The Pragmatic Engineer AMA: Gergely Orosz on AI, Hiring, Big Tech, and Running an Independent Newsletter

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Overview

In this reversed episode of the Pragmatic Engineer podcast, Gergely Orosz answers questions from subscribers instead of asking them. The questions are read by Volodymyr Giginiak ("Giggs"), CTO and cofounder of the legal AI startup Wordsmith, where Orosz is an investor. The questions fall into several groups: observations about the industry, opinions on AI and hiring, questions about Orosz personally, advice for specific situations, and the Pragmatic Engineer as a business. Across these topics Orosz returns to a few positions. He is skeptical of "AI-native" as a label, he sees hiring becoming messier rather than simply harder, and he thinks professionals who genuinely care about the craft will remain in demand.

32 min read

Leaving Uber: a book, a startup plan, and an honest look at motives

Orosz started at Uber as a senior engineer after about ten years as an individual contributor, and he soon became an engineering manager. About four years in, two things happened at once. COVID hit Uber's business hard. He had access to an internal revenue dashboard that showed ride revenue falling close to zero, and he shared it with his team because he valued transparency. He says he is not sure that was the smartest move, but he would probably do it again. Uber then made 20% layoffs, and about a quarter of his team was cut. The remaining team's mission no longer made sense: they had been building for drivers on the assumption that drivers would be scarce, but during COVID drivers flocked to the platform. He was given a new team, but for the first time in four years he felt demotivated.

Money made leaving possible. Before joining Uber he had received a stock grant worth about $500,000 and had promised himself that if it ever turned into real money, he would take a risk. After the IPO, a lower share price, and taxes, it came to roughly $400,000. That was enough to go two or three years without working. His plan had nothing to do with writing as a career. He would finish The Software Engineer's Guidebook, which he had started at Uber, within six months, and then found or join a startup. Part of the reason was fatigue with middle management. In his words, "They tell you congratulations, you became a manager. They should have said you became a middle manager." The job meant keeping his team, his management, and his manager peers happy. During the layoffs, being based in Europe also meant a lot of politics and explaining regulations. He had ideas and wanted to be in charge next time instead of "fighting the machine."

The book went the way first migrations go for junior engineers. Six months later he was still treading water on the main book, although he had written three other short books along the way. So he asked himself what he would actually be doing. His startup idea was to productionize Uber's internal RFC system. He points out that spinning internal platform tools out of Uber was a well-trodden path, citing Temporal and Chronosphere. His brother, who was on his second startup, told him to start a company only if he was ready to spend ten years on it. Orosz was not excited about spending ten years on an RFC system.

He then examined his motives. The first was money. In 2021, ex-Uber startups seemed to become unicorns within a year or two. He did not expect that for himself, but he imagined a ten-year path where he might end up with a 5–10% stake, perhaps $25 million after taxes. When he asked what he would do with that money, the answer was to share what he knew: write books and make YouTube videos. He realized he could do that right away. The second motive, which he calls the more legitimate one, was the feeling of a small team working against the world. He had enjoyed that at Uber and at Skyscanner, where he met Wordsmith cofounder Ross, and he had not enjoyed managing managers.

The trigger was Substack. Lenny Rachitsky had shared that his product management newsletter had 2,000 paid subscribers. Orosz reasoned that every team has roughly ten times as many software engineers as product managers. Engineers might be less likely to pay, but no paid newsletter for engineers existed. He gave himself six months and assumed it might not work. It did.

What an "AI-native SDLC" looks like, and why he doubts it transfers

Asked whether he has seen Big Tech teams adopt an AI-native software development lifecycle, Orosz first questions the framing of the SDLC itself. Many large non-tech companies run rigid Scrum or SAFe processes and call themselves agile. They are surprised to see that teams at Uber, Meta, or Google plan for a few days, build, deploy, get feedback, and iterate. To those companies this looks like waterfall. Orosz argues that the waterfall-versus-agile distinction no longer matters. Referring to a conversation with Kent Beck, he says real waterfall meant a year or two of planning and heavy documentation, and nobody does that anymore. Before AI, almost every modern company used RFCs or design docs because thinking things through before building produces better results.

