Old Nick and the Patriot: Ada Palmer on What Machiavelli Was Actually Doing

Open on YouTube ↗
Overview

Historian and novelist Ada Palmer of the University of Chicago returns to Dwarkesh's podcast to argue that Niccolò Machiavelli is badly misread. The popular image is of a cynical manual for self-advancement. Palmer reads The Prince as something else: a secret, proprietary study of how to keep a fragile state alive. It was written by a diplomat who had watched the most dangerous men in Europe up close, and who, after being tortured and exiled, refused to offer his knowledge to anyone except the regime that had wronged him. The conversation covers why Italy was so unstable, what Machiavelli learned at Cesare Borgia's side, how patronage held Renaissance society together, and how the book came to be remembered as the opposite of what its author intended.

31 min read

Why Italy Was "in Ruin"

The host starts with the last chapter of The Prince, where Machiavelli tells Lorenzo di Piero de' Medici that he alone can rescue Italy from ruin. Palmer gives a two-part explanation.

The first part is the city-state structure. Palmer describes a general political principle: a government that has held power for a long time has legitimacy, and people are used to its institutions even when they complain about them. Once that continuity is broken, it tends to keep breaking. One regime change is often followed by several more in quick succession. Palmer cites France alternating between republic and restored monarchy, and England's Wars of the Roses. When Machiavelli was born, six or seven Italian city-states had recently had their governments uprooted. By the time he wrote The Prince, Palmer says, that number had grown to dozens, a majority of them. From his point of view almost no government had staying power, and every one of them was ripe for another overthrow.

The second part is the papacy. Palmer describes a ratchet of executive norms. Over Machiavelli's lifetime and just before it, successive popes expanded their military power. One pope overthrew a city's government to install an illegitimate son. The next did it to three cities, the one after that to five. Eventually even a fairly decent pope inherited the assumption that popes knock over governments. Papal succession also could not be predicted. Popes were elected, not born, and Palmer notes that the winner was often put in by a coalition of everyone who hated the previous pope. As a working assumption she suggests roughly ten years per pontificate. That means that about once a decade, Italy got a new and unpredictable monarch who was probably hostile to his predecessor and would undo his arrangements.

Palmer argues this produced a perfect storm. Italy's polities had lost their thread of legitimacy, and nothing could stop the turnover of popes. The only thing that could impose stability was a hereditary power strong enough near Rome to influence who became the next pope, which is what Cesare Borgia had attempted. So Machiavelli wanted the Medici to stabilize Italy rather than unify it. They would need to hold enough territory that the papacy had to negotiate with them instead of dominating a ring of weak, constantly overturned neighbors. The host points out that a Medici was pope at that moment, which made the plan more plausible.

At the Side of Valentino

Before he wrote The Prince, Machiavelli worked as a diplomat and met many of the major rulers of his day. Palmer argues that he tries throughout the book to hide how much more Cesare Borgia ("Valentino") matters to him than anyone else. The disguise slips at one point. Describing Valentino's fall, after he had conquered nearly all of central Italy and then fell ill at the same moment as his father, Pope Alexander VI, Machiavelli could have written impersonally that Valentino planned for every contingency except his own incapacity. Instead he writes "he told me" that he had planned for everything else. For Palmer this is the moment the historian can no longer stay out of the text. Machiavelli watched the other rulers from a distance, but he was in the room with Valentino. Contemporary accounts of Borgia range from "the most charismatic leader I've ever met" to claims that he must be the Antichrist or the angel of death.

Palmer calls Machiavelli's assignment "the scariest job in the world." The Borgia plan was to conquer the Papal States, and Tuscany sat like a missing puzzle piece in their side. Anyone looking at a map could see Florence would have to be taken, and it could not be defended. Machiavelli advised his republic to buy time. It should swear total loyalty, hand over money and troops, help Borgia conquer everyone else, and betray its allies, including Bologna, whom Florence had been bound to defend for 300 years. Palmer compares the outcome Florence hoped for to Polyphemus's promise to Odysseus: "I like you, my guest. I'll eat you last."

The host asks whether this contradicts Machiavelli's own warning in The Prince never to rise with the help of stronger powers. Palmer says it does not, because Florence was not trying to rise. It knew it would lose. Machiavelli says openly that if Alexander had lived another year, Valentino would have finished his conquests and taken Florence. But popes die, and sometimes buying time is the only way to survive.

