Will AI Shrink Labor's Share of the Economy? Alex Imas and Phil Trammell on Scarcity, Redistribution, and Who Gets the Gains

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Overview

What will stay scarce once AI and robots can do most of what humans do? The host, Dwarkesh, puts the question to two economists: Alex Imas, Director of AGI Economics at Google DeepMind and a professor of economics at the University of Chicago, and Phil Trammell, Head of Economics at Epoch and a research scholar at Stanford. His reasoning is that whatever is scarce is where value will accrue, and that in turn shapes wages, the labor share, how AI wealth might be taxed and redistributed, and how countries outside the AI supply chain could share in the gains.

33 min read

The two guests do not give a single forecast. Imas repeatedly argues that the profession lacks the data to forecast well and that economists should map out scenarios and the conditions each one needs. Trammell is more willing to name a central expectation: that labor's share will probably shrink even if some human-only services remain. He treats this as a guess that could go either way.

Why individual economists' forecasts deserve skepticism

The host opens with a thought experiment. Suppose robots can physically do anything humans can, so a "machine economy" builds factories, does research, and generates ideas. Humans still want certain things from other humans, such as a ballerina or a barista, but only humans hold that preference. Humans in this "human economy" spend part of their income on each other and part on automated goods. Machines never buy a human-made coffee, though, so money leaks out of the human sector and never comes back. Doesn't that mean the human sector must keep shrinking as a share of the economy?

Imas reframes the question. He cites a blog post by Andrey Fradkin, Brian Jabarian, and Andrew Koh on economists' labor market forecasts, which found wide disagreement in every direction. He agrees with the authors that prediction markets and wisdom-of-the-crowd aggregation are better tools than individual forecasts, because economists have been "famously terrible" at forecasting.

His example is David Ricardo around 1820. Ricardo first predicted the Industrial Revolution would benefit everyone through lower prices, then reversed himself and warned that machines would automate the jobs that created value, causing mass unemployment and political unrest. Imas says Ricardo's narrow prediction was correct, since those jobs were automated. But if Ricardo were told that and then asked for the prime-age employment rate in 2026, Imas thinks he would be surprised to learn it is the highest ever apart from 2000. What Ricardo missed was structural change. Automated goods became cheap, people had more to spend, and they spent it on services. Imas calls this the lump-of-labor fallacy.

The host objects that it was not obvious money would go to services instead of more automated goods. Imas agrees, and says he is not using the story to predict full employment this time. His point is only that predictions are hard. He proposes starting from a premise, such as "labor share is zero," and writing down a model of what could produce it, or asking what would keep the labor share constant. His main message is that the data is missing. He has called for a "Manhattan Project for data": economists do not know consumer demand elasticities, do not systematically track which jobs are created or destroyed, and rely on the O*NET task database, which he calls rarely updated and "super low quality." Mapping scenarios to the kind of scarcity each one needs would show what data to collect.

The stubborn stability of the labor share

The host defines the terms. Total output is paid either to people as wages or to capital as rent, dividends, and similar returns. Historically about 60% has gone to wages and the rest to owners of machines, land, and companies. The question is whether that 60% falls as AI improves.

Imas notes that the stability of this share is a "Kaldor fact" and a surprising one, given how much automation has happened since the Industrial Revolution. Some people suspect the constancy is an accounting artifact. There is also a current dispute over whether the labor share has fallen in the last 20 to 30 years. Imas cites a paper by Atkinson showing that if accounting conventions are held fixed, the labor share has not fallen at all.

The host suggests the stability is less surprising if labor and capital are complements that both have to be paid. Trammell adds a distinction. Nothing has yet been completely automated once you look at "network-adjusted" factor shares, which trace the whole supply chain, including the labor that went into the machines doing the final step. On that measure, computer and electronic products in the US have a stable capital share of about 50%. The qualitative shift he expects is that some goods will have a network-adjusted capital share of 100%: the whole supply chain automated, with no step where anyone intrinsically cares that a human is involved.

Trammell says the effect of that shift on the overall capital share is ambiguous. Take two sectors, a "human-intrinsic" one (the ballerinas) and everything else. Everything else has been scarce because it needed labor. If its supply chains are fully automated and people satiate quickly, its quantity could grow without limit while its marginal utility falls to zero even faster. In that case, spending would shift toward the human sector.