The closest thing to an AI-native process at a large, successful company, in his view, is Anthropic. It likely employs hundreds of engineers rather than thousands. Orosz describes it as a research lab rather than a product company, and he says it works very fluidly. From his conversations with Boris Cherny about Claude Code, he reports that the team skips design docs, prototypes constantly, responds to bugs on social media, and fixes them immediately. Claude Code is now the leading coding harness, so the approach clearly works for them. Orosz still wonders whether it can be replicated and when it might break down. He also asks how much strategy sits behind it, pointing to pricing tiers that keep changing back and forth.

He has not seen any established company successfully retrofit an AI-native process. What he sees instead is companies such as Google, Ramp, and Uber building AI infrastructure, for example coding agents wired into all their internal services. He also raises a question he considers unresolved. When a business already works and customers expect certain things, how much should it change? At Uber, the car arriving depends on non-software processes: driver outreach campaigns and advance notice before big events. AI does not change the pace of those. Moving too fast can also mean forgetting the basics. He cites Spotify. Its CTO and team told him they adopt AI responsibly, yet as a user Orosz has been frustrated by outages. He could not publish an episode a few weeks earlier, and Spotify has no status page. He does not know whether AI is to blame, but he remarks that if they are using AI, they are not using it to improve reliability.

Hiring after AI: two worlds, more friction

Before answering how AI has changed what employers look for, Orosz asks Giginiak how Wordsmith hires. Giginiak says the company now looks mainly for the ability to reason about what AI produces, correct it, and do appropriate research. Candidates get a take-home assignment that the company expects them to complete with AI. A long discussion follows. The interviewers ask whether an algorithm or design decision was the candidate's own researched choice or simply AI's default. They also examine parts of the code to see whether the candidate can spot issues and propose fixes on the spot.

Orosz describes hiring before AI as two worlds. The first is Google's model of algorithmic coding interviews. Google adopted them after abandoning puzzle questions because they select for computer science fundamentals, the ability to perform under pressure and explain one's thinking, and scalability: you can train a thousand interviewers on a pool of 200 questions, and a few leaks do not move the bar. Orosz adds a less flattering benefit. Candidates must be willing to prepare, and that selects for people who will tolerate occasional corporate nonsense such as performance review cycles or projects that make no sense. The second world is startups hiring for practicality: trial weeks, take-homes built on real bugs, and hiring open-source contributors directly.

AI breaks both. It passes algorithmic interviews easily, so remote versions stop making sense, and it completes hard take-homes well enough that they lose their signal. Orosz bets that both worlds will survive in modified form. Early filters will be AI-assisted and effectively cheatable, and the deciding stages will move in person. Google will bring candidates in for whiteboard interviews where AI cannot help. Startups will ask candidates to explain their work, as Wordsmith does, and a few, such as Linear, will run paid work trials. His conclusion is that hiring will involve "more friction," more time, and more subjectivity, and that it will "feel more unfair because there will be no clear rules" of the kind people had grown used to.

Giginiak says Wordsmith used work trials in its early stages and found them hard to scale. Orosz clarifies that the hard part is candidates: many cannot take a week off. Linear can do it only because it is so well known, and even Linear loses people who would like to join but cannot spare the time.

Who is thriving, and the tiers of companies

Despite the layoffs, Orosz talks to engineers who are as much in demand as ever, or more. They work at startups or well-known tech companies, they are product-minded, and they "don't stop at borders." When AI arrived, they found a way onto AI projects at their companies, often AI infrastructure, and are now treated as experts. The hardest roles to fill, he says, are for engineers with a few years of experience who have actually built something with AI and can advise on architecture: RAG versus fine-tuning, off-the-shelf versus custom models, on-prem versus hosted, inference costs, and which inference providers to use, with Groq and Cerebras as examples. He compares this to hiring someone who knew the cloud five years ago. These engineers' main problem is that other companies are surprised by their compensation expectations.

The engineers who struggle have no exposure to building with AI at work beyond using Claude Code or Codex like everyone else, and they lack pedigree, meaning they do not work at a company seen as modern. Orosz frames this with a tier model. At the bottom are consulting firms such as Accenture or Capgemini, which he says are struggling. Next come product companies. Above them are venture-funded product companies, which compete with Big Tech for talent. At the top today are the AI labs, Anthropic and OpenAI, occupying the position Google held around 2004, Meta around 2010, and Uber briefly around 2015. Jumping tiers is hard. He knows many people at Google and Meta who want to get into the labs, and those places are now extremely selective.