Machiavelli was also with Borgia at Senigallia. Borgia learned that some of his captains had plotted against him and then backed out out of fear. He told them he forgave them and that they had passed the test, invited them to a banquet, and had them all killed. Palmer describes letters from Machiavelli's family in Florence who, because the postal system had broken down, waited months to find out whether he had died in the massacre. Palmer notes that Dante treats this kind of betrayal of hospitality as so grave that a devil takes over the sinner's body while they are still alive. Yet it worked: Valentino's remaining men became more loyal than before and would not even whisper complaints.

Fortune, Outcomes, and Why the Means Matter

Borgia's kingdom fell apart anyway. As Palmer tells it, he ate the same thing as his father and got the same food poisoning, his puppet pope Pius III died too quickly, and Julius II outmaneuvered him. If those things had not all happened in a row, the kingdom would have survived. Machiavelli's lesson is that at most half of what determines outcomes is in our control, and the other half is fortune. Palmer calls Machiavelli the origin of utilitarian thought, and she stresses a refinement: he judges actions not by their actual results but by the most probable result before fortune stepped in. People looked at the Borgias' fall, with their coats of arms chiseled off every wall in Rome (Palmer says you can still see the scars in pizzerias), and concluded that one should not act as they did. Machiavelli concluded the opposite. They did everything right, so they should be imitated.

The host says his own misconception had been that Machiavelli thinks only ends matter. After reading the books he found Machiavelli deeply concerned with means, because the way power is gained determines how stable it will be. Power won through mercenaries or great allies is precarious. On lying, the host notes that Machiavelli thinks breaking your word can be fine, since people forget. Palmer says it is subtler than that. Savonarola, a religious demagogue, kept making prophecies and then revising them. His authority rested on the belief that he was divinely inspired and could not be wrong, so exposed untruths hurt him badly. Borgia betrayed allies repeatedly, but because he was so frightening, his remaining allies responded by trying harder to stay in favor. Savonarola was charismatic but not frightening. Decades after his death, Michelangelo said, "I still hear his voice." That was not enough once he started flip-flopping. So lying is acceptable only if other conditions are met. A prince who has invested in being loved has to keep that up or cultivate fear alongside it, and a prince who is feared can do things a loved one cannot.

On "better to be feared than loved," the host reads Machiavelli as a cynic who thinks people will behave as badly as they are allowed to, whether they are tyrants, nobles, or commoners. The host compares this to the reasoning behind American checks and balances. Palmer adds that Machiavelli is, as far as we know, the first in the European tradition to suggest that a state could sustain more than one political party at once, with competition releasing social tension. He drew on Siena as an example. The usual view, Palmer says, was that parties could not coexist until one had been wiped out. Florence had massacred its Ghibellines and salted the ground where their houses stood, and then the Black and White Guelphs immediately started killing each other.

Reputation and the Annual Bribe Budget

The host raises Machiavelli's emphasis on how formidable a ruler is perceived to be. As a diplomat, Machiavelli was often sent to judge whether a foreign ruler was a serious threat. Maximilian, for example, was demanding a bribe not to invade. Palmer explains that this was routine. Paying an invader to leave was more reliable than fighting, and fighting meant ruined estates and economic losses. In Palmer's description, Florence effectively had a yearly "bribing-a-king budget," and the question was whether Maximilian deserved it or whether the money should be kept for Naples, France, Milan, or Venice.

Why Catholics Fought the Pope

The host asks what it means for Catholics to wage war on the pope. Palmer's answer is proximity. In Denmark or Iceland, the pope is abstract. A legate arrives with great ceremony, a street gets renamed, and papal judgments come from far away, so the differences between one pope and the next are barely visible. In Italy, the pope is someone you know: the man who beat up your brother at college, whose family, allies, and dirty laundry you are familiar with. Italians saw Giuliano della Rovere, not "Julius II." And when a pope took office, his relatives were promoted across Italy and everyone else was pushed out.