The relational sector, measured at the task level

Imas wants to drop the ballerina as the reference case. He uses the task-based model of jobs: a doctor fills out insurance forms, calls pharmaceutical companies, and also sees and talks to patients, which is not the bulk of the job. If every task except delivering the diagnosis and giving support is automated, and consumers will pay more to keep a human in that one role, Imas would count the job as part of the "relational sector."

He stresses that no data currently says which jobs are relational. He proposes conjoint studies of willingness to pay. Respondents would compare a fully machine-produced version of a service with one where a single task stays human, which would reveal how elastic demand is to having a human in the loop. Without that, he asks, what prediction can he make?

The host raises another problem: many fully automated goods do not exist yet, so nobody can measure how much people will want, for instance, a health-improving drug produced entirely by AI. Imas says this is Trammell's point about variety. If new kinds of capital-produced goods appear fast enough, people never reach diminishing marginal utility on them, and spending never shifts to the human sector. People could have all the relational goods they want and the labor share would still go to zero.

The Mongolian economist and the singers

The host asks Trammell to explain an analogy he had used earlier. Imagine an economist in Mongolia centuries ago trying to predict the effects of more automation. The intrinsically human jobs included singers. The non-intrinsic goods included horse-based transport, food, and shelter. Holding the set of goods fixed, that economist might have concluded that people would satiate on "horse-like transportation and in yogurt and in yurts," those shares would go to zero, and everyone would end up spending their income on singers.

That did not happen. Trammell says that as wealth and technology grew, the range of non-singer goods expanded and spending on singers stayed negligible. That is his central prediction for the future, though he says it "could go either way."

Transistors, H100s, and whether AI breaks the pattern

The host starts to argue that it is hard to picture trillions of robots receiving less total spending than a billion or so humans paid as chess players, doctors, tutors, or podcasters. Then the host explains why that reasoning is a fallacy. Transistor counts have grown by a factor of perhaps a trillion or more, yet Chad Jones has found that the share of the economy spent on computing has been falling. Prices reflect both supply and demand, so the value of the marginal transistor has been declining. In the "pessimistic framing" of Moore's law raised in the discussion, the value of computation halves every 18 months, and we run out of uses for it quickly enough to keep that going.

The host suggests AI might be the first break in this pattern. An H100 costs more to rent now than three years ago, despite better technology and more compute, because smarter models raise the opportunity cost of compute. Imas connects this to Trammell's variety argument: AI has created a new use for capital, and demand has jumped back up. If demand for compute is never satiated, compute's share of the economy could keep rising. He calls the rate at which new uses for compute appear "the ultimate question."

Evidence that people value human connection itself

Imas says most economic models in this area treat demand as nearly exogenous and do not look at what people actually want. His interest in the relational sector came from research suggesting people value empathy, connection, and interaction with other people for their own sake, not only because humans are scarce.

In one incentive-compatible experiment, participants paid real money for an art print. When told there was only one print, the human-made version was valued much more than the AI-made one (the conditions were between-subjects). When told 500 copies would be made, the value of the human-made print fell a lot, apparently because it no longer felt like a connection to one artist. The AI print's value did not change, which Imas reads as a sign that AI output is already seen as a commodity.

He says this separates humans from horses. A horse was an input that could be replaced as long as the output was the same. The relational story works only if replacing the human lowers the value of the output. If that effect is weak or covers too few jobs, "this story doesn't work anymore," and he says much more research is needed.

The "Messy Middle" scenario

The host brings up Molly Kinder's "Messy Middle" scenario and admits it made them wonder whether a faster AI takeoff might be better for distribution. The worry is that AI automates enough jobs to cause large layoffs without creating enough wealth to compensate the losers. The money firms save does still exist in principle, but governments cannot easily tell who lost a job to AI, and it is politically hard to send a laid-off Meta worker a $200,000 check while many workers earn much less.

Trammell calls the scenario possible but a "pretty narrow window." If technology can automate enough jobs to create a new political problem, he expects the economy to be growing fast too. The host pushes back: what if AI is only slightly cheaper than the software engineers it replaces? Jevons-style expansion might come eventually, but in the short run people are laid off before anyone works out what to do with "a million times more JavaScript tokens."

