Terence Tao on Kepler, Verification, and Why AI Makes Mathematics Broader but Not Yet Deeper

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Overview

In this conversation, Dwarkesh Patel asks Terence Tao how AI fits into the way science and mathematics make progress. They start with a historical case: how Kepler found the laws of planetary motion. Patel suggests that Kepler's method resembles what AI systems can do now, which is to try many relationships against a trusted dataset until one fits. Tao accepts part of the analogy but pushes the discussion elsewhere. In Tao's view, AI has made generating ideas nearly free. The hard parts now are verifying ideas, judging which ones matter, and building up understanding step by step. Tao describes current AI as strong in breadth and weak in depth. Tao's own papers have become richer with AI assistance but not deeper, and Tao expects human–AI collaboration, not autonomous AI, to dominate mathematics for a long time.

39 min read

Kepler's Long Road from Platonic Solids to Ellipses

Patel asks Tao to open with the Kepler story. Tao, who describes a longstanding amateur interest in astronomy, tells it in stages. Kepler built on Copernicus, who in turn built on Aristarchus. Copernicus put the Sun at the center and had the planets move in perfect circles, and this model fit the observations that Greek, Arab, and Indian astronomers had accumulated over centuries.

Kepler noticed that the ratios between the orbit sizes in Copernicus's model seemed to carry geometric meaning. Six planets were known at the time, which left five gaps between them, and there are exactly five Platonic solids: the cube, tetrahedron, icosahedron, octahedron, and dodecahedron. Kepler proposed that the solids nest between the planetary spheres. For example, if Earth's orbit is enclosed in a cube, the sphere around that cube almost matches the orbit of Mars. Kepler found the theory beautiful and took it as evidence that God had designed the planets to follow mathematical perfection.

Testing the theory required data, and Tao says only one high-quality dataset existed. Tycho Brahe, a wealthy and eccentric Danish astronomer, had persuaded the Danish government to fund an expensive observatory that occupied an entire island. There Tycho recorded decades of naked-eye observations of the planets on every clear night. Tao calls Tycho the last of the naked-eye astronomers. Tycho guarded the data and shared only small pieces with Kepler. In Tao's account, Kepler eventually copied the data and then had to fight Tycho's descendants over it.

The data showed that the Platonic-solid theory was off by roughly 10%. Kepler tried many adjustments, such as moving the circles around, and none of them worked. After years of effort, Kepler worked out how to reconstruct the actual orbits from the observations. Tao calls this a feat of genius-level data analysis. The orbits turned out to be ellipses, which shocked Kepler. From this came the first two laws: planets move in ellipses, and they sweep out equal areas in equal times. About ten years later, after struggling most with the distant planets Jupiter and Saturn, Kepler found the third law, which relates a planet's orbital period to a power of its distance from the Sun. Kepler had no explanation for any of the three laws. They came purely from data, and a theory that explained all three at once had to wait for Newton about a century later.

Was Kepler a "High-Temperature LLM"?

Patel offers a provocative reading: Kepler was a "high-temperature LLM." Across a whole career, Kepler tried relationships that were often random. The third law appears as an aside in The Harmonies of the World, a book about the musical harmonies of the planets. The book claims, for example, that Earth's note is mi-fa-mi, and that this explains the famine and misery on Earth. Somewhere inside this astrology sits the relationship between period and distance. Combined with Newton's F=ma and the formula for centripetal acceleration, that relationship yields the inverse-square law. Patel's point is that LLMs could plausibly spend "twenty years" trying random relationships, many of them nonsensical, provided there is a verifiable data bank like Tycho's. When one relationship works, the empirical regularity can drive deep scientific progress later.

Tao agrees that generating ideas is an important part of the process. Science has a dozen components: finding a problem, choosing a fruitful one, collecting data, planning the analysis, forming a hypothesis, validating it, and writing it up. The eureka moment of idea generation is the part people celebrate. Kepler cycled through many ideas that failed, and Tao guesses that many of them were never published. But Tao stresses that generation has to be matched by an equal amount of verification, "otherwise it's slop." Tycho deserves credit too, Tao says, because the data was about ten times more precise than any earlier observations, and Kepler needed that extra decimal place. Kepler also had to use the most advanced mathematics then available, Euclidean geometry, to compare models with data. Data, theory, and hypothesis generation all had to work together.