This is how Guelphs and Ghibellines could end up fighting popes. In theory, Guelphs held that the pope was the rightful heir of the Roman emperors and ruler of Italy. Ghibellines held that when the pope crowned Charlemagne he handed temporal power to the emperor. Palmer says that three centuries later the labels mostly meant "those jerks murdered Uncle Tybalt." When a pope from a Ghibelline family promoted anti-papal allies, the pro-papal faction would unite against him. Florence sometimes went to war with Rome to defend papal authority against the pope himself.

Palmer's example is what she calls the most passive-aggressive letter ever written. When a new pope was elected, each polity sent its highest-ranking available person to deliver an oath of obedience, which involved literally kissing the pope's feet. Lorenzo de' Medici (the grandfather and namesake of The Prince's dedicatee) did this for Sixtus IV. Sixtus then organized the Pazzi conspiracy, which killed Lorenzo's brother. When Innocent VIII, a puppet of the same faction, was elected, Lorenzo sent his son with an apology: the last time, he had a brother to leave in charge of the state, and since he now had no brother, he could not come in person.

A Church Growing More Corrupt

Palmer argues that the papacy became steadily more corrupt, and she explains why. With each generation, more bequests went to the Church, such as a childless widow leaving her property to a monastery. More wealth meant more power, which gave every ambitious family more reason to put a second son into the Church. This reached all the way down. Palmer describes letters in which Machiavelli and his relatives discuss the right size of bribe to buy a priesthood for his younger brother Totto, and complain that a rival family had outbid them. They treat it as ordinary. Palmer places the family in Florence's top 5 percent of wealth but not the top 1 percent.

She frames this as a prisoner's dilemma. A duke who does not manipulate the Church risks his enemies doing so, so manipulation becomes defensive. Kings needed popes for bishoprics and for dispensations to marry, since the person they wanted to marry was almost always a cousin. Palmer notes that every generation said popes were worse than when they were young: Dante around 1300, Machiavelli's grandparents' generation around 1400, Machiavelli around 1500. In her telling, their lived experience was accurate, and the accumulation eventually led to the Reformation. Machiavelli anticipated this in principle. He held that all institutions gradually become corrupt and must be returned to their foundations or they will collapse. He believed that without St. Francis, and to some extent St. Dominic, Christianity would already have collapsed two centuries earlier.

Patronage as the Glue of Society

The host observes that patronage was far more important to political power then. Palmer goes further: it was the fundamental glue of society, not one glue among several. When Alessandro Farnese became Paul III and appointed a competent general instead of his own illegitimate son to lead the papal armies, Romans rioted and demanded more nepotism. A son rises and falls with his father and would never turn the army against Rome, while an outsider might. Because communications were slow, soldiers swore loyalty to their commander rather than to the state, so giving someone an army meant trusting that person completely. Family ties that bound generations together provided that trust.

Criminal trials are, for Palmer, the clearest window onto patronage. Medieval and Renaissance law codes prescribed death for many offenses, but she says maybe one in a hundred convictions ended in execution, and most ended in fines or floggings. The reason was patronage. A carpenter whose son killed someone in a drunken fight would ask the family he worked for to intervene, and the judges would be lenient. Palmer ties this to a religious theory of justice that she contrasts with the Enlightenment ideal of equal sentences. The trial was meant to correct the sinner's soul: fear before a judge who stands in for God, a plea through a patron who stands in for a patron saint, then mercy, as a preview of divine judgment. Even the condemned were accompanied to the gallows by confraternities holding an image of the Virgin in front of them. So the one execution in a hundred usually meant someone had fallen out of the patronage network.

Palmer's examples come from the Inquisition. Giordano Bruno survived several earlier Inquisition investigations because patrons spoke up for him. The trial that ended in his burning began when a patron he had angered denounced him as a charlatan. Pico della Mirandola, whom Palmer calls substantially more radical than Bruno, was released to house arrest under Lorenzo de' Medici after Lorenzo went through his Orsini brother-in-law. Marsilio Ficino, who wrote about projecting the soul and summoning angels, once recommended a young scholar to the King of Hungary as the reincarnation of St. Thomas Aquinas. The Inquisition came to ask about reincarnation, Lorenzo contacted Cardinal Orsini, and Ficino promised to teach angel-summoning only to very pious people. Palmer says you could not even stay at an inn or buy an apple as a stranger without a letter from a patron.