Imas notes that his and Trammell's models contain no political economy. He cites Andy Hall's post on the politics of AGI, which observes that a 2% rise in unemployment "completely" changes the political winds. He thinks a slow "drip" may be among the worst cases politically. His example is telephone operators between 1920 and 1940: the technology to automate them existed, but the transition took 20 years. A QJE paper found operators were reabsorbed into the economy at lower wages and were mostly underemployed. That, he says, is the kind of messy middle Kinder describes, where nothing is a disaster. A sudden jump in unemployment, even 2–3%, would be treated as a national emergency, and COVID showed fiscal policy can respond quickly then. The harder case is a slow shift where the savings from cutting white-collar workers do not grow the economy and may not be enough for broad redistribution.

Imas also says the technological frontier has historically expanded each time, and he finds it hard to imagine AI that is just good enough to replace software engineers but barely cheaper, with no abundance effect. The host sums up the objection: the scenario needs several unlikely conditions together. Whole white-collar jobs would have to be automatable only piecemeal, so a system that replaces software engineers could not also replace accountants and analysts. The host doubts this, given how broad software engineering is and their view of intelligence. It would also require that the savings be small and AI not much cheaper than people.

How to tax and redistribute

Imas says policy options differ in how hard they are to implement and how quickly they help, and he expects a layered approach. Universal basic capital would not produce returns within six months. A negative income tax sets a floor as soon as it passes, with taxes rising as earnings rise. He is worried about the political economy of a universal basic income: today people hold labor they can turn into income, and if basic needs depend on a check, "it really matters who's in power." He calls that a dangerous power arrangement.

The host asks whether that applies to any government redistribution. Imas says universal basic capital differs because recipients hold ownership and property rights like any shareholder. Its weakness is targeting and indexing: what goes into the portfolios? The host asks what happens if Anthropic goes to zero while some unknown robotics company takes over, and Imas agrees that is the risk. A negative income tax, he adds, has the same vulnerability as UBI: a new government could cancel it, leaving people who cannot work with no floor.

The host raises two worries about taxing capital. A small wealth tax, say 0.5%, may have no politically stable level and could ratchet up the way the income tax did, starting low and justified by war, then reaching around 40% at the federal margin and over 50% in some states. A capital tax might also discourage investment if investors expect growing dilution.

Trammell says it helps to separate how revenue is raised, what is taxed, and how it is distributed. The government could raise money with a broad-based tax, use it to buy shares in companies like Anthropic, and hand those shares out, which he suggests "would probably be the right thing to do." He hopes a populist proposal to expropriate a well-known company does not get in the way. When the host lists externalities and land as candidates for efficient taxation, Trammell adds consumption. The host describes a European-style VAT used to buy stocks for everyone, and Trammell says that would be similar to, though not identical to, redistributing stocks directly. The conversation notes that proposals to privatize Social Security took a similar form, giving everyone a basket of stocks.

Is there a white-collar bloodbath yet?

Imas says the data is heavily studied, and he points to the Yale Budget Lab, whose recent report shows you "really have to squint" to see an effect. Even in software engineering, the most exposed field, he sees little. There may be a weak signal that junior developer hiring is slightly below trend, meaning slower growth, not a drop in level, while demand for senior engineers has if anything increased. He treats stories of CS graduates struggling to find work as anecdotal and suggests some routine layoffs are being described as AI layoffs.

He does see a risk in public coordination. If the story becomes that firms not cutting staff are behind on AI, firms may lay people off in a cascade to look modern, even if it hurts them. He mentions stories of "token counters" as a sign of this performative pressure.

Asked why there is so little displacement given AI's capabilities, Imas uses the O-ring model of jobs. If AI automates nine of ten tasks, the worker can focus on the tenth. Productivity rises, prices may fall, and if demand is elastic enough, hiring can increase. Some commentators point to rising software engineering demand as evidence that, for now, demand is elastic enough.

