How AI Is Eroding Japan's Language Barrier: Google's John Hultquist on the New Shape of Cyberattacks

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Overview

Japanese companies have recently reported a string of unauthorized access incidents, data leaks, and system disruptions. In this episode of TBS CROSS DIG's "1on1 Tech," business editor Masahiro Nakagawa asks John Hultquist, chief analyst at Google Threat Intelligence Group and a veteran of more than 20 years in cybersecurity, what is driving these attacks and how AI is changing them. Hultquist's position is consistent throughout. AI has moved from a translation and advice tool to an autonomous operator for attackers. Japan has lost some of its traditional protections. Defenders need to use the same technology, and use it now, while the threat is still at an early stage.

17 min read
1:22

What Google Threat Intelligence Group Does

Hultquist describes his group's job as tracking threat actors around the world through many channels. One major source is Mandiant, the incident response company inside Google. When an organization suffers a serious cyber incident, Mandiant goes in to work out what happened. Because this happens constantly and globally, it produces a steady flow of intelligence about attacker behavior. The group also looks for threat actors in Gmail, "increasingly now" in Gemini, and in the criminal underground, using other methods he does not detail.

He explains why this matters with an analogy. Doing cybersecurity without knowing what attackers actually do, he says, is like "building walls for an enemy that's got airplanes." You can't build a solution until you know what you're facing.

2:42

Why Japan Is a Target Now

Hultquist says the recent incidents in Japan do not look coordinated. He believes they are probably the work of separate financially motivated actors who see a large opportunity. Japan has many major brands and a lot of valuable data, which makes extortion attractive. He also points to "tech debt."

He makes a broader point about how countries harden their defenses. Some nations go through a series of major breaches and harden their systems as a result. In his view, Japan has not had that experience. He says he told colleagues on a previous visit that Japan had not suffered the same serious breaches the US had, and he thinks this made organizations more reluctant to make major security investments. Attackers, he says, are now exploiting that lack of investment.

The second factor is language. Hultquist argues that the language barrier protected Japan for a very long time, because it was hard for outsiders to master Japanese or pass as Japanese. He thinks that advantage "might be eroding" now that anyone can get translation through a model.

Nakagawa asked how much of the current activity is linked to AI. Hultquist was careful: much of it "would have happened anyway." His best evidence is that criminal threat activity appears to be dropping or plateauing in the United States while rising elsewhere. He thinks attackers are always looking for new fertile ground, and working inside the Japanese language is simply a new opening for them.

He also notes a regional factor. Many phishing kits built specifically to compromise Japanese users are coming out of the Chinese underground, and that activity is increasing. When asked whether these Chinese actors use AI, he said it is "probably a major part of it." He added that there is no threat actor now that isn't using AI somewhere in its operations, because the technology is good at too many of the things they do every day.

6:30

Three Stages of AI in Attacks

Asked what AI has changed most, Hultquist describes a progression in three stages.

Social engineering. The earliest use he saw during intrusions was deception, especially through translation. He names North Korean actors as early adopters. They consistently target Japan, including with a scheme to land IT worker jobs in the country. That scheme requires a lot of conversation during job hunting, and his team has seen them use AI to carry it out.

Technical troubleshooting. In the last few years, models became able to answer highly technical questions accurately, and they are especially good at troubleshooting. "Hacking is really just technical troubleshooting," Hultquist says. His team began to see actors using Gemini for help in the middle of intrusions, including what he calls a serious cyber espionage actor. He says they would not ask outright for help stealing credentials from a network they were in. They would phrase it cleverly, for example by posing as red teamers or as someone troubleshooting, to fool the model. If the model answered without its controls triggering, he says, the answer could be very strong. "Models are really good at hacking, unfortunately."

Agentic operation. The third stage, which he says defines the current era, is agents. Models can now do this work without close human involvement. Attackers can send agents out on their behalf and need only minimal involvement themselves.

9:02

Keeping Attackers Out of Gemini

Hultquist confirms that threat actors have tried to use Gemini to carry out cyberattacks on multiple occasions. Google runs an operation to keep them out, similar to how it keeps them out of Gmail and other Google properties. The group tracks actors globally and disrupts their operations whenever they appear. He says it is important to Google to keep the technology "in the hands of the good guys."

Nakagawa pointed out that a prompt alone can't reveal whether someone is an attacker or a defender, and asked whether tracking relies on things like IP addresses. Hultquist agreed that this is a good example. The team watches for indicators of compromise (IOCs) and other known attributes of specific actors so it can shut them down when they enter Google's technology.