Juniors, and junior roles in systems programming

A question about junior roles in low-level systems, embedded, hardware, and defense gets a hedged answer. Orosz says he knows this area less well and assumes it is less saturated. At the Pragmatic Summit in February, about eight people were discussing AI coding tools. Most said nearly all of their code was generated, using models such as Opus 4.5 or 4.6 or Codex 5.4. The one engineer working in C++ and assembly said AI wrote perhaps 30% of their code. Orosz sees this area as closer to electrical and hardware engineering. He observes strong demand there, with more startups and more money in hardware. He also believes that someone who can build high-performance, low-latency systems in C++ can easily learn higher layers of the stack, while the reverse is rarely true.

His general advice to juniors: pedigree helps, so pursue good schools and internships. Otherwise, build impressive projects or contribute to open source, which he thinks still stands out, especially now that AI-generated contributions are being rejected. Accept a stepping stone, because any job beats no job. Then try to be the best at whatever job you get, even a bad one, build a network, and wait for the next opportunity.

Meta's "wartime mode"

One questioner asks how Meta's leadership could fail to foresee the damage to morale from cutting 10% after a record year and then reassigning another 10% without consent. Orosz says directors and people above them at Meta do see it. The real question, in his view, is whether founder Mark Zuckerberg sees it, and if so, why he does not care. He notes that companies with career CEOs, such as Uber, Microsoft, and Google, have not done anything similar, presumably because they know it would cause outages and cost them their best people. At Meta, some strong long-tenured engineers who had been content have been reassigned to work they do not want, such as data labeling within an AI data organization. Orosz adds that some people there, often less experienced engineers, are making the most of it. But the message many take away is that leadership no longer cares about engineering as a whole.

He stresses that the rest is speculation. Meta has entered wartime mode before, when Google+ launched and the company believed its survival was at stake, and everyone understood why. Now, he says, it looks like wartime without a visible enemy: revenue is at a record, ads are doing well, and products are growing. Owning AI seems existential to Zuckerberg, as the metaverse once did, and people are starting to ask Meta to "pick a lane." Orosz offers one possible explanation: Meta still owns no platform and remains an application-layer company, and Zuckerberg may want to break out of that. He says the simplest route is to ask Zuckerberg directly.

How Big Tech and "little tech" are adopting AI

Orosz ranks Google as trying the hardest. Its approach of letting everyone build internal AI tools is chaotic but productive. Google is also the only Big Tech company with a competitive frontier model, and Gemini is, in his view, the one product actually taking market share from ChatGPT. As an anecdote, he mentions that his editor now uses Gemini instead of ChatGPT, partly because it is free. Meta, he says, is bogged down in training its own models, and morale is falling. Microsoft is, in his assessment, more focused on politics than on AI. He describes overlapping organizations, GitHub now sitting under CoreAI with its source-control mission seemingly neglected and reliability suffering, and Azure short on capacity. Apple is secretive, and everything he hears suggests its engineering culture is poor and held together with duct tape. He nonetheless hopes Apple will push local AI on its hardware, and he credits it with not forgetting its core business. Amazon, in his view, shows how hard it is to retrofit innovation: it built Kiro and its own models, but he calls them subpar and says engineers drag their feet and prefer Claude Code.

He thinks the smaller public companies are further ahead: Uber, Ramp, Intercom, and Block (with a caveat about its layoffs). They have no identity crisis. They do not feel they must own the model, the application layer, and the platform. They take the best available tools, whether Claude Code or Codex, integrate them deeply, and optimize for their own business.

Should anyone copy Anthropic?

Orosz accepts that Anthropic, along with possibly the Codex team, is the best example of AI-native development at scale. He argues that it is nearly impossible to copy, because Anthropic's product is Claude, the model, not Claude Code. Claude Code generates revenue, but the whole organization works like a beehive around training and shipping a new model every few months. To copy it, you would have to become an AI lab. He also notes that Anthropic seems to have little or no enterprise sales team, which makes it an anomaly.