The host stresses that this depends on elasticity. Jevons paradox, the idea that spending on something rises as it gets cheaper, as with coal in 19th-century Britain, holds only when demand is highly elastic. Cheap oil would not quickly produce enough extra cars to raise total oil spending, and Imas adds insulin as another example. Long-run elasticity is higher than short-run elasticity, but agriculture shows the limit: we could produce far more food if we spent the same share of the economy on it as a century ago, but people stop eating once they are full. The claim about software, the host says, is that it happens to be a good we will keep wanting more of as it gets cheaper, not that markets in general behave that way.

Why a demand-collapse recession is hard to produce

The host asks about Citrini's widely shared scenario, in which automated white-collar workers lose income and the economy falls into a recession. Imas says fast automation could plausibly cause unemployment, and that part is not his objection. His objection is to negative economic growth.

In an essay, he started from the assumption of negative growth and asked what it would require. His answer was a set of implausible conditions. AI mainly moves income from lower-income workers to owners of tech capital. For total output to shrink, those owners would need a hard cap on demand, not just diminishing marginal utility, so that they eventually stop wanting to spend. The money they do not spend would also have to not become investment. Even if people wanted no more consumer goods, a world with a singularity where nobody wants to build more data centers or fabs to run AGI would be "crazy."

Imas recounts sending the essay to Trammell, who replied that it was "pretty dumb," since the conditions for negative growth were so implausible. Imas says that was the point of the essay. He credits Citrini's piece with starting a useful conversation, because demand collapse feels intuitive and does describe depressions. But in the Great Depression the technological frontier did not expand. Here it is expanding, and getting negative growth out of abundance is very hard.

The O-ring logic in reverse: humans as a drag on machine production

The host suggests the O-ring model, named after the component failure that destroyed the Challenger shuttle, explains current limits: when one unreliable step can ruin the product, you cannot hand a whole job to an AI that succeeds only some of the time. Once AI is advanced enough, the host argues, the logic flips. Production flows will be designed for AI workers that communicate "in neuralese" and think thousands of times faster. Even where comparative advantage favors hiring a human, transaction costs and reliability concerns could make it hard to fit humans in.

Trammell agrees and separates two mechanisms. In one, automating nine-tenths of a job lets workers move to the last tenth, where much more work may be demanded of them. The other is Gans and Goldfarb's recent model of O-ring automation: if you can automate only nine-tenths and the automated part is lower quality than human work, you may not automate it at all. Trammell says that logic applies in reverse too. Humans may be left out of the final tenth because they would lower the product's quality or speed compared with the AI-handled parts.

The host finds the reliability story convincing for why lawyers, accountants, and software engineers have not been automated: clients pay for real assurance that the company will not go under. Imas adds regulation. Someone has to own and back up the work, someone has to be hireable and fireable, and licensing keeps humans involved for reasons unrelated to their ability. The view was also expressed that these frictions, including relying only on humans as legislators, judges, and jurors, look transitional. What people expect from humans in politics has changed many times, from hunter-gatherer bands to empires, and AI-run systems might outcompete the alternatives once they are much more efficient.

Whose preferences will shape the future economy?

The host turns from human preferences to the preferences of new entities. Evolution selected for drives that now determine what a hundred-trillion-dollar economy produces. Even without catastrophic misalignment, the host expects selection among AI agents, or firms containing them, to favor those that grow. Such entities are unlikely to prefer human-intrinsic goods. They would more likely save heavily and have unsatiable demand for some resource, with compute the obvious candidate.

Imas says he has "absolutely no prior" that an autonomous AI with its own welfare would prefer dealing with humans. He then argues the other side on human preferences. Some claim the relational premium will fade as people get used to AI, and an AI therapist will come to seem simply better. Imas calls this complicated and offers an evolutionary counterargument. Compare a person who is indifferent between AI and humans with one who has what Jonathan Haidt would call a moral emotion against handing social interaction to AI. Imas thinks the second is more likely to find a mate and reproduce. The host notes that depends on how reproduction works. Imas agrees, says he is not making a prediction, and cites David Reich's point on the show that humans are still under active natural selection, so a stronger preference for other humans could even be selected for.

The host then argues that humans need not change at all for accumulation-driven preferences to dominate. Mark Zuckerberg's consumption leans relational, such as hiring MMA instructors and dancers for his wife's birthday, but most of his wealth is Meta stock. As controlling shareholder, he could turn it into dividends to spend, yet he prefers compounding it and building data centers, which the host calls "almost Nick Landian."