Tao then says hypothesis generation may no longer be the bottleneck. Science once had two paradigms, theory and experiment. Numerical simulation arrived in the 20th century, and big data in the late 20th century. Much progress now comes from collecting huge datasets first and extracting patterns afterward, which reverses the classic method of starting with an idea and then gathering data to test it. Tao notes that even Kepler began with preconceived theories rather than with Tycho's dataset.

Patel argues that Kepler's story actually fits the data-first description well. The polygon and Platonic-solid ideas came in 1595–96 and were wrong. Only after Kepler obtained Tycho's data did twenty years of trying things produce a real regularity. Without the data, Patel says, Kepler would just have written books about harmonics with nothing to check them against.

Six Data Points and the Cautionary Case of Bode's Law

Tao clarifies the distinction. The traditional pattern is to form a hypothesis and test it. Modern statistics and machine learning let researchers start from data and derive laws that were not proposed beforehand. The third law was partly like this, but Kepler had only about six data points: one orbital period and one distance for each known planet. Kepler did what would now be called regression, fitting a curve to those points. Tao says Kepler was lucky that six points led to the correct conclusion, because that is too little data to be reliable.

As a counterexample, Tao describes Johann Bode. Inspired by Kepler, Bode fit the planetary distances to a shifted geometric progression. The fit had a gap between Mars and Jupiter, so it predicted a missing planet. Tao calls the idea "kind of a crank theory." Then Herschel discovered Uranus, and its distance fit the pattern exactly. Ceres was found in the asteroid belt and also fit. People became excited that Bode had discovered a new law of nature. Then Neptune was discovered, and its distance was far off. The pattern had been a numerical fluke. Tao suggests that one reason Kepler emphasized the third law less than the first two may be that Kepler sensed, without modern statistics, that conclusions from six data points should be held tentatively.

Idea Generation Is Nearly Free; Verification Is the Bottleneck

Patel asks the question behind the analogy directly. Suppose there are millions of increasingly capable AIs searching every field for empirical regularities like the third law, so that someone later can explain them. Is that the bottleneck in science?

Tao answers that AI has pushed the cost of idea generation close to zero, much as the internet did for the cost of communication. That is remarkable, but it does not create abundance by itself. People can now produce thousands of theories for one scientific problem, and all of them need to be verified and evaluated. Science has traditionally built walls against low-quality input. Amateur theories of the universe existed long before AI, and peer review and publication systems grew up to filter out noise and isolate high-signal ideas. Now plausible explanations can be produced at massive scale, some good and many terrible, and human reviewers are already overwhelmed. Tao notes that many journals report floods of AI-generated submissions. Verification, validation, and judging which ideas move a field forward all have to catch up. For a single paper, scientists can argue and reach consensus within a few years. That process does not work for a thousand papers a day.

How Would Anyone Recognize the Next Unifying Idea?

Patel brings up Bell Labs in the 1940s. Many papers dealt with the engineering details of pulse-code modulation and with sending digitized signals over analog wires. One of them introduced the bit, an idea whose consequences reached probability, computer science, and many other fields. If AIs produce the next unifying concept, how would anyone spot it among millions of papers that are useful but not unifying?

Tao says much of it comes down to the test of time. Many great ideas were received poorly at first and mattered only after other scientists extended them into their own fields. Deep learning was a niche part of AI for a long time, and the idea of getting answers through training on data rather than from first principles was controversial until it began to pay off. Tao also argues that success depends on context. Other computer architectures were proposed besides binary, including three-valued logic, and in another universe a different paradigm might have won. The transformer was the first deep learning architecture sophisticated enough to capture language, but some other architecture could have been first and become the standard. Base ten works much better than Roman numerals, yet ten is not special. It is useful because everyone uses it and every system is built around it, so people are now stuck with it despite occasional proposals for alternatives. For these reasons, Tao says, a scientific achievement cannot be graded objectively in isolation, without knowing both its past and its future. So judging ideas "may never be something that you can just reinforcement learn" the way more localized problems can be.

The Right Theory Often Looks Worse at First

Patel adds that a new theory which later proves correct often has implications that seem absurd at the time. Some of those implications are correct but look implausible. Others are wrong, and people only later understand why. Aristarchus proposed heliocentrism in the third century BC. Critics objected that stellar parallax should then be visible unless the stars were extraordinarily far away, and in fact they are that far away. Leibniz criticized Newton's gravity for implying action at a distance without a mechanism. Newton was puzzled that inertial mass equals gravitational mass. Einstein resolved both problems later, yet Newton's theory was still progress. Patel's question for AI peer review: even when a theory can be falsified, how would anyone recognize that it is still an advance?