What he has not yet seen is startups fundamentally changing how they work. He suspects the reason is that traction matters more than process. No amount of AI-nativeness helps without customers and a market. Before AI, a great idea could succeed with weak engineering: early Uber had contractors building an ugly app, but it solved a real need in the right city. Coinbase is his other example. However AI-native it tries to be, its results follow the crypto market, and it recently made layoffs after a downturn. He wonders aloud whether "AI-native" is overrated.

Giginiak argues that adopting AI just because Anthropic does is a poor strategy. It works better to start from a concrete problem, such as having AI take a first pass at incident debugging, and keep the practice only if it sticks. Orosz suggests thinking of AI as a natural tool you reach for: try it, keep it if it helps, discard it or revisit it later if it does not, and do not be precious about it.

Tech debt, standards, and managers who code

On whether sacrificing code quality for AI speed is worth it, Orosz admits engineers know which answer they want. He then tells a story from before AI. Before its 2016 rewrite, the Uber app polled the server every five seconds for an ever-growing blob of several hundred kilobytes. He calls it inaccurate, slow, wasteful, and "honestly stupid." It existed because a small backend team could not keep up with the larger mobile and web teams, so they created a catch-all blob that frontend teams could extend at will. It was terrible architecture, and it also unblocked Uber's growth for a long time. His point is that tech debt can speed you up. He proposes thinking in stages, using Kent Beck's explore/expand/extract framing. When exploring for an idea, ignore quality. When scaling after product-market fit, pay more attention, knowing that revenue will let you hire people to fix the hacks. With a mature product, such as Instagram, which he says Meta still managed to damage, be very careful. He adds that AI speeds up refactoring as well as building, which removes the excuse for never doing it. Giginiak calls speed versus quality a false dichotomy and suggests segmenting by time or by codebase, for example infrastructure versus product.

On whether the industry should deliberately create AI standards, Orosz says it is too early and that standards emerge by accident. MCP succeeded because it came from Anthropic when Anthropic was a small, non-threatening lab. If Anthropic proposed the same thing today, he says, others would resist out of fear of lock-in.

On whether engineering managers should code, as at Anthropic, or focus on people, as at Meta and Uber, he sees trade-offs rather than a right answer. He recalls Elon Musk mandating that managers at X code while having 20+ reports. Non-coding managers pay more attention to people and fix organizational problems, for example working with HR to change a policy or coordinating teams to stop duplicated work. Coding managers give better technical guidance but have less bandwidth for that systems-level work. The industry is swinging strongly toward technical managers, so Orosz expects engineers to get less support and people-focused managers to feel underappreciated for a while. He thinks the pendulum will swing back at some point but does not know when.

Measuring AI productivity, and a common misconception

Orosz considers the problem of AI adoption turning into theater (token leaderboards, mandatory usage) largely obsolete. That frustration dates from the autocomplete era, before models like Opus 4.5 and GPT-5.4 and before Claude Code spread. Shopify ran token leaderboards back then and has since deprecated them. Now that nearly everyone uses these tools, he thinks measuring usage is about as meaningful as counting lines of code.

On what would convince him of real productivity gains, he goes back to Uber. People there told him revenue did not matter, only growth. Headcount was a black box: fill your allocation quickly and you got more, and unused headcount was reallocated at year's end. That always felt wrong to him. He stayed on teams where he could say what two more engineers would add in revenue, or what losing half the team would cost. He passed on a platform team building an internal React Native alternative because he could not see the business case. By that standard, he argues, AI productivity cannot be separated from business productivity. There are only two measures: incremental revenue that would not otherwise exist, which excludes gains from a rising market, and cost savings. He admits he finds it "kind of depressing" that cost savings may be AI's biggest use case, though companies selling AI products, including the labs and startups such as AI incident-review tools, clearly make money from it. His private hunch is that AI will resemble cloud, which is now everywhere, even at banks that once swore they would never adopt it, but invisible to customers and mostly a flexible way to control costs. He contrasts this with mobile, which created entirely new markets.

The popular belief he thinks is wrong is that AI makes work easier. If AI is making your life much easier, he asks whether you are trying hard enough. His own experience is that work with AI is just as hard as before, if not harder.