10:12

Every Model, Open Models, and Stolen Compute

Asked which other models attackers use, Hultquist said he has seen them use "just about every model you can imagine." They still use frontier labs' products, including GPT, whenever they can. The drawback is that commercial products have many controls. Running an operation through one also means "somebody else gets to see your entire operation," which spies and criminals want to avoid. So many actors also use open or local models that nobody else can see.

He highlights a growing trend: stealing compute. Attackers opportunistically compromise someone's server, install a local model, and run it on the victim's expensive processing power. This gives them tokens for free. Hultquist calls this a big concern: while legitimate users pay for tokens, attackers who steal access may gain "a bit of a token advantage."

Nakagawa asked whether attacks require frontier-level models. Hultquist said "not anymore." Many open models are now capable enough to handle different parts of an attack. He says it is still rare to see a single intrusion run end to end, "soup to nuts," by one system. Attacks are still carried out in portions, which lets actors mix different models.

Asked whether giant agents are already coordinating entire operations, he said there have been some highly orchestrated cases, but they still likely involved many models. He expects things to move toward fuller orchestration: "we'll get there." He gives two reasons attackers currently split operations up. Running everything on one model creates a single point of failure. And state actors, especially espionage actors, want tight control so they don't trigger detections on the way in, since getting caught ruins the operation.

13:41

Agentic Attack Tools and Open-Weight Models

Nakagawa mentioned reports that a Chinese agentic attack tool had been used against Japan and against Korean financial institutions the previous month. Hultquist said tools of this kind have been showing up often in incidents and in chatter. He named one tool that appears in many incidents (its name is unclear in the recording) and another called HexStrike, which his team has seen used in Japan. As these tools coalesce, he expects they will make this work very easy and let almost any threat actor "uplevel" its operations. That means defenders will soon face much faster, larger-scale operators.

Nakagawa then raised open-weight models, citing China's GLM 5.3. He noted that AI labs such as Anthropic had argued that releasing such models causes harm by putting them in attackers' hands, and asked whether Hultquist agreed. He did not take a position on the broader debate. He said attackers will obviously prefer models that let them work without monitoring or controls, but that he can't judge the other externalities. His point was narrower: attackers always want to stay under the radar, and if an option is strong enough, they will use it.

15:57

What Japanese Companies Should Do

On priorities for Japanese leaders, Hultquist called this "a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity" to get ahead of the threat. He expects it only to scale up and become more serious. He said the best time to act was yesterday and the second-best time is today. He described his approach as "never waste a crisis." Because organizations can now see how serious the threat is, they can invest against it. He even called the timing "kind of ideal," since this is only the beginning. Acting now gives organizations a chance to get ahead of a much larger threat and to pay down the tech debt he mentioned earlier.

17:13

What Individuals Can Do

Hultquist said most of this activity targets enterprises, not individuals, although individuals' information gets swept up in it. He gave two ways individuals can still be drawn in.

First, attackers using models often obtain a random person's credentials and then use that person's account to carry out what can become a major incident. "You don't want to be a part of that," he said. His advice is to lock down accounts so that you are the only one using them.

Second, he said state threat actors in Japan very often come through small office and home office routers. Everyone can help by power cycling home routers and keeping their firmware updated so third parties can't exploit them. These steps may not directly protect the individual, but they make things harder for the adversary.

18:58

Who Is Attacking Japan, and the Extortion Business Model

Hultquist said state-backed hackers from China, Russia, and North Korea have long been interested in Japan and are active worldwide. Most of the recent incidents, however, come from financially motivated cybercriminals whose business model is extortion.

He described how that model works. Because attackers can demand payment directly in cryptocurrency, any stress they put on a target can be turned straight into money. They only need enough pressure to get a payout. He traced the history in steps:

  1. Criminals first targeted individuals by encrypting single computers with ransomware.
  2. They realized companies cared more and paid more.
  3. They then found that leaking data could be a more powerful lever than disruption alone.

Today, he said, they increasingly leak data rather than only disrupting systems. They will use anything that adds pressure, including threats against CEOs, which his team has seen more often, and other disruptions such as DoS attacks.