Tao agrees and says the eventually correct theory is often worse at first. Copernicus's model was less accurate than Ptolemy's. Geocentrism had been refined for about a millennium with increasingly complicated ad hoc fixes. Copernicus's model was far simpler, but only after Kepler did heliocentrism become more accurate than Ptolemy's system. A partial solution can look worse than a wrong theory that has been patched until it answers every question.

Tao also argues that progress often comes from removing assumptions rather than adding theories. Geocentrism lasted partly because of the Aristotelian belief that objects naturally tend to rest. Under that belief, a moving Earth raises the question of why people are not knocked over. Newton's laws of motion removed the problem, but realizing that the Earth moves was a large conceptual leap because the motion cannot be felt. Tao says Darwin's central idea, that species are not static, was similarly hard to see, because evolution was not visible within one lifetime. Tao adds that it now can be observed.

Tao sees the present as a cognitive version of the Copernican revolution. People used to treat human intelligence as the center of the universe. Now they are finding very different kinds of intelligence with very different strengths and weaknesses, and they have to rethink which tasks require intelligence. Tao says people are struggling to fit AI into their theories of what is hard and what is easy, and have to ask questions that perhaps only philosophers asked before.

Darwin, Newton, and the Role of Persuasion

Patel cites Edward Dolnick's The Clockwork Universe. On the Origin of Species appeared in 1859, nearly two centuries after the Principia in 1687, even though Darwin's idea seems conceptually simpler. Thomas Huxley reportedly said, "How stupid not to have thought of that," and nobody says that about Newton. Patel's explanation is that the evidence for natural selection is overwhelming but cumulative and retrospective. Newton could simply compare the equations with the Moon's orbital period and distance. Lucretius had an idea of species adapting to their environments in the first century BC, but no experiment could force anyone to pay attention. Patel wonders whether progress will favor fields with tight, easily verified feedback loops even when those fields are conceptually harder.

Tao emphasizes a different factor: communication. Darwin wrote persuasively in plain English, without equations, and brought scattered facts together into a compelling vision, despite not knowing the mechanism of heredity or anything about DNA. Newton wrote in Latin, invented new mathematics to express the work, and belonged to a more secretive and competitive era. Tao says Newton held back some of the best insights to avoid helping rivals and adds, "from what I gather," that Newton was a somewhat unpleasant person. Newton's work spread widely only after others explained it more simply a couple of decades later.

Tao concludes that exposition, narrative, and persuasion are essential to science, and that these are hard to reinforcement-learn because persuasiveness is hard to score. Tao remarks that marketing departments try, and that it may be good that AI is not yet optimized for persuasion. Science includes a "soft, squishy" social side: combining data with a narrative that includes admitted gaps. Darwin could argue that transitional forms and a mechanism of inheritance would be found later, and they were. Tao does not know how to quantify that kind of argument precisely enough for reinforcement learning and suggests it may remain the human side of science.

The Deductive Overhang and Squeezing Signal from Data

Patel refers to Tao's series with 3Blue1Brown on the cosmic distance ladder. One lesson Patel took from it is that many fields may have a large "deductive overhang": with the right insight, much more could be learned from data already available. Tao says astronomy was among the first sciences to squeeze every drop of information out of its observations, because data was the bottleneck and still is. Astronomers extract conclusions from small traces of data "almost like Sherlock," and Tao has heard that quant hedge funds like to hire astronomy PhDs for this reason.

Tao thinks this kind of extraction is under-explored in general. As an example, Tao recalls a study of how often scientists actually read the papers they cite. Instead of surveying researchers, the authors tracked small typos in references, such as wrong numbers or punctuation, and measured how often a typo was copied from one citation to the next. That let them estimate how often authors copied references without checking them. Tao suggests the question of which scientific developments are fruitful might also leave measurable traces in citation patterns, conference mentions, and similar data, and that sociology of science could learn to detect them. "Maybe we should get some astronomers on the case," Tao says.