Trammell spells out the economics. If two equally rich people satiate on capital equally fast and one also enjoys human-intrinsic services, their future valuation of capital should be about the same. If instead one never satiates on capital, for example because they want to explore the universe, that person will rationally save more, end up with most of the wealth, and the overall capital share will approach the capital share of their spending, which is one. The host points to Elon Musk, the richest person in the world, talking about mass drivers on the moon and probably indifferent to whether his future researchers are human or AI. Trammell adds that slower biological reproduction by such people may not matter if they can live forever, and Imas agrees that indefinite lifespans would change his own analysis too.

Returns to capital, relative prices, and greedy titans

Imas argues that saving depends on returns. Data centers pay extremely well now, but if people become satiated with capital, returns fall and the rich consume more. Society has become vastly richer since 1820 and more people invest, yet consumption has continued to support employment and a high labor share.

Trammell objects that historically investment itself had to pass through workers. In the future, only consumption would be human-mediated, since robots can carry out the investment. The host adds that low returns to capital seem to require low growth, which conflicts with explosive growth under transformative AI. Trammell says not necessarily. The capital stock can grow fast while the price of capital goods relative to consumption goods falls even faster. If each robot becomes 100 robots next year, the interest rate measured in robots is 10,000%, but that says little once prices adjust. He calls this investment-specific technical change and criticizes standard macro models for treating "output" as a single "chimera" that can be allocated one-for-one to consumption or capital. Each unit of capital next year will cost much less consumption than a unit this year. One robot turns into many, while the number of ballerinas stays the same.

Imas returns to variety: if next year's extra robots come in new varieties that people do not satiate on, the consumption story changes. The host asks whether, on the investment side, one greedy titan of industry who keeps wanting more robots would be enough to raise the value of robots and lower the labor share. Trammell says yes.

Imas questions whether such titans persist. Historically they built libraries, and accumulation has been a social game for admiration among peers. Rousseau and Saint Augustine wrote about how people have enough pleasure and then seek status. An intrinsic preference for accumulation would make the argument work, he says, but "that's just not how preferences usually work." The host argues that fortunes have dissipated because founders died and passed wealth to heirs who could not even match economic growth, or to trusts and foundations. With longer lives, or trusts aligned with accumulation, selection could become very strong: a handful of such agents could dominate because their share grows faster than everything else. Trammell puts it more strongly. Such people are not hypothetical. They exist today and in history, and they have not taken over only because of "dissipation shocks." Wanting to fill the universe with monuments to oneself and live forever is "a weird preference, but it's not a hypothetical preference."

Trammell adds instrumental reasons to accumulate: arms races over political, philosophical, or religious influence, and total-utilitarian philanthropy. As a classical utilitarian, he says, one could have a nearly unsatiable demand for future wealth in order to create new happy beings, an idea that goes back at least to Bostrom's astronomical waste argument about Dyson spheres powering happy simulations. The host notes that what the greedy optimizer wants hardly matters, and a self-replicating von Neumann probe is the extreme case. Trammell raises an accounting issue: GDP counts only final consumption and investment. If a probe counts as a self-owning agent choosing between spawning another probe and paying a ballerina, how it appears in the statistics "completely depends on how we're doing the accounting." In a world with von Neumann probes, he thinks the labor share could still be high "the way we usually count it."

What should countries outside the AI supply chain do?

The host asks what India or Nigeria should do if they are not building models or supplying hardware like Korea (HBM), Taiwan (fabs), or the Netherlands (ASML). Imas calls this the most underresourced question in economics and includes himself in that criticism. In one scenario, AI spreads to developing countries and gives them a large boost in capability. In another, they lack the resources to train models or build hardware, fall behind, and lose even their role as producers once developed countries can make commodities with automation. That world "looks pretty bad."

Trammell treats this as an extension of the messy middle. In his view, the messy middle is bad only in a narrow range because a growing pie makes redistribution easier, and also because interest rates would be very high, or equivalently the prices of everything except human-intrinsic goods would fall fast. A little savings would buy a lot of consumption next year, even without redistribution. The host infers that modest savings held in developed-world assets could go a long way for developing countries. Imas warns that the messy middle could be wider for them because they start so far behind and are poorly connected to the global economy. Trammell says it is important for them to "get on it now," whether through sovereign wealth funds invested in the right supply chains or subsidies for citizens to buy small stakes. He does not have a strong view on which.