Neutral Justice and the Borgia Paradox

The host pulls the threads together. In the Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli attributes Rome's decline partly to generals who spent years on distant frontiers until their troops were loyal to them rather than to Rome. The host argues that fast communication, impartial justice, and an impartial welfare state are what let a modern state claim loyalty that used to go to commanders and patrons.

Palmer responds with what surprised Borgia's contemporaries. He conquered central Italian cities, killed as much of the ruling families as he could, and imposed authoritarian rule, and he became popular. Because he and his men had no stake in local feuds, they administered justice neutrally. Before, the carpenter's son went free if his family's patrons were in power and was executed if they were not. Now the verdict was the same either way, and long-resented elites were finally punished. The people joined Borgia's armies and manned his fortresses. Machiavelli concluded that a conqueror who is feared but not hated can hold on.

Liberty, and Why the Medici Were the Gentlest Fall

So why would Borgia ruling Florence have been so bad? Palmer gives two answers. First, for Machiavelli, anyone living where a man can point at you in the street and have you killed is a slave. Where there must be a trial and a public process, there is liberty, even if the system is biased and even if it is the system that tortured Machiavelli. A benevolent tyrant still ends that, and his successor could be worse. Palmer notes how much Florentines cared about this despite having almost no political participation. They risked their lives under the LIBERTAS banner, which was the emblem of a Signoria drawn from a tiny elite. In effect they were fighting for their boss's boss's right to govern.

Second, when the host asks whether the Medici were exactly that kind of tyrant, Palmer draws a distinction between conquest from inside and conquest from outside. The Medici loved Florence and wanted it to remain Florence. They would never threaten to tear down its walls or cathedral. Palmer says Florence under a Medici duke looked more like itself than Milan did under the Visconti or Sforza, or Ferrara under the Este. If Florence had to fall, falling to the Medici was the gentlest outcome, though perhaps the least stable, since they would be feared less.

Art as a Proxy for War

The host asks how a society at constant war paid for so much art, pointing to Palmer's estimate, from her book, that the elder Lorenzo spent the equivalent of about $30 million on a library to educate his grandsons. Palmer says half the answer is that banking and the wool trade were enormously profitable. She compares wool to Henry Ford: clothing was something people saved for the way they save for a car. The other half is that art was diplomacy, and she cites the claim that the Fulbright Program is the most cost-effective US defense spending. Florence could not afford an army that could stop France, but it could paint fleurs-de-lis on its government buildings and send the French king beautiful gifts. The art was not paid for out of surplus left over after war. It was a cheaper substitute for war, a "culture victory."

The host adds that to a French diplomat these works would have been high technology, the equivalent of an unprecedented skyscraper. Palmer agrees and says that in this period "backwards is forwards." The hoped-for future was the recovery of Rome, and whether it could be surpassed was an open question. The host asks how admirers of Rome squared this with Livy's myths and with emperors like Claudius. Palmer answers that every culture curates its history. Renaissance Italy already had plenty of tyrants, orgies, and massacres. What it did not have was seventy years of peace, so Trajan, Hadrian, and Marcus Aurelius stood out. Gibbon later called the era of the five good emperors the best time in human history. The medieval world loved Trajan so much that it accepted the legend that Gregory the Great summoned his ghost and baptized it, and Dante placed him in Paradise, even though Trajan persecuted Christians.

Sin Without Purity

The host asks whether the betrayals Machiavelli highlights, such as Borgia executing his deputy Ramiro d'Orco for the harshness Borgia had ordered, were rare, given that everyone believed such acts led to hell. Palmer says the period struggled with exactly this contradiction. Dante filled hell with Florentines, especially usurers and sodomites, and addressed Florence as "a city famous in hell." He put Paolo and Francesca, the heroes of the era's favorite love story, among the damned for adultery, which shocked readers.

But Palmer argues that pre-Reformation Christianity did not focus on purity the way Calvinism and Puritanism later would. Everyone was assumed to sin constantly and then repent, do penance, and be forgiven. St. Julian the Hospitaller, who was tricked by the devil into killing his parents and spent the rest of his life serving pilgrims, was the patron saint of murderers. Palmer says the many images of him in Florence were commissioned by people living with a killing they had committed. Dante and Savonarola objected to things like family coats of arms covering church interiors, and society answered that God forgives almost anything if you repent enough. Palmer calls this "a complicated, sophisticated hypocrisy."