Degrees, prestige, and self-taught engineers

Orosz believes computer science is becoming more of a prestige field, mostly because of the market rather than what degrees teach. From about 2015 to 2020, bootcamp graduates could land well-paid jobs because every university graduate was already snapped up. That era has ended. Most companies no longer hire from bootcamps, and apprenticeships exist only in small pockets. Graduates of top schools such as MIT, Caltech, Harvard, Waterloo, and Imperial are still recruited, but they receive fewer competing offers, and graduates of mid-tier schools face a harder market. He tells of a self-taught engineer with five years of experience in SRE and infrastructure work who could not find a job for a year after being laid off and is now considering changing fields or working independently. Large employers use degree requirements to filter applicants because they already receive too many resumes. He also points out a less obvious advantage: degrees matter a great deal for visas and immigration, and that can pay off decades later.

How Orosz works with AI himself

Most of Orosz's time goes to research and writing. He also builds software for his business, including a backend for group subscriptions, customer support tooling, and now a self-service company signup flow he had long put off. He describes it as simple CRUD on a database running on infrastructure like Render. Where he would once have bought a SaaS product, he now prefers to build. He uses Codex with GPT-5.5 and Claude Code, and he rotates through Cursor and Factory. AI makes building less intimidating and makes him more ambitious, but it has not tempted him back into software full-time, because he loves the human connection of his current work.

He uses no AI in his writing. He experimented with having it generate an article in his voice from notes, and he did not think it sounded like him; it felt artificial. More importantly, for him writing is thinking. Many of his most popular social media posts are ideas that surfaced while he was revisiting a topic for the third time. He compares himself to a Hacker News commenter's observation that the best photography YouTubers are working photographers who post occasionally. His main job is research: staying close to engineers he knows. That, he says, is how he noticed Meta's decline, when 10 to 15 long-time contacts there started "sounding the alarm bell." He uses deep research heavily, yet he does not feel he works less. He simply researches more than he ever would have.

He accepts that some skills will weaken. His ability to search the web manually may decline, but that was drudgery, and he still checks deep research's sources, especially when they lean heavily on Reddit. His hand-coding fluency will probably degrade, and he is fine with that. His general rule is that any skill you delegate to AI will decline, so decide whether you can accept that.

Advice for specific situations

For a QA engineer in banking who is thinking of quitting to study computer science full-time, Orosz's advice is to future-proof from inside the job. Propose a part-time AI experiment, even an internal tool. Leaders currently want more AI use, so this is usually a win-win, and the worst case is that you learn something like RAG. He praises Google for encouraging this. A full-time degree may lag the industry during a shift this big, and hands-on work is the best way to learn. Changing jobs is harder, and side projects work only if something genuinely motivates you.

For a student whose classmates are not very motivated, he suggests finding people elsewhere: other classes, online communities, or other teams at work. He recalls being one of only two coders at his high school, and the difference between a bank where colleagues were kind but not passionate about technology and Skype, where everyone was.

For a parent whose son wants to become a game developer, Orosz says nobody knows what five years will bring. He offers a construction analogy. Anyone can buy professional tools and materials and learn from YouTube, yet professional builders still have work because most people would rather hire them. He expects tech to work the same way, with DIY growing alongside a lasting professional path. The games released in ten years will come from startups or AAA studios hiring graduates and people who build games on the side. He points to his episode with Jonas Tyroller, whose game sold a million copies with a two-person team and who has built games on the side for many years. His advice: encourage the son to start building games now.

For engineers in the EU choosing between aiming higher and staying put, he notes that staying put can be sensible in a volatile market. But this market is not 2023's, when layoffs were everywhere and nobody was hiring. Many companies are hiring now, which may create chances to move up a tier to more autonomy and more AI exposure. Staying at a slow-moving company could leave you with zero years of the experience that will be in demand. He recommends staying opportunistic: talk to your network, do not ignore recruiters, and remember you can always turn down an offer.

On using AI to learn, his view is that AI only helped him when he already wanted to learn something. It gives you one fewer excuse, but it will not make learning easier without motivation, and books, videos, and building things still matter.

