly why. The closest explanation Caro offers: finding documents is a small thing compared to reading them.

46:27

The 350,000 Words Cut From The Power Broker

The host asks how a 40-something Caro in 1975 would have reacted to learning that the Johnson volumes then being planned would take more than 40 years. Caro gives what Caro calls a long but accurate answer, beginning with The Power Broker. Caro submitted a manuscript of 1,050,000 words to editor Bob Gottlieb. Caro was determined that it be a single volume, and the most that could fit, which Caro says Gottlieb worked hard to achieve, was about 700 pages or about 700,000 words, meaning 350,000 words had to be cut. Gottlieb, Caro says, has said he cut a lot of the best material he ever read. Caro feels it is tragic that no one knows that material; people still ask about things, Caro tells them it was written, and they point out that no one ever read it.

Yet Caro doesn't think Caro would have changed anything. Even while writing, Caro knows a passage will be too long and will have to be cut, but says Caro doesn't seem to have the ability not to write what Caro believes should be written.

48:57

An Archive for Future Historians

Caro keeps cabinets of interview notes and working notes in the next room, much of it never published. What scholarship does Caro hope it will support? Caro says there is so much cut from the books that Caro wishes people knew, and sometimes, reading the news, thinks that if Caro had written about a subject, newspapers would cover it differently.

The "easy example" Caro gives is Sam Rayburn. Caro's books contain only a brief chapter on him, but Caro considers him a great figure in American history who ran the House of Representatives, passed many of Roosevelt's bills and others, and did so much for the country, yet has no good biography. It is a tragedy to Caro that people don't know this, and the material to know it is in those cabinets. Caro says there are around 700 interviews for The Power Broker alone, with detailed typed notes, which Caro thinks could help people understand how New York evolved. For the Johnson presidency, too, there is understanding in the files that won't make it into the books. Caro interviewed many senators and their assistants for the Senate volume and says the vast majority of what Caro learned, declining to put a figure like 90% on it, is not in the books but is in the files.

That is why Caro gave the archive to the New-York Historical Society. Caro says other institutions offered a lot more money, and Caro accepted a great deal less, an amount that mattered a lot to Caro, because Caro wanted the archive in New York and easily accessible, not, for instance, at the University of Texas where researchers would have to fly in. When the host remarks that the research will pay dividends for generations of scholars, Caro responds simply: "Well, hope so."

53:05

The Lives Behind the Biography: The Hill Country

The host notes that much of what Caro describes, the Gold Coast and tenements of New York, the Hill Country during frontier settlement, would be fascinating even if Johnson had never become president, and wonders whether one could spend decades on the biography of an ordinary person. Caro picks up the Hill Country example. Despite all the Western movies, when Caro began learning about the people who settled Johnson City, Johnson's ancestors only a generation or two back, Caro found it extraordinary: what it meant to move your family to the frontier, in part to Indian country, where your family might be massacred one day, among many other hardships. Caro's notes are full of this, because people talking about Johnson would also talk about their grandfathers and what their grandfathers had told them. There are many books on that era, Caro acknowledges, but Caro thinks there are not enough.

Asked whether Johnson felt the gulf between his upbringing and the country he led in the 1960s, Caro says yes; Johnson was very aware of the frontier and of what his grandfather's land had been like. The Johnson Ranch lay 18 miles beyond Johnson City, and growing up there, Caro says, formed character differently. Loneliness was a big part of it. Caro wrote a section on Johnson's mother and her loneliness that had to be cut to about three pages; Caro recalls a line describing how she could walk up a hill in the afternoon and see nothing but more hills, with no other houses nearby.

Caro was personally shocked by this while interviewing elderly people who had grown up with Johnson. One woman gave directions: drive 22 miles out of Austin, look for a cattle guard on the left, turn onto the dirt road, and it's 22 miles to the farm. Caro drove those 22 miles without passing another house or another person, and she had lived there all her life. Caro is not sure America understands the heroism involved, setting aside Indians and raiders, simply in the loneliness of life for those people.

58:31

Caro's Own Loneliness

The host closes on that theme: Caro lives in New York City, not on a remote ranch, but Caro and Ina have worked essentially alone for a very long time. How has loneliness affected Caro's work and life? "A lot," Caro says. Caro comes to the office in the morning, turns off the phone, and talks to no one all day. Caro describes being a friendly person, which makes this hard at times; Caro would sometimes like to pick up the phone and chat, but tells themself it would break the concentration on the book. Caro acknowledges this may sound "phony," but says it is true. Caro thinks it has affected Caro's entire life: calls don't get returned until the end of the day, and while some friends understand, many people don't. That, Caro concludes, is simply a fact of Caro's life.