The Erdős Problems: Jumping Machines in the Dark

Patel turns to Tao's recent post: AI tools have helped solve about fifty of the roughly 1,100 Erdős problems, and progress then paused after the easy ones were taken. Tao confirms this still appears to be the case. About fifty problems have been solved with AI assistance, roughly six hundred remain, and people continue to work through one or two at a time. There was one month when AIs solved problems outright in one shot. Tao says that has stopped, and not for lack of trying. Tao knows of three separate efforts to have frontier models attack every problem at once. These found minor observations or discovered that some problems had already been solved in the literature, but produced no further purely AI solutions. AI is now used mainly inside mixed workflows. One person uses AI to suggest a proof strategy, another uses a different tool to critique or rewrite it, generate numerical data, or survey the literature. Some problems have been solved through ongoing conversations among many humans and many AI tools.

Tao offers an analogy. Picture a mountain range in the dark, with walls of three feet, six feet, fifteen feet, and cliffs a mile high, and nobody knows which is which. Mathematicians light candles, draw maps, and slowly find which walls can be climbed or where a partial route leads upward. AI tools are like jumping machines that can leap two meters, higher than any human. They sometimes jump the wrong way or crash, but they sometimes reach the tops of low walls humans could not. Released across the range, they found and cleared the low walls. Tao expects that when models improve substantially, another sweep will clear a few more. But the style of work is different. Human mathematicians hill-climb, leave markers, and identify partial results. The tools either succeed or fail and have been poor at producing partial progress or identifying intermediate goals. That links back to the earlier theme: there is still no way to evaluate partial progress the way a one-shot success or failure can be evaluated.

Breadth Versus Depth, and Experimental Mathematics at Scale

Patel presents a bearish and a bullish reading of the same facts. The bearish reading is that AIs only reach walls lower than humans can climb. The bullish reading is that once AIs reach a given level, they can take every problem at that level, which humans cannot do. Nobody can make a million copies of Tao, give each a million dollars of compute, and run a hundred subjective years of research on a million problems in parallel. Patel argues that even human-level AI, not superhuman AI, would be qualitatively broader and more powerful than human intelligence.

Tao agrees that AI is good at breadth and human experts are good at depth, and calls the two complementary. Current mathematics and science focus on depth because that is where human expertise lies and because humans cannot do breadth. Tao argues science should be redesigned to use this new breadth. That means putting more effort into broad classes of problems alongside the one or two deep problems that humans should keep working on. Moderately capable AIs could first map out entirely new fields and make all the easy observations, then identify "islands of difficulty" for human experts. Tao hopes eventually to combine breadth and depth but says the paradigms for using breadth do not exist yet. Once they do, Tao expects science to be "unrecognizable."

Patel asks whether "vibe researching" differs from vibe coding. In software, the goal is an effect on the world and understanding is instrumental. In research, solving a problem like a Millennium Prize Problem matters mostly for the new objects and techniques found along the way. Tao agrees that in mathematics the process often matters more than the problem, which serves as a proxy for measuring progress. Tao also notes that software varies. Boilerplate should be handed to AI, but programmers report that even when AI builds a first prototype, integrating and maintaining it is ongoing work, and skills not gained from writing the code can make maintenance harder. Mathematicians use problems to build intuition about what is true, what is provable, and what is hard, and getting answers immediately might interfere with that.

Tao then points to something new. Most sciences divide into theory and experiment, but mathematics has been almost entirely theoretical. Mathematicians have intuitions but have never run large-scale studies, such as testing two methods on a thousand problems to see which works better. Tao expects AI to transform this experimental side of mathematics, where the goal is large-scale data on what works rather than the details of individual problems, much as a software company releasing a thousand products looks for workflows that scale instead of handcrafting each one. Tao says mathematics at scale "is at its infancy."

How Far Can Existing Techniques Go? Selection Bias in AI Successes

Patel asks how much progress would come from applying every known technique to every open problem. Tao says there is not yet enough data to answer. Faced with a new problem, mathematicians first try the standard methods that worked on similar problems. Sometimes that succeeds, and the result is still worth publishing if the problem mattered. Sometimes one extra twist is needed. Papers in top journals are usually those where existing methods handle about 80% of the problem and a new technique must be invented for the resistant 20%. Tao says it is now rare for a problem to be solved without relying on past literature, because mathematics is mature enough that ignoring the literature is a severe handicap.