The Pragmatic Engineer as a business

Orosz avoids giving exact income figures because every time he did, he was flooded with requests for coaching and financial advice. He shares scale instead. In the first year he had about 2,700 paying subscribers, and today there are more than 10,000, plus podcast sponsors. For comparison, his best year at Uber in the Netherlands paid roughly €288,000 (about $320–330k at the time), of which about €120k was base salary, with a bonus of roughly €26–30k and the rest in equity. He started with modest expectations based on Lenny's roughly $300k. In the first week he had 100 paying subscribers, about $10,000 paid upfront. At six weeks he had 1,000, roughly $100,000 a year at the original $100 price. Within four or five months his annual run rate exceeded his best Uber total compensation. He then stopped watching the numbers for about two years and focused on writing one good article at a time. He credits his 15 or so years as a developer, and the connections he made, with making the business possible. He says he is not attached to it: if interest faded, he could live with that as long as he had helped people. He has also chosen to leave important pieces outside the paywall even though it costs revenue.

Because he took no VC funding, he says he has no obligation to expand. His plans are to make the Pragmatic Summit a regular event, ideally with one in the US and one in Europe, perhaps London; to grow his small team slowly; and to do more ambitious research, including into "boring" but important industries such as utilities.

Two articles that caused trouble

Asked whether anyone has tried to sue him, Orosz describes two articles. The first, about the Dutch neobank bunq, he never published. In his first year, he was upset by bunq's use of intelligence tests before technical interviews, tweeted about it, and received evidence-backed stories from unhappy employees. His draft read like a hit piece. At his editor's suggestion, he sent it to bunq, then slept on it. He asked what it would achieve: bunq would only get defensive, and the article contained nothing positive about a growing business that employs people. He also heard from someone who had found bunq tough but called it a crucial stepping stone. That person could not get a Dutch visa sponsor anywhere else, was hired by bunq, and now works at Facebook. Orosz deleted the draft and decided to focus on writing about what works. Journalists later asked him for the details, and he declined.

The second article was about Pollen, the events company. Orosz had briefly noted in a layoffs roundup that Pollen handled its layoffs poorly. At an all-hands, the CEO reportedly dismissed his newsletter as a small publication with an agenda, not the BBC or Panorama. Angered, Orosz wrote a full investigation into unpaid salaries, canceled health insurance, and what he describes as a deliberate double charge of customers disguised as an outage. When he sent it to Pollen, the company called various claims libelous, and he self-censored parts of the piece. The BBC later reported on the company and made a documentary, which Orosz says he helped with. The experience convinced him that investigative journalism is not for him.

Trends, the book, and favorite tools

Orosz spots trends when several people start saying the same thing. Over the Christmas break he used Claude Code heavily and was impressed. He then researched whether others felt the same, and that led to his early article arguing that coding by hand is over. Some readers called him an AI shill, but he says his own experience plus the evidence he gathered supported the piece.

He considers The Software Engineer's Guidebook surprisingly durable, because it contained little about coding and its non-technical parts, such as understanding the business and software architecture, have become more relevant. He will revisit it once real best practices for AI-era engineering emerge, which he expects to take a while.

His favorite technical books are John Ousterhout's A Philosophy of Software Design, which he values as the only book comparing architecture approaches across groups of students and for its ideas of deep and shallow modules, and Kent Beck's Tidy First?, for how crisp every idea is. Among products, he names Granola for meeting notes as an example of what an AI-enhanced product can be, and Perplexity's deep research, which he finds the fastest of its kind and wishes Google Search resembled. He notes he pays for both and has no affiliation, and he does not care for Perplexity's newer push into areas like its "computer" product.

What will stay the same

Asked what will not change in five years, Orosz bets there will be as much demand as today, and he hopes more, for true professionals who care about the craft. He describes them as people who know where the industry stands, have used most of the tools, understand their trade-offs, and "have no ego and just choose the right one for the right job," whether for writing code, testing, deploying, or verifying correctness. He compares them to an architect who looks at a building and sees load-bearing concerns and earthquake resistance where a pedestrian sees pretty windows. Such people can change systems confidently, sometimes with scaffolding and sometimes without. He hopes AI will not scare those people away, and he suggests it may instead drive out those who never cared about software and were only there to make a quick buck.