Exile and a Job Application to His Torturers

Palmer notes that exile was common among major thinkers (Dante, Voltaire, Rousseau, Hobbes) and that in Florence it was usually provisional. The exile was sent to a specific place such as London or Bruges, expected to act as an unofficial envoy, and recalled after years of good behavior. Leaving the assigned place to work for someone else made the exile permanent. The Medici distrusted Machiavelli so much that they sent him to an isolated hamlet in the Tuscan countryside with no one important to talk to.

Everyone expected him to leave. Palmer lists who would have hired him: cardinals, a dozen courts, any ruler who wanted a Florentine historian to write a flattering family history, which even kings of England had sought. He stayed and wrote The Prince as a job application to the regime that had arrested and tortured him even though he had not plotted against it. Palmer calls him "possibly one of the most patriotic patriots in Earth's history." His Discourses, histories, and comedy were written for circulation. The Prince was secret and proprietary, and he shared it only with the Medici and a close circle of longtime friends. Palmer compares him to a nuclear scientist who will not let his country's secrets reach other hands, and finds it ironic that "Machiavellian" means self-serving when she considers him one of the most selfless people she has read about.

The host asks why such a polished book would be meant for so few readers. Palmer says bespoke books were normal. Alfonso the Magnanimous of Naples, famous for once throwing an urgent messenger out of his morning discussion of Plato ("a place for men in togas, not for men in armor"), paid scholars like Pontano far more than Florence paid Machiavelli to write individual princely handbooks for each of his children. One exists in a handful of copies for his daughter, the future Duchess of Ferrara, and addresses her as a prince, a term Palmer says was then gender-neutral. The author gained fame simply because people knew such a book had been written, much as a scientist can be known for secret government work. The host suggests that AI, which already writes much of what he reads, might bring back books with an audience of one. Palmer replies that such writing never disappeared. Most of what anyone reads is correspondence, and governments still commission book-length reports for a handful of readers. She mentions historian friends who write such reports for Defense Department intelligence.

How The Prince Got Out, and When It Mattered

The Medici pope allowed The Prince to be printed in 1532, and the papacy censored it 27 years later. Palmer explains that it was published because Machiavelli's surviving relatives wanted fame for their dead kinsman, and the Medici liked a book dedicated to their family. Neither took its contents as seriously as its author had. It then landed on the Index during a broader wave of censorship. Palmer offers a mini-thesis: every new information technology is followed by a wave of censorship. She recalls being disappointed to find Machiavelli's name on the Index in lowercase, because capital letters were reserved for arch-heretics, meaning Protestants.

Her general pattern is that radical books drift along until a new question makes them relevant, as Lucretius did in the 1600s with the germ theory of disease. Machiavelli's first surge followed Hobbes's Leviathan. Palmer describes roughly forty years in which Western philosophy's main project was refuting Hobbes, and critics went back to "the daddy monster that spawned the baby monster." The second surge came in the 19th century, after the Enlightenment revolutions, when people needed a way to think about politics that did not depend on God, and Machiavelli offered that. Italian nationalists also claimed him as "the first modern man," competing with England's Bacon and France's Descartes. Palmer says Machiavelli would not have recognized the phrase "separation of church and state," but would have thought it over, liked it, and written letters about it.

The host pushes back: the Discourses treat religion as essential to a republic. Numa matters more to Rome than Romulus, and Scipio stops Romans from fleeing after the defeat by Hannibal by making them swear by the gods. Palmer agrees and separates religion as an institution from religion's psychological effects. She compares Machiavelli to Thomas Paine, who called institutional churches centuries-old conspiracies but wanted mandatory religious education, no matter which religion, because fear of God makes citizens obey the law. Machiavelli argues that Roman religion, in which a ghost keeps its identity only while it is remembered, gave people strong reasons to die for their country, whereas Christianity secures salvation through inner piety and produces monks rather than soldiers. He ends that chapter by adding that Christianity has the advantage of being true, which Palmer reads as an obligatory disclaimer. The point is utilitarian: religion is weighed alongside literacy or good newspapers as something that shapes citizens, not as a truth the state must serve.