Tao says AI tools are becoming very good at the first stage, trying standard techniques, and often make fewer errors in applying them than humans do. In Tao's own tests on small tasks, the tools sometimes caught Tao's errors and Tao sometimes caught theirs: "It's about a tie right now." Tao has not seen them take the next step, when there are holes that no known method fills. They propose random ideas, but chasing those down often costs more time than it saves. Nearly all of the roughly fifty Erdős problems solved by AI had essentially no literature. Erdős had posed them once or twice, others may have tried casually without writing anything up, and the solution turned out to combine an obscure technique with an existing result. Tao calls this "the median level of what AI can accomplish" and says it is still very valuable.

Tao warns about selection bias. The successes shared on social media make it look as if decades-old problems are falling one after another. Systematic sweeps show that an AI tool has a success rate of maybe 1–2% on any given problem. The tools can buy scale, and people pick out the winners. Tao expects the same pattern with prestigious hard problems. Some AI may get lucky and find a backdoor everyone missed, which will get heavy publicity, and then people will try the tools on their own favorite problems and again see 1–2% success. Tao considers it increasingly important to build standardized challenge sets rather than rely on AI companies, which publish their wins without disclosing failures. When Patel stresses how much progress it already is for AI to apply a technique nobody had connected to a problem, Tao agrees that the progress is "simultaneously amazing and disappointing." People adjust quickly, Tao adds. Google search seemed astonishing twenty years ago and soon became taken for granted, and 2026-level AI, with face recognition, natural speech, and college-level math, would have stunned people in 2021.

Tao's Own Use: Richer and Broader Papers, Not Deeper Ones

Patel notes that in 2023 Tao predicted that by 2026 AI would be a trustworthy co-author in mathematics if used correctly. Tao says they are pleased with how that prediction has held up. Asked when Tao will be twice as productive, Tao says productivity is not one-dimensional. The style and content of Tao's work have changed. Papers now contain much more code and many more figures, because a plot that once took hours takes minutes. Previously Tao would not have included such plots and would have described the results in words. Tao estimates that writing the kind of paper produced today without AI would take five times longer, but says that without AI those papers simply would not be written this way. The gains come from auxiliary tasks: deeper literature searches, more numerical work, and small chores like having an AI agent fix inconsistent parenthesis sizes in the background. The core of the work, solving the hardest part of a problem, has changed little, and Tao still does it with pen and paper. Rewriting a 2020 paper at the same level of content would not save much time, Tao says. AI has made the papers "richer and broader, but not necessarily deeper."

Cleverness Versus Intelligence: The Missing Cumulative Process

Patel asks about Tao's distinction between artificial cleverness and artificial intelligence. Tao says intelligence is hard to define, then gives an example. When two mathematicians work on a problem together, neither knows the solution at first. One has an idea that looks promising, they turn it into a rough strategy, test it, see it fail, and modify it. The idea adapts and improves over time until they have mapped what works and what does not and can see a way forward. AIs can imitate this only partly. In terms of the jumping-robot analogy, they can jump and fail repeatedly, but they cannot reach a handhold, stay there, pull others up, and jump again from the new position. Their approach looks more like trial and error and brute-force repetition. That scales and can work very well in some settings, but it lacks the cumulative, interactive building of partial progress.

Patel asks whether a model's own understanding of mathematics advances when it solves a problem, or even when it fails. Tao says no. A new session forgets what came before and gains no skills to apply to related problems. At most, the work might become some tiny fraction of the next generation's training data and be absorbed eventually.

If AI Proves the Riemann Hypothesis, Will Humans Understand It?

Patel asks whether AIs trained to be ever better at Lean might eventually solve something like the Riemann hypothesis with a proof that offers little insight, closer to "assembly code gobbledygook," or whether any such proof would necessarily contain constructions that advance human understanding. Tao says nobody knows. Some problems have been solved by brute force. The four color theorem still has no conceptually elegant proof, and some problems may only yield to enormous case splits checked by uninsightful computation. Part of why the Riemann hypothesis is prized, Tao says, is the strong belief that proving it will require a new kind of mathematics or a new connection between previously separate areas. Nobody knows what the solution will look like, but it does not feel like a problem that case-checking will settle. Patel points out that it could also be false. Tao acknowledges the unlikely scenario of a zero off the critical line found by a huge computation and says that would be very disappointing.