20:51

How Google Defends Itself

Asked how Google handles attacks at its scale, Hultquist said Google, like every major organization, is targeted, including routinely by opportunistic actors. A core practice is using intelligence to anticipate what to expect, then reviewing Google's own infrastructure to address those weaknesses. Inside Google, he said, you can't really discuss next steps in security without first looking at what attackers are doing: who they are, what they want, and what is likely coming. He suggested organizations elsewhere need the same approach. Google faces this challenge internally too, because the technology is changing fast and it has to keep up.

Nakagawa cited reports that Google's security teams were already using Gemini to fix vulnerabilities. Hultquist said Google has been doing this kind of work for a few years. He described a program called Big Sleep, built to find vulnerabilities. It started on models he says we would now call "prehistoric," much less sophisticated than today's. What made it effective was a strong harness of code built around the model by vulnerability and exploit experts.

Google first used Big Sleep to review its own code, then open-source code, and began finding very serious vulnerabilities. When it reported them to open-source projects, it received a lot of negative feedback. The reason was that the more vulnerabilities Google found, the harder it became for maintainers to keep up. The lesson, Hultquist said, was that finding vulnerabilities isn't enough. AI also has to help fix them. That led to CodeMender, which Google runs internally and offers externally. It identifies vulnerabilities and proposes options for fixing them. "If you're not doing both sides," he said, you're not getting the full benefit of the technology.

24:15

Self-Replicating AI and Threats to Critical Infrastructure

Nakagawa asked about the risk that AI could launch attacks on its own or copy itself onto systems it has compromised, referring to a report Anthropic had published a few weeks earlier. Hultquist said he had not read the report. He acknowledged that self-replicating, worm-like malware has long been a concern and that intelligent capabilities make it a real threat. The hard part, in his view, is access to a model. Such malware can't operate independently without access to "the brain," and he said it remains to be seen how that plays out.

The conversation then turned to physical harm, prompted by a recent cyberattack on a French supermarket food logistics system. Hultquist explained that attackers who are genuinely skilled at targeting critical infrastructure are very few. "We know their names... we know where they live," he said. They come from around the world and generally have deep technical training, often in industrial control systems, which he described as obscure technology and "a whole another level of nerd."

His concern is that AI opens this obscure technology to many more people, because it can walk them through it. He gave a personal example. He is building a robot at home, something he says he has "no business" doing because it is far outside his expertise. Working with a model, he can do things he never could before. It isn't perfect, but he says he is making major progress. He expects the same to apply to complex critical infrastructure systems. Attackers who didn't understand these systems before can now use a model to guide them, so the threat to critical infrastructure "is absolutely growing."

His response is that these systems have relied heavily on "security through obscurity," meaning they were secure mainly because they were hard to understand. Stronger controls will need to be put in place and funded, including controls that never existed. He also called for a broad view of what counts as critical infrastructure. People think first of power plants, but the French case shows how essential systems like food logistics can be overlooked.

28:14

Who Has the Advantage

Asked whether attackers or defenders benefit more from AI, Hultquist said that in theory attackers always move first. They lack the bureaucracy and the safeguards that defenders have, which he noted exist for good reasons. For defenders, moving quickly requires money and investment, and he said that unfortunately this usually doesn't happen without serious incidents first.

Attackers also have a large freedom to experiment. A bank robber risks jail or injury if things go wrong, but a cyberattacker whose operation fails can just restart it. That flexibility helps them learn new technology first.

Still, Hultquist said he has been "pleasantly surprised" by how some organizations have responded on vulnerabilities. After major discussion of models' ability to find vulnerabilities, many organizations took it seriously and are already running their code through major models for review. He called this "absolutely fantastic" and a cornerstone of the future approach. The other challenge is what he called the "swarm effect" of scaled-up attacks. Defenders will need to raise their game, probably using AI themselves, and he said how fast that happens "is really up to us."

30:23

Five Years Out: Good and Bad Scenarios

In the good scenario, Hultquist said, systems are locked down and models and agents handle many security tasks that have long been done at human speed and scale. With those in place, he believes defenders will have "a fighting chance" to keep up with the latest models. Without them, "we're just going to be overwhelmed."

In the bad scenario, a massive series of intrusions leaves "all of our data out... outside of our own control." He called this very realistic if action isn't taken now.

Nakagawa asked what would happen if all systems were disrupted. Hultquist, who has spent much of his career on disruptive attacks, answered calmly: generally, "we'll be fine." It would be a massive nuisance, and the biggest effect of many disruptions is psychological. But people will find a way to get groceries where they need to go, the water will come back on, and the trains will run again. He added that it would still be bad for economic outcomes and for people's lives, and that this is why it should be prevented.