The difficulty of indexing the economy

The host connects this to the earlier puzzle about why the Rockefellers' descendants do not control everything. Before index funds, tracking the whole economy was very hard, since a small fraction of companies from a century ago account for most of the value created since, and missing them meant stagnation. The host suggests there may have been a "golden window" from the invention of index funds until about five years ago, followed by concentrated returns in private companies that ordinary people cannot easily access. Most Americans' capital is a house, or part of one. Trammell calls housing capital "uniquely ill-suited" to complement AI or robots, or to be the kind of asset the rich will bid up. A house's value comes mainly from land near other people, which will not be a main factor of production. The host says this is why a Georgist land tax would not raise enough for the programs discussed. The host asks whether Nigeria owns much SK Hynix or Anthropic, guesses not, and says owning the S&P 500 is not enough.

Imas frames it as a choice between AI being like electricity or like social media. Utilities such as ConEd are monopolies supplying something everyone uses, but most of the benefits went to users and utilities did not gain outsized power. Social media is also everywhere, but its rents went to the platforms. The host, while saying they do not yet endorse the idea, suggests that the more AGI transforms the whole economy the way electricity did, the more future S&P 500 companies will be the ones using AI well, so indexing works again. But the host also notes how concentrated the S&P has become in big tech and says it is hard to judge how much of AI's gains individual private firms can capture. Imas thinks open models will matter most: if they stay six to nine months behind the frontier, everyone gets access to AGI soon after it arrives. The host observes that this links a developing country's prospects, "whether Uganda will have any purchase on the returns of AGI," to technical questions like recursive self-improvement and continual learning.

Buying the index versus retraining

The host says the usual advice for both the messy middle and developing countries is retraining, jobs programs, or hosting data centers, while the guests seem to favor buying the index of AGI. Imas describes two worlds: a concentrated one where indexing AGI is very hard, and an electricity-like one where every company has AGI, Nigeria can simply buy the index, and open models give it access.

Trammell would prioritize indexing given how fast AI could arrive, but would not rely on it alone. If timelines are long or the messy middle holds, skipping retraining in the latest computing tools would waste value, and he does not see it as either/or. The host notes that poor countries often have weak education systems, so becoming world-class at AI retraining seems unlikely. Imas mentions leapfrogging, such as mobile banking, which he says is far more common in Nigeria than in Germany, and suggests without assigning probabilities that a transformative technology could let a country skip steps and grow very fast.

Trammell is less worried about indexing than the host. He calls it something to watch, but says, as in his and Imas's essay, it is already not that hard. Privatization of returns has risen somewhat, but private companies make up "well under 20%" of the total market cap of non-tiny US companies. OpenAI and Anthropic look likely to go public before long, and AI might reduce the frictions, such as disclosure requirements, that keep firms private. He expects the long trend toward easier indexing to continue despite the recent move the other way.

Commoditization, narratives, and safety

The host hopes the labs become commoditized, or at least go public as soon as possible, arguing AI will be more popular and more likely to spread prosperity if its gains are as hard to capture as electricity's. Imas notes there are no "anti-electricity people," though he and the host acknowledge electricity did take some jobs. He adds that narratives matter. The current story about AI is negative partly because it is easier to describe losing something that exists, like jobs, than to picture a good future that does not exist yet.

Trammell points out a cost of commoditizing frontier models: race dynamics. For safety, fewer frontier companies might leave each a buffer to slow down. He argues the trade-off with broad distribution of gains is smaller than people think. A leader could keep a large lead while being a public company with widely distributed ownership, so a safer, less competitive market does not require a few people to become fantastically rich.

The host closes with their own recent view that the risk of commoditization, namely wider access to AI for harmful uses, is worth the benefits. Concentrated labs not only spread the surplus less widely but also make a clear political target, and the host cites the Defense Production Act threat against Anthropic as an example that would be much harder to make without one or two clearly leading labs. The host ends by noting that many questions remain unresolved, but says it helps to know the first branch point along each of these dimensions.