Tao does not think fully autonomous one-shot approaches are the right way to tackle these problems. Tao can imagine one being solved by strong human mathematicians assisted by very powerful AI tools, possibly in a kind of collaboration that does not yet exist. For instance, someone might generate a million variants of the Riemann zeta function and use AI-assisted data analysis to find a pattern that moves the problem into a different area of mathematics.

Patel presses further: what if a Lean proof contains a transformative new construction? Descartes's coordinate system, which unified algebra and geometry, might look in Lean like nothing more than "R→R." Tao answers that formalization lets any piece of a proof be studied on its own. In a human paper, authors may not say which lemmas are essential and which are routine. Lean pins every step down precisely, so a reader can see that one lemma resembles familiar material while another is new and clearly carries the main result. Tao predicts whole professions of mathematicians who take huge Lean-generated proofs and perform ablation: removing parts, looking for more elegant versions, possibly using other AIs to optimize for elegance and to judge whether one proof is better than another.

Tao also expects paper-writing to change. Writing was once the most time-consuming part of the job, so researchers wrote up results only once everything else had been checked, because rewriting and refactoring were painful. Now one proof can be turned into many versions. Tao points to the Erdős problem website, where an AI produced a proof along with 3,000 lines of verifying code, others then used AIs to summarize it, and people wrote their own proofs. Tao calls this post-processing a nascent area of mathematics and says they are not very worried about incomprehensible proofs: once a proof exists as an artifact, a great deal of analysis becomes possible.

A Semi-Formal Language for How Scientists Actually Reason

Patel asks about Tao's suggestion that mathematics could use a formal or semi-formal language for strategies, not only for proofs as in Lean. Tao says nobody knows what that would look like. Mathematics was fortunate to work out its laws of logic, but this is recent. The project began with Euclid two thousand years ago, and only in the early 20th century were the ZFC axioms, first-order logic, and the definition of proof pinned down. Proofs could be automated because that framework existed. Plausibility is different. If a conjecture passes a few test cases, how much should confidence rise? Tools like Bayesian probability exist, but they require base assumptions and involve substantial subjectivity. Tao calls this "more of a wish than a plan." Tao's reasoning is that Lean made deductive proof much easier to automate and train AI on, and that strategy and conjecture are currently bottlenecked by human experts and the test of time. A semi-formal framework would need to resist hacking, because reinforcement learning is very good at finding backdoors, and formal proof assistants are valuable precisely because no proof can be certified without actually being proven.

Patel asks for a concrete example and points out an apparent paradox in formalizing narrative. Tao answers with Gauss and the primes. Gauss built one of the first mathematical datasets by computing roughly the first 100,000 primes. Gauss found not a regular pattern but a statistical one: primes thin out, with density inversely proportional to the natural logarithm. This became the conjecture now known as the prime number theorem, that the number of primes up to X is about X/ln X. Gauss could not prove it. Tao calls it perhaps the first major statistical conjecture in mathematics, because it gave an approximation that improves at larger scales rather than an exact count, and it launched analytic number theory.

Many similar conjectures followed, and many were proved. Together they supported a view of the primes as pseudo-random: not actually random, since nothing random generates them, but most productively treated as if "some god rolling dice" had produced them with a certain density, plus a few known regularities such as nearly all being odd. From this random model mathematicians are "absolutely convinced" the twin prime conjecture is true, since a random set with that density would contain infinitely many twin pairs, even though there are good reasons it cannot currently be proved. Tao describes the model as mostly heuristic and non-rigorous but extremely accurate. In the few cases where rigorous results have been obtained, they matched it. The same belief supports confidence in the Riemann hypothesis and in prime-based cryptography. Tao says that if the Riemann hypothesis were false, it would reveal a hidden pattern in the primes, and people would quickly abandon prime-based cryptography, because one unknown pattern would suggest others that could be exploited.

Tao admits the consensus could be wrong, since paradigm shifts have happened before, and says there is no way to measure this because data on how science develops is so limited: one timeline and perhaps a hundred stories of turning points. With a million alien civilizations that developed science in different orders, it might be possible to formalize what progress and good strategy mean. As a substitute, Tao proposes building many small universes: simulations in which AIs tackle basic problems such as arithmetic with their own strategies, serving as laboratories. Tao mentions research on the smallest neural network that can perform 10-digit multiplication and thinks much could be learned from evolving small AIs on simple problems.