Why Original Ideas Were Dressed as Commentary

The host suggests that a boy with few books, whose father (as the host tells it) had to do months of indexing work to get a copy of Livy, would read it over and over, and asks whether that explains decades spent on the Discourses. Palmer describes a manuscript in the Vatican Library in which Machiavelli copied out all of Lucretius from a printed edition, correcting it against a manuscript and annotating it as he went. Print and manuscript coexisted. She notes that he could also use his patrons' libraries, but owning a book gave a different kind of intimacy with it.

The bigger reason, Palmer argues, is fashion. Antiquity was cutting-edge, and "nobody wants original ideas." Scholars presented new thinking as commentary. Bruno attributed to Aristotle things Aristotle never said. Annius of Viterbo, subject of a book by Tony Grafton, forged ancient texts and staged archaeological digs. Seventeenth-century political theory, including discussion of Machiavelli, lived in the footnotes of editions of Seneca. Nineteenth-century historians, who valued original thought, concluded the Renaissance had almost none apart from The Prince and Pico's Oration. Palmer says that work is neither an oration nor about the dignity of man. A philosophy colleague once told her the Renaissance was "200 years of people being wrong about Plato." Palmer's reply is that it was 200 years of original thought using the ancients as a trellis. Ficino sincerely believed his cosmology was hidden in Plato, and he was wrong. The Discourses on Livy were Machiavelli's bid for prestige, and The Prince was the oddity.

Printing Before Copyright, and the Inquisition's Role

As an adult, Machiavelli was among the first authors to find a printer publishing his work without asking, full of typesetting errors he feared would be blamed on him. His friends could only suggest writing to everyone important to explain. Palmer says copyright and censorship were born together in the Inquisition. After 1515, books needed prior approval from an inquisitor or bishop. In exchange, the approved printer got a monopoly and could use the censorship record to sue for unauthorized editions. England, she says, saw popular demand to copy this, and its early licensing system, the ancestor of Commonwealth and US copyright, imitated the Inquisition. Over the first half of the 1600s this became a system that kept "the copyright half of censorship" and dropped or changed the censorship half.

Why did the Inquisition protect authors? Palmer says it attracted cooperation, and individual inquisitors, often Dominicans without enough income, had their own interests, bottles of wine included. More importantly, the Inquisition was not the centralized power it presented itself as. Local inquisitors were weeks or months from Rome and depended on local governments for funding, guards, and jails. The Spanish Inquisition was large because Ferdinand and Isabella funded it to target Jews and Muslims. In Medici Florence, the duke could simply tell an inquisitor that someone worked for him, and surviving letters show inquisitors complaining about liberal dukes. Palmer compares the Inquisition to Doctors Without Borders: only as strong as the host government allows. This created protected bubbles. Palmer describes Machiavelli as "solidly bisexual," with poetry and letters to lovers of both sexes. His gay friends in Rome rushed to take jobs with cardinals during a crackdown, and one who failed hired two courtesans to be seen with him. Heresy and homosexuality were policed by the same structures and escaped them through the same patronage. That brings the story back to copyright. A book dedicated to a duke, like The Prince to the Medici, was one the Inquisition had reason to protect, and the Medici wanted to control its quality and make sure the dedication stayed in.

Old Nick and Niccolò

In closing, Palmer describes how some authors split into two figures: the real person and a character. There is Machiavelli the patriot, and there is the "murderous Machiavel" of Shakespeare and "Old Nick," a name for the devil that Palmer says became popular because of Niccolò. The same thing happened to Hobbes, "the Beast of Malmesbury," and to Spinoza. When you read Spinoza, Palmer says, he is warm and devoutly pantheist, but his expulsion from the Jewish community was so rare that someone had to travel across Europe to find a person who knew the ceremony, and rumor turned him into an arch-heretic. In 16th-century Spain, Palmer notes, "Machiavellian" and "Jewish" were even used interchangeably as labels for thought seen as undermining Catholic Spain.

Palmer does not dismiss the character. The Machiavellian villain is a useful thought experiment for political philosophy. But The Prince sitting on a shelf as a guide to getting ahead belongs to Old Nick, not to the man who stayed in exile and gave up wealth, fame, and company to serve his country. Palmer finds the doubling itself the most interesting part: society takes something real and intimate, creates a character from it, and uses both for different purposes. Her advice is that if you own The Prince, you should read it remembering who wrote it, and a very different Machiavelli will come through.