How Tao Learns and Spends Time

Asked how they learn new fields deeply enough to contribute, Tao cites Isaiah Berlin's distinction (Tao attributes it to "Berlin") between hedgehogs, who know one thing well, and foxes, who know a little about everything. Tao identifies as a fox who works with many hedgehogs and can act as one when necessary. Tao also describes an obsessive, completionist streak. When someone uses unfamiliar mathematics to prove something Tao feels they should be able to prove, it bothers Tao until they understand the trick. Tao has had to stop playing computer games because of the urge to finish every level. Collaboration is another route: Tao befriends mathematicians in other areas, becomes interested in their problems, and learns the basic tricks and the state of knowledge from them. Writing also matters. When younger, Tao would learn a clever argument, forget it six months later, and remember only that they had once understood it. That frustration led to the rule of writing down everything interesting, which is part of how the blog started. A post takes from half an hour to several hours. Tao often writes when avoiding less pleasant work such as referee reports, because writing feels creative and time passes quickly. Tao adds that administrative drudgery is exactly where AI now helps a lot.

Patel asks how civilization would allocate Tao's time if it could decide from first principles. Tao jokes that the podcast would not be happening, then defends serendipity. As academics become more senior, committees and obligations accumulate, yet events Tao attended reluctantly have often led to conversations with people Tao would not otherwise meet, including Patel, and to new learning and connections. Tao schedules parts of the day carefully but deliberately leaves other parts open, and says that more often than not this produces good experiences that could not have been planned.

Tao worries that modern society has become very good at optimizing everything without "optimizing our own optimization." During COVID, remote meetings kept academics busy and in contact with about as many people as before, but everything was scheduled, and chance encounters in hallways or at the coffee machine disappeared. In graduate school, Tao retrieved physical journals from the library and sometimes found the next article interesting as well. Instant search returns exactly what is requested and nothing else. At the Institute for Advanced Study, which has no distractions, Tao found the first weeks productive but ran out of inspiration after several months, got bored, and spent more time online. Some distraction, Tao says, "adds enough randomness and high temperature," though Tao does not know the optimal way to schedule a life.

When Will AI Dominate Mathematics?

Patel asks when AIs will do frontier mathematics as well as the best humans. Tao says that in some sense they already do superhuman frontier mathematics, but on a different frontier, much as calculators did superhuman number crunching. When Patel specifies fully replacing Terry Tao, Tao asks what Patel would then want them for, and Patel jokes that Tao would just go on all the podcasts. Tao questions whether this is the right question. Within a decade, Tao expects AI to handle much of what math students do now and much of what goes into papers, and expects people to find that this was not the most important part of the work. Tao gives historical parallels. A century ago, many mathematicians solved differential equations by hand for physicists, work that Mathematica, Wolfram Alpha, or now AI can do in minutes. "Computers" were once people who computed log tables and listed primes as Gauss did. Sequencing one organism's genome used to be an entire PhD and now costs about $1,000. In each case the field continued at a different scale, for example moving from individual organisms to whole ecosystems.

Patel sharpens the question: when will a newly solved Millennium Prize Problem be 95% likely to have been solved by an autonomous AI? Tao expects hybrid human–AI teams to dominate mathematics "for a lot longer." Full replacement would need further breakthroughs, so the timing is stochastic. Current AIs are very good at some things and very bad at others. Frameworks layered on top can reduce errors and help systems cooperate, but Tao feels the field lacks the ingredients for a satisfactory replacement across all intellectual tasks. For now the relationship is complementary. Tao hopes that AI will speed up discovery, but adds that by eliminating serendipity it could also inhibit certain kinds of progress, and says the world is currently very unpredictable.

Advice for Early-Career Mathematicians

For people starting careers in mathematics, Tao says this is a time of change in which long-standing assumptions may stop holding, in mathematics and elsewhere. Tao admits a preference for a quieter era in which things stay the same for decades, but says change has to be accepted. Some of what people study will become obsolete or be transformed, and some will last. Tao advises watching for opportunities that did not exist before. Contributing to research mathematics used to require years of education and a PhD, but with AI tools and Lean, a high school student can now join a project and make a real contribution. Tao recommends an adaptable mindset and room for curiosity and play, while noting that credentials still matter and that learning mathematics and science the traditional way will remain important for a while. Tao's final advice is to stay open to ways of doing science that do not yet exist, and Tao calls the present "a scary time, but also very exciting."